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I. INTRODUCTION
"The jury, or at least the judge, should know how far errors in recollec-
tion are normal and how they vary under different conditions."
J. McKeen Cattell'
A FEW YEARS ago, Nevada politician Robert Seale took off in
his Cessna 410 heading for a campaign tour of rural Nevada
with his wife, two other candidates for office, and a member of
the campaign staff. Seale had owned the plane for several
months, noticing during that time that the left engine was diffi-
cult to start. Despite these difficulties, Seale continued to use
the plane.
On the day of the Cessna 410 crash, Seale experienced a left-
engine out on take-off. He turned the plane around, located an
open field, and attempted to land. Unfortunately, the plane ran
into a hidden gully as it landed and crashed. Seale's wife was
killed, and he and the other passengers were severely injured.
Initially, Seale testified that he had feathered the propeller, a
procedure necessary to maintain altitude and maneuverability
during an engine out situation. Pictures of the cockpit taken at
the scene, however, showed the throttle still in full open posi-
tion. Did Seale deliberately lie to protect himself? Or did he
honestly "remember" that he had, indeed, feathered the propel-
ler? If so, did his desire to protect himself from any blame for
his wife's death and his friends' injuries fuel his "memory" that he
I John McKeen Cattell, Measurements of the Accuracy of Recollection, in SCIENCE
761-766 (1895).
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followed proper procedure? Or did the ingrained knowledge of
the routine procedure for engine out on take off make him as-
sume that is what he did?
Mechanics who worked on the plane testified that they had
checked the engine and had it running correctly. Had they? Or
did they "remember"in hindsight that they had actually done what
hindsight told them they should have?
Ground witnesses testified that they heard the engine stall
and sputter before take off. Did they? Or did hindsight tell
them it must have been that way?
Other passengers testified that they had asked Seale about the
safety of the engine and that he had reassured them. Did hind-
sight and the motivations associated with their liability suits
cause them to "remember" falsely? Or did they actually ask Seale
about the engine before the crash?
Modern memory research would suggest that although false
testimony may be deliberate, it is more often sincere. Motiva-
tions and biases such as those alluded to in the Seale case perva-
sively influence memory such that witnesses sincerely believe the
false reports they provide in court. They become, in effect,
"honest liars."
Notwithstanding the potential for error in memory, American
courts rely extensively, and in some cases exclusively, on wit-
nesses' recollections to provide the 'facts" of the cases before
them. These recollections range from the details of a particular
event to an event's many antecedents and consequences. They
run the gamut of recollections-from those of the observer's
own thoughts or behavior to the statements and behaviors of
others, and from physical events to documents and conversa-
tions, among m.any other things. They refer not only to overt
observable behaviors, objects, and events, but also to pertinent
motives, intentions, or other interpretations of what happened
and why. In other words, witnesses must testify about virtually
all aspects of everyday life, from the more usual everyday activi-
ties leading up to the target event or the more unusual to trau-
matic, acute incidents that lead to trial. Indeed, it is hard to
imagine a trial without witnesses.
In fact, everyday life would not be possible without memory.
But memory has a darker side, fraught with forgetting, errors
and distortions. We forget things sometimes almost as soon as
they happen. We remember things that did not actually happen
as if they did, and we remember things that did happen incor-
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rectly. Daniel L. Schacter 2 referred to this duality of vast capac-
ity and susceptibility to error as memory's 'fragile power," and
offered a list of memory's foibles, which he termed the "seven
sins of memory."
Just as the biblical seven deadly sins (pride, anger, envy,
greed, gluttony, lust, and sloth) occur frequently in daily life, so
do the seven sins of memory. These can be broadly divided into
three categories 3 including sins of forgetting (either temporary or
permanent inability to remember), distortion or inaccuracy (re-
membering incorrectly), and persistence (pathological intrusive
remembrances, or information we cannot forget even though
we wish we could).
A. WHY IS WITNESS MEMORY A PROBLEM?
"[Memory, whether we like it or not, is one more source of fiction ...
The "sins" of the darker side of memory are often innocuous
and merely inconvenient, such as difficulties remembering
where we put our keys, the name of a former colleague, or what
movie we saw last. Other "sins" are more serious, such as those
experienced by elderly people when they forget to make an im-
portant appointment, forget to take necessary drugs, or even
forget to eat.
Memory errors in court may sometimes be similarly unimpor-
tant. However, the outcome of a case will often turn on the tes-
timony of witnesses-sometimes on the testimony of a single
witness. In such instances, where witness testimony may replace
or outweigh physical evidence, it is crucial for jurors to have the
means to evaluate its accuracy.
Jurors are clearly aware that a witness may consciously
deceive, choosing to falsely report their memories of relevant
facts. They consider any vested interest the witness may have in
the outcome of the case and try to monitor the testimony of fact
or expert witness for evidence of truth or deceit. Unfortunately,
research on detection of deception has shown that few people,
including jurors, judges, attorneys, psychologists, or other pro-
fessionals and laypersons, are able to reliably detect deception.
2 DANIEL L. SCHACTER, SEARCHING FOR MEMORY: THE BRAIN, THE MIND, AND
THE PAST 7-8 (1996); Daniel L. Schacter, The Seven Sins of Menory: Insights from
Psychology and Cognitive Neuroscience, 54 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 182 (1999).
3 Schacter, The Seven Sins of Memory, supra note 2, at 182.
4 Paul J. Eakin, Autobiography, Identity, and the Fictions, in MEMORY, BRAIN, &
BELIEF 290, 291 (D.L. Schacter & Elaine Scarry eds., 2000).
20011 1429
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
More than twenty years of research has shown that the average
accuracy in judging truthfulness rarely exceeds 60% (chance
performance being 50%), with some falling below chance
ability.5
Alone, jurors' inabilities to detect deception represent a sub-
stantial problem for evaluation of witness accuracy. Memory re-
search, however, has clearly demonstrated that false reports
come not only from false intentions, but also from false recollec-
tions, the latter arguably being a more frequent source of error.
Unfortunately, whereas distortion and inaccuracy in memory is
commonplace, judges, attorneys, and jurors are generally una-
ware of the frequency and causes of such honest errors. Thus,
jurors suffer from a dual problem in evaluation of accuracy (as
opposed to honesty) in witness memory. That is, jurors lack un-
derstanding of the fact that memory is much more fallible than
they think, and lack understanding of when and under what cir-
cumstances memory is most likely to be inaccurate. In other
words, jurors both underestimate the need to try to evaluate the
potential for honest failures of memory and lack understanding of
how to make such an evaluation if they know they should.
To summarize then, witness memory is a problem because:
(1) Witness testimony includes a host of honest errors of
memory, and
(2) There are many features of the event, the parties in-
volved, or the witness that are known to reduce witness accuracy,
sometimes to the point that virtually no witness can accurately
describe the event or the parties at issue.
However,
(3) Jurors underestimate the potential for honest errors of
memory; and, therefore,
(4) Jurors tend to believe that witness testimony (particularly
that of uninterested witnesses) is accurate, although
(5) Jurors do not accurately understand the conditions under
which witness testimony is most and least likely to be accurate;
and, therefore,
(6) Jurors are unable to distinguish reliably between accurate
and inaccurate witnesses.
Nevertheless,




(7) Jurors frequently decide a case solely on the basis of eye-
witness testimony (for example, convicting a criminal defendant
solely on the basis of a single eyewitness's identification), and
thus,
(8) Jurors often make erroneous decisions on the basis of tes-
timony from inaccurate witnesses.
Documented sources of error in eyewitness testimony com-
bined with jurors' tendencies to over-believe the witnesses are
widely considered by social scientists to account for a large num-
ber of erroneous verdicts. This conclusion has been best sup-
ported by studies of wrongful convictions of defendants proven
innocent by evidence uncovered after trial. Eyewitness identifi-
cations of perpetrators, for example, are largely responsible for
many false convictions.
One systematic investigation of various sources of miscarriages
of justice has singled out mistaken identification as the number
one source of error,6 being responsible for 52% of the wrongful
convictions identified. More recently, DNA analyses have freed
at least sixty-two wrongfully convicted prisoners.7 Eyewitnesses
convicted the vast majority of these prisoners largely on the basis
of mistaken identification.' Gary Wells9 found that of forty ex-
onerations, mistaken identification was involved in thirty-six of
the cases involving fifty separate eyewitnesses mistakenly identi-
fying the defendants. Barry Scheck's1 ° analysis of the full sixty-
two cases identified fifty-two cases involving mistaken identifica-
tions by seventy-seven confident, but mistaken, eyewitnesses.
While there are many sources of error in actual witness mem-
ory, jurors generally show three forms of misunderstanding or
misuse of eyewitness testimony. First, they tend to over-believe
eyewitness testimony, assuming greater-than-realistic accuracy.
Second, they misunderstand the variables that affect accuracy,
and thus do not adjust their judgments of accuracy properly.
Finally, they cannot discriminate between accurate and inaccu-
6 Arye Rattner, Convicted but Innocent: Wrongful Conviction and the Criminal Justice
System, 12 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 283, 289 (1988).
7 BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND
OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 73 (2000).
8 EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., CONVICTED BYJURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE
STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TIAL 24
(1996); Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations for
Lineups and Photospreads, 22 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 603, 605 (1998).
9 See Wells, supra note 8, at 606-608.
10 See SCHECK, supra note 7, at 73.
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rate witnesses. These failings are documented in a number of
sources. 
1
1. The Special Issue of Witness Confidence
The issue of the relationship between witness confidence and
accuracy is particularly important since confidence is the single
cue to accuracy jurors rely on most. There is widespread belief
(among college students, jurors, police officers, trial lawyers,
and even the U.S. Supreme Court) that witness accuracy and
witness confidence are highly correlated.12
Given this widespread belief, it should not be surprising that
there is substantial evidence that jurors (and mock jurors) sub-
stantially rely on witness confidence to judge the accuracy of the
witness's testimony." Further, jurors tend to give more weight
to the confidence of the witness than to factors that are more
predictive of accuracy. Wells, R.C. Lindsay, and their colleagues
have demonstrated this in a series of studies.14
I I See generally Kenneth A. Deffenbacher & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Do Jurors Share a
Common Understanding Concerning Eyewitness Behavior, 6 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 15, 26
(1982); ELIZABETH F. LoFTus & JAMES M. DOYLE, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL
AND CRIMINAL 75 (1987); Peter N. Shapiro & Steven Penrod, Meta-Analysis of Fa-
cial Identification Studies, 100 PSYCHOL. BULL. 139 (1986); GARY L. WELLS & ELIZA-
BETH F. LoFrus, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 87 (1984);
Kipling D. Williams et al., Eyewitness Evidence and Testimony, in HANDBOOK OF PSY-
CHOLOGY AND LAW 141 (Dorothy K. Kagehiro & W. S. Laufer eds., 1992).
12 John C. Brigham & Melissa P. WolfsKeil, Opinions of Attorneys and Law En-
forcement Personnel on the Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications, 7 LAw & HUM. BEHAV.
337, 344 (1983); Deffenbacher & Loftus, supra note 11, at 19-21; Manson v.
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114-116 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200
(1972); A. Daniel Yarmey & Hazel P. Jones, Is the Psychology of Eyewitness Identifica-
tion a Matter of Common Sense, in EVALUATING WITNESS EVIDENCE 13 (S. Lloyd-Bos-
tock & B.R. Clifford eds., 1983).
13 John C. Brigham & Robert K. Bothwell, The Ability of Prospective Jurors to Esti-
mate the Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications, 7 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 19, 28 (1983);
S.G. Fox & H.A. Walters, The Impact of General Versus Specific Expert Testimony and
Eyewitness Confidence Upon Mock JurorJudgment, 10 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 215, 224-25
(1986); R.C. Lindsay et al., Can People Detect Eyewitness Identification Accuracy Within
and Across Situations? 66J. APPL. PSYCHOL. 79 (1981); Gary L. Wells & Michael R.
Leippe, How Do Triers of Fact Infer the Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications? Using
Memory for Peripheral Detail Can Be Misleading, 66 J. APPL. PSYCHOL. 682 (1981).
14 R. C. Lindsay et al., Mock Juror Belief of Accurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses: A
Replication and Extension, 13 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 336-37 (1989); Lindsay,
supra note 13, at 79; Gary L. Wells et al., The Tractability of Eyewitness Confidence and
Its Implications for Triers of Fact, 66J. APPL. PSYCHOL. 688 (1981); Wells & Leippe,
supra note 13, at 682; Gary L. Wells et al., Accuracy, Confidence, andJuror Perceptions
in Eyewitness Identification, 64J. APPL. PSYCHOL. 440 (1979); Gary L. Wells et al.,
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Across all of these studies, mock jurors were unable to dis-
criminate between accurate and inaccurate witnesses. Witness
confidence was a strong predictor of perceived accuracy, whereas:
(1) confidence was not actually significantly related to accuracy,
and (2) mock juror perceptions of witness accuracy were not related
to actual witness accuracy. In fact, juror perceptions of witness
confidence accounted for as much as 50% of the variance in
juror judgments of accuracy. Brian Cutler and his colleagues 15
found that out of ten witness variables known to affect actual
accuracy, only confidence predicted perceptions of accuracy
and verdicts. Thus, it is clear that witness confidence has a dra-
matic influence on jurors' perceptions of witness accuracy.
It is equally clear that confidence is not a good predictor of
witness accuracy. Recent reviews and meta-analyses of the litera-
ture on the relationship between eyewitness confidence and ac-
curacy have uniformly concluded that witness confidence is only
modestly (at best) related to accuracy-either between or within
subjects. 6
Effects of Expert Psychological Advice on Human Performance in Judging the Validity of
Eyewitness Testimony, 4 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 275, 282-83 (1980).
15 Brian L. Cutler et al., Juror Sensitivity to Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 14
LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 185, 188-190 (1990); Brian L. Cutler et al., Juror Decision
Making in Eyewitness Identification Cases, 12 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 41, 48-51 (1988).
16 Brian H. Bornstein & Douglas J. Zickafoose, "I Know I Know It, I Know I Saw
It": The Stability of the Confidence-Accuracy Relationship Across Domains, 5 J. Exp.
PSYCHOL. APPL. 76 (1999); Robert K. Bothwell et al., Correlation of Eyewitness Accu-
racy and Confidence: Optimality Hypothesis Revisited, 72J. APPL. PSYCHOL. 691 (1987);
Peter Juslin et al., Calibration and Diagnosticity of Confidence in Eyewitness Identifica-
tion: Comments on What Can Be Inferred from the Low Confidence-Accuracy Correlation,
22J. Exp. PSYCHOL. LEARN. MEM. COGN. 1304 (1996); Saul M. Kassin et al., The
"General Acceptance" of Psychological Research on Eyewitness Testimony, 44 AM.
PSYCHOL. 1089 (1989); Saul M. Kassin, et al., The Accuracy-Confidence Correlation in
Eyewitness Testimony: Limits and Extensions of the Retrospective Self-Awareness Effect, 61
J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCHOL. 698 (1991); C. A. Elizabeth Luus & Gary L. Wells, The
Malleability of Eyewitness Confidence: Co-Witness and Perseverance Effects, 79 J. APPL.
PSYCHOL. 714 (1994); Jennifer Nolan & Roslyn Markham, The Accuracy-Confidence
Relationship in an Eyewitness Task: Anxiety as a Modifier, 12 APPL. COGN. PSYCHOL. 43
(1998); Nils Olsson, A Comparison of Correlation, Calibration, and Diagnosticity as
Measures of the Confidence-Accuracy Relationship in Witness Identification, 85 J. APPL.
PSYCHOL. 504 (2000); Timothy J. Perfect & Tara S. Hollins, Predictive Feeling of
Knowing Judgements and Postdictive Confidence Judgements in Eyewitness Memory and
General Knowledge, 10 APPL. COGN. PSYCHOL. 371 (1996); TimothyJ. Perfect et al.,
Accuracy of Confidence Ratings Associated with General Knowledge and Eyewitness Mem-
ory, 78J. APPL. PSYCHOL. 144 (1993);J. Don Read et al., The Unconscious Transfer-
ence Effect: Are Innocent Bystanders Ever Misidentified, 4 APPL. COGN. PSYCHOL. 3
(1990); Michael D. Robinson & Joel T. Johnson, How Not to Enhance the Confidence-
Accuracy Relation: The Detrimental Effects of Attention to the Identification Process, 22
LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 409, 410 (1998); Vicki L. Smith et al., Eyewitness Accuracy and
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AN COMMERCE
There is also some evidence that eyewitness confidence is, in
part, a stable individual difference variable. Looking at accu-
racy-confidence relationships within individual subjects, Evan
Brown, Kenneth Deffenbacher, and Sturgill17 found that a given
eyewitness's confidence when correct was highly correlated with
that person's confidence when incorrect. In contrast, however,
a given eyewitness's confidence when correct was not signifi-
cantly higher than that same person's confidence when incor-
rect. In other words, a person's confidence in his/her own
eyewitness testimony seems to be determined more by whether
(s)he is a confident person than by the accuracy of his/her
testimony.'
To summarize, jurors are strongly affected by the confidence
of the witness. Such that they are very likely to believe a confi-
dent witness. Unfortunately, overall, confident witnesses are not
reliably more accurate than less confident witnesses.
It is important to note that the research documenting these
effects was conducted with eyewitness accounts of crimes, per-
sons, and events that did not directly involve them. Thus, the
witnesses were uniformly free from any personal involvement or
motivation that might promote false accounts. Even in such cir-
cumstances, witness confidence was unrelated to accuracy.
a. Procedures that Cause Distortion in Memory Also
Enhance Confidence
Confidence in our memories is dependent on many factors,
not just the validity of our memories. Unfortunately, many
things that affect confidence also carry great potential to cause
distortion in memory. For example, most of the common pro-
cedures used to aid memory retrieval or to prepare for trial have
been shown both to cause distortion in memory and simultane-
ously to enhance witness confidence. These include such com-
mon techniques as hypnosis, guided imagery, repeated
Confidence: Within-Versus Between-Subjects Correlations, 74 J. APPL. PSYCHOL. 356
(1989); Siegfried L. Sporer et al., Choosing, Confidence, and Accuracy: A Meta-Analy-
sis of the Confidence-Accuracy Relation in Eyewitness Identification Studies, 118 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 315 (1995); Gary L. Wells & Donna M. Murray, Eyewitness Confidence, in
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES, 155 (Gary L. Wells & Eliza-
beth F. Loftus eds., 1984).
17 Evan Brown et al., Memory for Faces and the Circumstances of Encounter, 62 J.
APPL. PSYCHOL. 311 (1977).
Is Perfect & Hollins, supra note 16, at 371.
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questioning, preparation for cross-examination, and many
others, as shown in the sections below.
2. Summary: The Problem with Witness Memory
Research using varying methods has converged on the twin
conclusions that: (1) witness memory is subject to many sources
of error and distortion, and (2) empirical findings regarding
factors that actually affect eyewitness accuracy are often inconsis-
tent with lay assumptions about the factors that influence eyewit-
ness performance and thus with the criteria jurors actually use
to evaluate witness accuracy."9 Witnesses tend to use the least
accurate cue (confidence) and remain unaffected (or minimally
affected) by other cues that more strongly predict witness accu-
racy. Thus, there is clear evidence thatjurors possess neither an
adequate nor accurate understanding of witness memory and
what may affect accuracy.
It is this conflict between how memory actually works and how
jurors believe it works that has led to the rise in use of memory
experts in court. Expert testimony on witness memory is useful
for the jury in that it gives them a more accurate basis for evalua-
tion of the accuracy of witness testimony. Expert testimony is
also useful for the explanation of the implications of failures in
memory. For example, an expert may explain the impact of
trauma, such as rape or other extreme violence, on memory to
help jurors understand the implications of temporary or perma-
nent lapses of memory of the victim. Finally, memory experts
may be useful for the attorney in preparing motions to exclude
testimony based on issues of probable witness inaccuracy or for
preparation for cross-examination of a witness.
The remainder of this article will provide an explication of
how memory works. In doing so, it will explain common causes
19 Brigham & Bothwell, supra note 13, at 20; Brigham & WolfsKeil, supra note
12, at 346-47; Cutler et al., juror Sensitivity to Eyewitness Identification Evidence, supra
note 15, at 190; Cutler et al., Juror Decision Making in Eyewitness Identification Cases,
supra note 15, at 53; Deffenbacher & Loftus, supra note 11, at 24; Michael R.
Leippe et al., Crime Seriousness as a Determinant of Accurarcy in Eyewitness Identifica-
tion, 63 J. APPL. PSYCHOL. 345 (1978); Elizabeth Noon & Clive R. Hollin, Lay
Knowledge of Eyewitness Behaviour: A British Survey, 1 APPL. COGN. PSYCHOL. 143
(1987); Gary L. Wells, How Adequate is Human Intuition for Judging Eyewitness Testi-
mony, in EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 256 (Gary L. Wells
& Elizabeth F. Loftus eds., 1984); Gary L. Wells, The Eyewitness, in THE PSYCHOL-
OGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE 43 (Saul M. Kassin & L.S. Wrightsman
eds., 1985); WELLS & LoFrus, supra note 11, at 87; Williams et al., supra note 11,
at 141; Yarmey & Jones, supra note 12, at 13.
20011 1435
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
of memory failure and distortion and identify typical categories of
errors that follow from specific causal processes, providing exam-
ples pertinent to the legal system, particularly aviation litigation,
as it proceeds. Finally, the article will end with a discussion of
how memory researchers can be helpful as consultants or expert
witnesses. Throughout the article, the discussion will be con-
fined to sources of unintentional errors.
The discussion of the foibles of witness memory will be based
on principles of memory discovered over the full history of
memory research. Thus, some research citations will not per-
tain specifically to witness memory, although the principles by
which memory operates are constant and will apply unchanged
to analogous witnessing circumstances.
Further, much of the scientific literature dealing with witness
memory has addressed issues relevant to criminal trials, with the
greatest emphasis on factors related to accuracy in identification
of perpetrators of crime and, to a lesser extent, emphasis on
factors related to reports of the criminal events. More recently,
extensive literature has developed concerning the potential for
trauma-induced loss or "repression" of memories and the poten-
tial for memory distortion induced by common techniques or
processes for "recovery" of those memories, particularly in cases
concerning child sex abuse or rape. Finally, a small but growing
body of literature has begun to examine factors determining the
accuracy of conversational memory-an area vitally important
to civil trials in particular, and an area where expert testimony is
beginning to appear. Thus, many of our research examples will
come from these areas of witness memory research.
II. FUNDAMENTALS OF MEMORY PROCESSES
Modern scientific theories of memory suggest that our mem-
ory system operates in three general stages: (1) Acquisition (or
Encoding), when information is first transferred into our mem-
ory system; (2) Storage, while information is maintained in mem-
ory over a period of time; and (3) Retrieval, when information is
located and retrieved from storage. At each stage, memory may
be compromised by failure or inaccuracy.
III. ACQUISITION/ENCODING
At the acquisition stage, information about an event is per-
ceived by the observer and processed for storage in memory.
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The popular "modal model" of memory2° proposes that three sub-
systems of memory operate at the acquisition stage. Informa-
tion moves between them through active "control processes" such
as focusing of attention, rehearsal, and thinking, but may be dis-
rupted or distorted in the process.
A. SENSORY REGISTERS
The first stage of encoding (entry into memory) is called the
"sensory register, "which perceives information in its original phys-
ical form just long enough for us to determine if some aspect of
input is worthy of further attention. Visual information in the
sensory register decays within less than a second, and auditory
information decays within a few seconds. At this stage, informa-
tion may be lost through disruption of sensory processes, result-
ing in failure to ever encode the information or failure to
encode it clearly. For example, a witness may fail to encode some
aspect of an event in sensory memory (either clearly or at all)
because at the time it occurred something interfered with the op-
portunity to observe clearly.
B. SHORT-TERM (OR WORKING) MEMORY
Given that the observer has had the opportunity to observe,
the information may or may not enter short-term memory
before it is lost. Information from the sensory registers enters
short-term memory if and when it becomes the focus of atten-
tion. Those sensory impressions that do not engage attention
are lost within a few seconds. In turn, information that does
enter short-term memory will decay within thirty seconds unless
sustained by continued attention, rehearsal, and elaboration.
Those features that do engage attention, rehearsal, and elabora-
tion are more likely to enter long-term memory.
C. LONG-TERM MEMORY
The "modal model' of memory21 suggests that information
from short-term memory enters long-term memory through
"elaborative rehearsal-the process of thinking about the infor-
mation and relating it to other information already in long-term
memory. If elaborative rehearsal is prevented by distraction or
20 R.C. Atkinson & R.M. Shiffrin, Human Memory: A Proposed System and Its Con-
trol Processes, in 2 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING AND MOTIVATION 89 (K.W. Spence
&J.T. Spence eds., 1968).
21 See id. at 89-195.
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other factors, information in short-term memory will be lost.2
With greater interference or distraction associated with faster
and greater information lOSS.
23
Some controversy exists concerning the exact nature of the
relationship between the three memory systems, and the se-
quence in which information is processed. For example, there
has been increasing attention to the "Parallel Distributed Process-
ing" model of Stephan Lewandowsky and Bennet Murdock. 4
The model suggests that information is processed simultane-
ously in several different parts of the total memory system. Sen-
sory impressions, for example, must engage information in long-
term memory for recognition of an object to occur in short-term
memory. However, despite competing theoretical perspectives
regarding the exact nature of the interaction between memory
systems and the exact processes by which memory operates, re-
search has converged in identification of factors that tend to
compromise memory through failures of encoding.
These failures include both failures to encode the informa-
tion at all and inaccuracy in encoding. If the information does
reach long-term storage, memory may still be inaccurate. That
is, if the information is not encoded accurately, it will not be
later retrieved accurately. Thus, much general memory re-
search, and specifically witness memory research, has focused on
factors that may interfere with the accuracy of encoding. Gener-
ally, three types of factors have been investigated: (1) the nature
of events witnessed; (2) the conditions under which they are wit-
nessed (lighting, for example); and (3) characteristics of the wit-
ness (either enduring characteristics or temporary states).
Each of these factors tends to affect encoding through either:
(a) the ability to clearly see or perceive the event; (b) effects on
the amount of attention and therefore, information processing
capacity devoted to the event itself or to the particular aspect of
the event (such as a central party versus peripheral actors or
characteristics of the setting); or (c) biasing the interpretation of
what is witnessed, and therefore what one later remembers.
22 Lloyd R. Peterson & Margaret J. Peterson, Short-Term Retention of Individual
Verbal Items, 58J. Exp. Soc. PSYCHOL. 193, 197-198. (1959).
23 Judith S. Reitman, Without Surreptitious Rehearsal, Information in Short-Term
Memory Decays, 13J. VERB. LEARN. & VERB. BEHAV. 365, 375 (1974).
24 Stephan Lewandowsky & Bennet B. Murdock, Memory for Serial Order, 96
PSYCHOL. REv. 25, 51 (1989).
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IV. FAILURES OF ACQUISITION/ENCODING
A. FAILURES OF PERCEPTION
1. Failures of Opportunity to Observe
The Importance of Clarity of Perception. Intuition would tell us
that anything affecting a witness's opportunity to observe the
events in question would affect accuracy. To the extent one re-
members an event at all, one will at best remember only what
was originally witnessed. Thus, it follows without question that if
one is unable to see or hear clearly at the time the event is wit-
nessed, one will be unable to remember it any more clearly later
on. Indeed, the U. S. Supreme Court has accepted this asser-
tion as a criterion for judging eyewitness reliability.25
The eyewitness literature has documented negative effects on
witness accuracy stemming from factors compromising either
the opportunity or ability to observe clearly. These include physi-
cal features of the environment, such as noise or other acoustical
interference, or factors compromising vision such as poor or
sudden changes in lighting, obstructions, and distance between
the observer and the event in question. Also included are fea-
tures of persons or objects being observed, including a perpetrator's
obstructing hats, clothing, or disguise.26
Important observer factors including age, degree of visual, ol-
factory, auditory or tactile sensory loss, or temporary incapaci-
ties such as extreme stress, blindfolding, drug or alcohol use,
can also affect accuracy through ability to observe.
25 See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972) (listing factors bearing on
whether a line-up identification procedure was overly suggestive).
26 Brian L. Cutler et al., The Reliability of Eyewitness Identifications: The Role of
System and Estimator Variables, 11 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 223 (1987); K. E. Patterson
& A. D. Baddeley, When Face Recognition Fails, 3 J. Exp. PSVCHOL. HUM. LEARN. &
MEM. 406, 416 (1977); Siegfried L. Sporer, Clothing as a Contextual Cue in Facial
Recognition, 17 GERMAN J. PSYCHOL. 183 (1993).
27 Brigham & Bothwell, supra note 13, at 19; Brigham & Wolfskiel, supra note
12, at 337; Cutler et al., Juror Sensitivity to Eyewitness Identification Evidence, supra
note 15, at 185; Cutler et al., Juror Decision Making in Eyewitness Identification Cases,
supra note 15, at 41; Deffenbacher & Loftus, supra note 11, at 15; Leippe et al.,
supra note 19, at 345; Noon & Hollin, supra note 19, at 143; Wells, How Adequate is
Human Intuition for Judging Eyewitness Testimony, supra note 19, at 242; Wells, The
Eyewitness, supra note 19, at 43; WELLS & LoFrus, supra note 11, at 87; Williams et
al., Eyewitness Evidence and Testimony, supra note 11, at 141; Yarmey & Jones, supra
note 12, at 13.
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2. Duration of Exposure
Clearly, the opportunity to observe any aspect of an event de-
pends in part on the length of time one can observe it. In part,
longer exposure allows time for sensory impressions to receive
adequate attention, and for the elaborative rehearsal necessary
to transfer information from short to long-term memory. Not
surprisingly, a number of studies in the basic memory literature
have shown memory to depend upon length of exposure. Simi-
larly, the eyewitness literature has shown that eyewitness reports
are more accurate after a longer exposure to a perpetrator or
event.
2 8
Duration of exposure may also be reflected in the frequency of
exposure. Just as memory for any information is facilitated by
frequent exposure or practice, so is memory for people and
events. The more often a person is seen, for example, the easier
it is to identify him.29
Opportunity to observe may be a problem in many respects
with regard to aviation accidents. Among them is the speed of
unfolding events. Many plane crashes happen rapidly with little
warning of the trouble that will cause the crash and with little
time between the onset of the problem and the crash. It may be
less than thirty seconds, for example, between an engine out on
take-off and contact with the ground. Regardless of the interval
between the first sign of trouble and the crash, however, events
tend to unfold rapidly with little opportunity to observe every
detail or to attend to any individual detail for a long period of
time.
Although one might expect that we ourselves (and the aver-
age witness) would be aware of the limitations of our memories
for what we never clearly perceived, this is often not the case. A
very large body of literature in the eyewitness identification area
has repeatedly shown that witnesses asked to identify the perpe-
trator of staged crimes or to describe other witnessed events do
so confidently, although the event itself provided little opportu-
nity to observe clearly. The poorest "witnessing conditions" (such
as poor lighting, brief exposure, great distance, perpetrator
wearing a hat, etc.), where the rate of accuracy of identification
of the perpetrator may be as low as 10%, nevertheless produce
28 Shapiro & Penrod, supra note 11, at 139.
29 Glenn S. Sanders & Dell H. Warnick, Some Conditions Maximizing Eyewitness
Accuracy: A Learning/Memomy Model, 2 BAS. APPL. Soc. PSYCHOL. 67 (1979).
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large numbers of witnesses willing to positively (but inaccu-
rately) identify a perpetrator with confidence.
We are equally unaware of the foibles of others'memories. For
example, Cutler, Penrod and Stuve,30 as described earlier, had
mock jurors observe one of a number of versions of the reenact-
ment of a trial. Ten factors that have been shown to affect eye-
witness accuracy were varied, including some regarding
opportunity to observe. Among these, only eyewitness confidence
affected mock juror judgments of witness accuracy, even though
the mock jurors did recall testimony regarding each of the nine
other factors that are known to compromise accuracy. Thus, the
damaging impact of poor witnessing conditions (and other bias-
ing influences) is underestimated by both the witnesses them-
selves and by the jurors who base their judgments on witness
testimony.
Similarly, factors that may compromise witness ability to ob-
serve may be unknown to both the witness and the jury, such as
age-related failures of attention, hearing, vision (both general
and color specific), or understanding. For example, ability to
taste declines rapidly with age, a fact unknown to most people.
B. "ABSENT-MINDEDNESS" AND FAILURES OF PROCESSING
Memory may also fail because of insufficient attention and/or
depth of processing. Schacter 3' referred to these deficiencies as
"absent-mindedness"- the second deadly sin of memory.
1. Memory Depends Upon Attention
It has been demonstrated in countless areas of research and is
uncontested among psychological researchers that: (a) memory
follows the focus of attention, such that what is most focused on
will be remembered better; and (b) that memory is a function of
the amount of attention devoted to a particular event or object.
Memory is better for any object or event where more attention is
devoted to it. This includes both the quality of attention (con-
centration, lack of distraction) and/or the duration of attention.
Events that are not attended to will be poorly remembered, if at
all. Further, features of an event that are not well attended to will
be remembered poorly. Thus, anything about the event, the
conditions under which it is witnessed, or the state of those wit-
30 Cutler et al., Juror Decision Making in Eyewitness Identification Cases, supra note
15, at 41.
31 Schacter, supra note 2, at 182.
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nessing it that reduces either the amount or the quality of atten-
tion to it will also impair memory.
The effects of the focus of witness attention have been
demonstrated in several ways in the eyewitness literature. For
example, Cutler, Penrod and Martens3 2 directly told subjects
what to attend to when exposed to a videotaped scene. Subjects
remembered the aspects they focused on better than those they
did not. Similarly, Reinitz, Morrissey and Demb33 directly
manipulated how much attention a subject could devote to a
face by subjecting some subjects to distraction while viewing the
face. They found that later recognition was superior for faces
originally viewed without distraction. Moreover, the importance
of attention has been further demonstrated through studies of
the impact of selective attention to some features of a scene and
not others.
2. Memory Depends Upon the Depth of Processing
Both the amount and quality of attention and the "depth of
processing' of information (referring to the amount of thinking
about it or analyzing it) will affect memory. Daniel Schacter34
considered shallow processing to be the second prong of the sin
of "absent-mindedness."
Information may be encoded on a continuum from shallow to
deep, with deeper processing producing better memory.3 5 Pre-
sumably, memory is enhanced because deeper processing may
lead to a stronger and more elaborate memory trace. The more
elaborate the memory trace, the more distinctive it becomes
from other memories, and therefore the more easily it can be
located. 6 Further, the more it is related to other information in
32 Cutler et al., supra note 26, at 223.
33 Mark T. Reinitz et al., Role of Attention in Face Encoding, 20 J. Exp. PSYCHOL.
LEARN. MEM. & COGN. 161, 166-167 (1994).
34 Schacter, supra note 2, at 182.
35 Fergus I. M. Craik & Robert S. Lockhart, Levels of Processing: A Framework for
Memory Research, 11 J. VERB. LEARN. & VERB. BEHAV. 671 (1972); Fergus L M. Craik
& Endel Tulving, Depth of Processing and the Retention of Words in Episodic Memory,
104J. Exp. PSYCHOL. GEN. 268 (1975); Lars-Goran Nilsson & Ronald L. Cohen,
Enrichment and Generation in the Recall of Enacted and Non-Enacted Instructions, in
PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF MEMORY: CURRENT RESEARCH AND ISSUES VOL. 1: MEMORY IN
EVERYDAY LIFE 427 (M.M. Gruneberg et al. eds., 1988); Daniel L. Schacter & S.M.
McGlynn, Implicit Memory: Effects of Elaboration Depend on Unitization, 102 Am. J.
PSYCHOL. 151 (1989).
36 Henry C. Ellis, Recent Developments in Human Memory, 7 THE G. STANLEY HALL
LECTURE SERIES 159 (B.P. Maksosky ed., 1987).
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memory, the more associations it forms and therefore the more
associative paths available to lead to retrieval.
a. Three Levels of Processing
Fergus Craik and Robert Lockhart37 identified three levels of
processing: sensory processing, intermediate processing, and
deep processing. Sensory processing involves the encoding of
the physical features of the information. Intermediate processing
involves recognition and labeling of information. Deep process-
ing involves semantic processing and assignment of meaning. It
includes elaborative rehearsal (where repetition maintains new
information in short-term memory longer, allowing greater op-
portunity for elaboration and entry into long-term memory),
thinking about what is observed and its meaning/interpretation,
and relating it to already stored knowledge. Deeper processing
has been consistently shown to produce better memory. It is for
this reason that recommendations for studying material for tests
include thinking about it and relating it to one's life and exper-
iences as a mnemonic device.
It is also for this reason that organization is such an excellent
facilitator of memory. Students are routinely advised to outline
material to study for tests. Material presented in an organized
manner is encoded better." It is more understandable and eas-
ier to encode at the deepest semantic level of processing. Fur-
ther, memory works by association, and associations are easier
among organized material. Finally, the act of organizing mate-
rial (as in outlining study materials) creates better understand-
ing and builds associative links.
b. "Absent-mindedness" and Shallow Processing
1. Specificity of Encoding
Among the hallmarks of shallow processing is lack of specific-
ity in encoding. That is, when information is processed without
adequate attention and elaboration, it tends to be encoded in
terms of its "gist." Often, the "gist" will consist of a category la-
bel, such as "talking," "having dinner," "running," "party," "man,"
"black man," "doctor," etc. In this way, much of the detail is lost.
37 Craik & Lockhart, Levels of Processing, supra note 35, at 671.
38 Gordon H. Bower et al., Hierarchical Retrieval Schemes in Recall of Categorical
Word Lists, 8J. VERB. LEARN. & VERB. BEHAV. 323, 340-341 (1969); George Man-
dler, Recognizing: The Judgment of Previous Occurrences, 87 PSYCHOL. REv. 252
(1980).
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Because little detail is encoded, features of a specific event,
object or person that might otherwise allow the observer to dis-
tinguish it from a similar other are not encoded. Thus, when
later asked to identify the specific person or object involved, or
to describe the details of the event or actions, the observer
cannot.
a. Cross Racial Identification
Failure in specificity of encoding is widely considered to be
responsible for difficulties in cross-racial identification. We may
simply engage in shallow categorical processing, attending to
the person's race and not to individual facial features. We may
also attend to the wrong features. Specific features we use to
distinguish between members of our own race (such as hair and
eye-color among Caucasians) do not succeed as well in distin-
guishing between members of another race (such as those
whose members are characterized predominantly by dark hair
and eyes). Thus, if we use the familiar strategies and encode
those features, we will not successfully distinguish members of
the other race.3 9 Cross-racial identification is less difficult for
those who spend more time with members of other races and
thus learn to use the correct features.4' For example, Dunning,
Li, and Malpass4' showed that Caucasians, who are avid basket-
ball fans, therefore having more exposure to African American
faces, have less difficulty with cross-racial identification.
b. "Change Blindness"
One of the more interesting illustrations of the importance of
the quality of attention, or depth and specificity in processing, is
39 Robert K. Bothwell et al., Cross-Racial Identification, 15 PERS. Soc. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 19 (1989); John C. Brigham & Roy S. Malpass, The Role of Experience and
Contact in the Recognition of Faces of Own-and Other-Race Persons, 41 J. Soc. ISSUES
139, 142-143 (1985); D. Dunning et al., Basketball Fandom and Cross-Race Iden-
tification Among European-Americans: Another Look at the Contact Hypothesis,
presented at the American Psychology-Law Society (Mar. 1998); Roy S. Malpass &
Jerome Kravitz, Recognition for Faces of Own and Other Race, 13 J. PERS. & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 330, 333 (1969); S.J. Platz & H.M. Hosch, Cross Racial/Ethnic Eyewitness
Identification: A Field Study, 18J. APPL. Soc. PSYCHOL. 972, 977 (1988).
40 John C. Brigham et al., Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications in a Field Setting, 42
J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCHOL. 673, 679 (1982);June E. Chance et al., Recognition Mem-
oiy for Infant Faces: An Analog of the Other-Race Effect, 24 BULL. PSYCHOL. Soc. 257
(1986); Platz & Hosch, supra note 39, at 972.
41 Dunning et al., supra note 39.
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the newly discovered phenomenon of "change blindness. "1 2
"Change blindness" refers to failure to detect changes in scenes or
objects under continuous observation.
In one study,43 for example, observers watched a movie in
which an actor performed a simple action. Unknown to the ob-
servers, one actor was replaced by another during the course of
the scene. Unbelievably, two thirds of the observers failed to
notice the change.
In an even more incredible demonstration of the phenome-
non, Daniel Simons and Daniel Levin' had a confederate on a
college campus ask subjects for directions. While the two were
conversing, the confederate was momentarily obscured by two
men who walked between them holding a door. Behind the
door, the confederate changed places with another, so that by
the time the door passed, the subject was confronted with a dif-
ferent person who continued the conversation as if he was the
original. Incredibly, less than half of the subjects noticed the
change! The authors45 suggested that change blindness might
be explained by "shallow encoding' of the features of a scene or
person, such that the "gist' of the scene is recorded without spe-
cific details. The "gist" of similar objects or the same object in a
slightly different position or configuration is the same. Thus,
detection of the difference between stimuli requires encoding
of the features or details that distinguish one from another.
Change blindness with respect to people may be an unrecog-
nized source of errors in eyewitness identifications. Imagine a
convenience store robbery in which the witness has a clear op-
portunity to observe a man entering a store, but does not notice
that a different man walks to the counter to rob the clerk. With a
clear memory of the person he did observe clearly, the witness
describes him to the police and later identifies that person as
the perpetrator of the robbery. In fact, some laboratory evi-
dence exists for this phenomenon.46 The authors found that
42 D.T. Levin & D.J. Simons, Failure to Detect Changes to Attended Objects in Motion
Pictures, 4 PSYCHOL. BULL. REV. 501 (1997).
43 See id.
44 Daniel J. Simons & Daniel T. Levin, Failure to Detect Changes to People During a
Real-World Interaction, 4 PSYCHOL. BULL. REV. 644 (1998).
45 See id.; see also DanielJ. Simons & Daniel T. Levin, Change Blindness, 1 TRENDS
IN COGN. Sci. 261 (1997).
46 David F. Ross et al., Unconscious Transference and Mistaken Identity: Wen a
Witness Misidentifies a Familiar but Innocent Person, 79 J. APPL. PSYCHOL. 918, 929
(1994).
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many witnesses to an assault confused the assailant and the by-
stander, thinking that they were the same person.
Change blindness may also provide an explanation for various
aviation, vehicular, or industrial accidents. A pilot may fail to
perceive crucial changes in gauges; a driver may fail to perceive
changes in location or motion of other vehicles; or a factory
worker may fail to perceive indications of danger on devices he
or she monitors for warning of trouble. Further, genuine lack
of awareness of such changes may be the basis of honest false
testimony. If these actors fail to notice crucial changes, they will
later honestly, but falsely, report that the changes did not occur,
thus misleading juries regarding the true causes of and responsi-
bility for accidents.
The change blindness phenomenon provides a clear illustra-
tion of the general principle that in order to later accurately
identify or describe a particular person or object (or to distin-
guish one from another), one must attend to and encode the
features that distinguish the one in question from similar others.
Thus, if one attends only to the category of the object, rather
than its individual features, or if one attends to the wrong fea-
tures (i.e., those that do not distinguish the particular object
from others in its category), one will later be unable to identify
the individual.
2. Did I Remember to Lock the Door? Consequences of Automatic
vs. Controlled Processing
Many of the activities we perform in daily life are routine, ef-
fortless, and do not require the focused attention and deep
processing necessary to form long-term memories. Things we
tend to do on "automatic pilot, " to put it colloquially, are done by
means of what is called "automatic processing" in information
processing terms. When we are in the automatic processing
mode, we pay minimal attention and may accomplish things
while devoting focal attention to something else.
Activities that form a regular morning routine, such as brush-
ing teeth, taking pills, getting ready to go, locking the doors,
and even driving to work are often done in automatic process-
ing mode. This is why, for example, we often cannot remember
whether we took a pill, fed the cat, or locked the door. If we do
47 Johnathon A. Bargh, Automatic Information Processing: Implications for Commu-
nication and Affect, in COMMUNICATION, SOCIAL COGNITION, AND AFFECT 9 (L. Do-
nohew et al. eds., 1988).
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remember that we did these things, it is unlikely that we also
remember the doing of them, as in the sense of having an inter-
nal video of exactly what we did.
Driving is also accomplished in automatic mode much of the
time. We listen to the radio, talk to other passengers, and pay
only minimal attention to the physical task of driving. In fact, if
we shifted to controlled processing mode, where each action is
placed in focal attention, and thought about it in depth, we
would experience difficulty driving, much like a beginning
driver who gets behind the wheel for the first time.
Automatic processing mode is necessary to accomplish every-
day activities smoothly and efficiently without too many de-
mands on limited processing capacity. The side effect of this
efficiency, however, is loss of memory. How many of us have
been stopped by a traffic cop only to wonder what our offense
might have been? Then when confronted with having run a
stop sign, how many of us could not remember how completely
we stopped, or even whether the stop sign was there?
Memory for routine behaviors often becomes crucial in court.
When putting the plane's engine back together, did the
mechanic put a particular filter in place correctly? Was the door
locked? Did you recall seeing your husband that morning? Did
you warn this particular patient about the risks of the proce-
dure? Often, the issue is whether a professional did or did not
perform, in a specific instance, what they usually do perform in
the typical instance. Inherently, reports of such behaviors are
unreliable.
Because routine activities are often done in automatic
processing mode, they are not encoded elaboratively, in a way
that would facilitate long-term memory. When these activities
later become an issue in court, the witness will often be unable
to accurately report on their behavior. Instead, (s)he will tend to
base the report on a memory constructed (see section on con-
structive processes below) from the assumption that they would
have done it that way because that is how they usually do it. For
example, we cannot truly remember each physical act involved
in driving, even though we know what we did. We must have, or
we would not have gotten to work!
3. Attention/Processing Capacity is Limited, and Therefore Selective
The amount of information in the environment exceeds the
limits of our attentional resources, a situation that forces atten-
tion to selectively focus on some features of the situation and to
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neglect others. Predictably, certain kinds of people, objects and
events tend to selectively draw attention and to compromise at-
tention to other features of the situation in the process.
a. Salient Features
Some things draw attention by their very nature, such as those
that are loud, colorful, dramatic, exciting, or central to the ac-
tion. Recall the standard techniques for "creating a diversion"
among TV criminals or private detectives designed to draw at-
tention away from the person who wants to sneak in or snatch
something unobserved.
b. Threatening Features
Situations or objects that are personally threatening tend to
draw attention. For example, investigations of the presence of a
weapon during a crime have demonstrated that the weapon
tends to attract the attention of the witness, leaving less atten-
tion to the perpetrator's facial and physical characteristics. This
phenomenon is often referred to as "weapon focus." Nancy
Steblay performed a meta-analysis of weapon focus studies,
showing a reliable decrement in recognition accuracy for the




We have all heard references to the idea of "sticking out like a
sore thumb, "illustrating the idea that attention is drawn to things
that are distinctive or different. In turn, those features are more
likely to be remembered than less distinctive or noticeable as-
pects of the scene.
Distinctiveness is also the basis on which we distinguish one
object from similar others. Attention tends to go to the distin-
guishing features of a person, hence the importance, should
one want to commit a criminal act, of looking and dressing in
the least distinct manner possible.
The use of distinctiveness to differentiate between people is
widely considered to contribute to the difficulty in cross-racial
identification,49 as noted earlier.
48 Nancy M. Steblay, A Meta-Analytic Review of the Weapon Focus Effect, 16 LAw &
HUM. BEHAV. 413 (1992).
49 Bothwell et al., supra note 39, at 19; Brigham & Malpass, supra note 39, at
139; Malpass & Kravitz, supra note 39, at 330; Platz & Hosch, supra note 39, at 972.
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d. Features Relevant to Personal Interests, Goals, or Current
Concerns
Rachel Remen, in her book Kitchen Table Wisdom, tells of a
time when she was in medical school, riding the subway to see
her parents: "I remember traveling home to visit my parents on the
subway, realizing only after a while that I had been unconsciously scan-
ning the veins of the bare-armed people around me, wondering whether
my skills with a needle were good enough to allow me to successfully draw
blood from them. "5o Attention is naturally drawn to things relevant
to one's own personal interests, goals, or current concerns, just
as her attention was drawn to veins as she was being trained to
draw blood. When planning to buy a car, for example, one
tends to notice different makes and models in parking lots, car
ads on TV, and other relevant information where it is encoun-
tered. If cars are not of concern, such information is either not
noticed at all or not deeply processed. The world is generally
filtered through the lens of our own interests and needs.
Imagine, as suggested by S.T. Fiske and S.E. Taylor,5" that you
walked through a house with the eye of a burglar casing the
house for entry and loot. Would you notice and remember the
same things as if you walked through as a potential buyer of the
house, or as the police investigating the burglary? Attention re-
search has shown that memory will be best for features relevant
to the burglary, the crime investigation, or to the purchase deci-
sion, depending upon the observer's intentions.
e. Features Relevant to Activated Schemas, Stereotypes, and
Expectations
"Labeling sets up an expectation of life that is often so compelling we
can no longer see things as they really are .... We are in a relation-
ship with our expectations and not with life itself.52
"Schemas" provide the basis of our understanding of the world
around us. They include social category schemas (or stereo-
types), event schemas (telling us what tends to happen and who
tends to be involved in particular event categories), causal
schemas (telling us what tends to cause particular events or out-
comes), person schemas (telling us what a particular person is
50 RACHAEL N. REMEN, KITCHEN TABLE WISDOM: STORIES THAT HEAL XXV
(1996).
51 S.T. FisiK & S.E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION (2d ed. 1991).
52 REMEN, supra note 50, at 66.
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like and how (s)he is likely to behave), and self schemas (our
own beliefs about ourselves), among others.
Research in cognitive and social psychology has shown that
the influence of schemas on information processing is pervasive.
They allow us to recognize objects, people, procedures, social
situations, and much more. They form the basis of expectations
that tell us what to do with a person or object or, in a particular
situation, what to expect to happen. They offer the standards
against which we evaluate specific individuals or events. Finally,
they direct attention to schema relevant features of what we ob-
serve and direct interpretation of what we see.
A particular schema may become active in any number of
ways. For example, the social category of "criminal" may become
salient to an observer because the target was identified as a crim-
inal by another observer (labeling), because the target "looked"
suspicious, because the observer is a policeman and deals with
criminals every day, or because the observer had just seen a tele-
vision show about crime.
Once a schema is activated, it has very predictable conse-
quences for attention and information processing. Among
them is the tendency for attention to selectively focus on schema-
relevant aspects of the situation the observer is in and later to
selectively remember that information. 3 Further, memory for
information consistent with expectations generated by the
schema is better in most circumstances than memory for infor-
mation that is inconsistent with them. Incongruent information
can be remembered as well as, or better than, consistent infor-
mation under limited circumstances. When the observer is
highly motivated to perceive things accurately at the time an
event or information is first encountered, incongruent informa-
tion may be processed carefully in an effort to understand it.
This increased depth of processing, in turn, will facilitate encod-
ing and memory. -In the absence of such motivation, incongru-
ent information tends to be ignored.54
5" Reid Hastie, Schematic Principles in Human Memory, in SOCIAL COGNITION: THE
ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM 1 (E.T. Higgins et al. eds., 1981); FisKE & TAYLOR, supra note
51, at 242; ZrvA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 104 (1999).
54 Charles Stangor & David McMillan, Memory for Expectancy-Congruent and Ex-
pectancy-Incongruent Information: A Review of the Social and Social Developmental Litera-
tures, 111 PSYCHOL. BULL. 42, 58 (1992).
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f. Memory for the "Core" of the Event is Superior
Attention tends to be drawn to what may be thought of as the
"core" of the event. Thus, memory for the nature of the event
and the central actors and actions tends to be superior to that
for peripheral details. This holds true for both stressful/trau-
matic and non-stressful events and for observers or victims of all
ages (see section .B.4(b) (2) infra on trauma and memory).
Interestingly, observers often assume that witnesses who can
provide great detail concerning peripheral aspects of an event
will be more accurate regarding central detail. However, just
the opposite tends to be true. Gary Wells and Michael Leippe,
for example, reported a negative correlation between the ability
to recognize a perpetrator and the ability to recall peripheral
details. Subjects in their experiment observed a man steal a cal-
culator. Later, those who remembered details about the room
in which the theft took place were less likely to accurately iden-
tify the perpetrator.
Unfortunately, jurors' common sense understanding of the
relationship of memory for central detail versus peripheral de-
tail is diametrically opposed to the actual relationship. Jurors
tend to believe that failure to accurately remember peripheral
details casts doubt on a witness's accuracy for central actions,
persons, or events. However, exactly the opposite is true. Good
memory for peripheral details would suggest that the witness's
attention was directed away from the core event at the time it
was witnessed, and that memory for core details may be
compromised.
4. Attention is Vulnerable
Try as we may to focus our attention undisturbed, it is never-




Attention may be compromised by event "complexity." The
more demands for attention there are, the less attention is avail-
able for any specific feature of the event. The events of, and
leading up to, airplane crashes are perfect examples of complex
events.
55Wells & Leippe, supra note 13, at 682.
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Passengers in a commercial jet, for example, may be con-
fronted with unexpected physical events such as jolts, changes in
altitude, announcements and direct interactions with the crew
and other passengers, severed parts of the plane, fire, decom-
pression (many occurring simultaneously), and ultimately the
crash and its aftermath. The crew must attend to the physical
events noticeable to passengers, as well as gauges and crucial
readings and must attempt to fix or compensate for mechanical
problems. Additionally they must manage the plane and com-
munications with both ground crews and flight attendants. The
flight attendants must attend to physical events with the plane,
the passengers and their needs, and liaison communications be-
tween crew and passengers. Ground crews, in turn, must man-
age not only the flight in danger, but also others that may be
affected. Thus, everyone involved is confronted with a rapidly
unfolding complex event with many divergent demands on their
attention-a situation that continues unabated for those who
survive and confront the aftermath. Under such circumstances,
attention to the details of the event, as well as the depth of
processing of those details, will be compromised through several
processes.
First, the necessity of attending to so many different details of
the event, per se, reduces not only the likelihood of attending at
all to a given detail, but also the amount of time one can attend to
it and consolidate it to memory.
As noted earlier, memory is dependent upon attention. The
less attention devoted to a particular aspect of the event, the less
well it will be remembered later. In our plane crash example,
there are so many diverse things to attend to that attention is
necessarily divided, forcing the witness both to fail to witness
some details at all, and, among those they do witness, to devote
less time to each. Thus, on the average, memory for any given
aspect of a complex event will be: (a) less likely to exist at all,
and if it does, (b) less clear and accurate than for the same as-
pect had it been part of a simpler event.
This point has been demonstrated in the eyewitness identifi-
cation literature. There, research has shown that as the com-
plexity of a criminal event increases (e.g., more bystanders,
more perpetrators, the use of weapons, other events occurring
simultaneously with the crime, a more complex environment),
descriptions of and memory for any given detail, including the
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perpetrator, will decrease in detail and accuracy.56 Brian Clif-
ford and Clive Hollin also found that the effects of complexity
were greater at higher levels of event violence, probably due to
greater emotional arousal in the witness." This finding is con-
sistent with the notion that the stress and trauma of an airplane
crash would similarly exacerbate the negative impact of event
complexity on memory.
a. The Issue of Ambiguity
Related to the issue of complexity is the issue of ambiguity.
That is, complexity itself can sometimes render what one is wit-
nessing ambiguous. This is in part because the necessity of di-
viding attention between a number of different people, actions,
and events makes it impossible to track each of them as care-
fully. Thus, one many be unable to know for certain what is
going on with everything or everyone at all times (especially if
they are in disparate locations).
Studies of social influence have demonstrated that people are
more susceptible to persuasion or influence by others if they are
uncertain of their own perceptions or opinions. Thus, the com-
plexity of the situation in which events take place, combined
with conditions of the witness that may compromise attention,
such as intoxication, extreme stress, trauma, etc., may create less
clear perceptions. In turn, this ambiguity of perception may
give rise to the potential for greater contamination of both their
perceptions of the events as they occurred and of their subse-
quent memories of the events. For more information, see our
discussion of witness contamination below.
2. Proactive and Retroactive Interference
Memory is further compromised by "interference" processes re-
sulting from a rapid overlapping sequence of events. These
processes are similar to those preventing us from remembering
jokes heard as part of a sequence of many. We can remember a
particular joke better when it is the only one heard that day than
when it is one of many in a rapid sequence ofjokes. Those of us
56 Robert K. Bothwell, Trait Anxiety and Facial Recognition (1991) (unpublished
manuscript); Brian R. Clifford & Clive R. Hollin, Effects of Type of Incident and the
Number of Perpetrators on Eyewitness Memory, 66 J. APPL. PSYCHOL. 364 (1981);
Sporer, supra note 26, at 183; Steblay, supra note 48, at 413; P.M. WALL, EYEWIT-
NESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES (1965).
57 Clifford & Hollin, supra note 56, at 364.
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who are older may recall that we remembered everyday events
better when there were not so many to remember (back when
our lives were less complex). Similarly, students can remember
exam materials for a particular class better if that material was
not preceded or followed by studying for other exams.
This problem has been documented extensively in the mem-
ory literature, where it has been shown repeatedly that memory
for information is better when it is learned (encountered) in
isolation. When either preceded ('proactive interference") or fol-
lowed ("retroactive interference") by other information, the target
information is remembered more poorly.58 Interference from
prior or subsequent additional information or events interferes
with the ability to consolidate and transfer the target informa-
tion from short into long-term memory.
These interference processes are one reason (other than ad-
vancing senility) why the rapidly sequenced events of a complex
life can lead us to forget some things as fast as they happen.
Similarly, a rapidly unfolding airplane crash involving multiple
overlapping events permits neither adequate attention to given
neither details nor time for processing, elaboration, and consoli-
dation or storage in long-term memory.
b. Witness Factors Disrupting Attention
Clearly, external forces may disrupt attention. Internal forces,
however, may sometimes be even more disruptive.
1. Intoxication
Intoxication from either alcohol or other drugs can severely
impair attention and, later, memory.59 Further, there is some
evidence that later recall is better when again intoxicated than
when sober, a phenomenon called "state-dependent retrieval. '
2. Trauma and Stress
Among the hallmarks of aviation disasters are strong emotion,
trauma, and stress among all involved, from victims and their
58 Wayne A. Wickelgren, Single-Trace Fragility Theory of Memory Dynamics, 2 MEM.
& COGN., 775-780 (1974).
59 Stephen A. Lisman, Alcoholic "Blackout": State Dependent Learning, 30 ARCH.
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 46 (1974).
60 Eric Eich, Theoretical Issues in State Dependent Memory, in VARIETIES OF MEMORY
AND CONSCIOUSNESS: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ENDEL TULVING 331, 332 (Henry L.
Roediger III & Fergus I. M. Craik eds., 1989).
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families to ground personnel, rescue workers, and investigators.
Many assume that memories for trauma are more accurate and
more durable over time than those for any other events; that is,
they are "burned-in" and indelible. The true picture, however, is
much more complicated.
Memory research has addressed memory for stressful or trau-
matic events at two levels. First, laboratory studies have assessed
memory for events or other materials varying in violence or abil-
ity to create strong emotions. This research has enabled re-
searchers to examine basic attentional processes engaged by
violent, arousing, or stressful material. However, ethical con-
straints prevent laboratory examinations of extreme personal
trauma. Thus, the second level of research has attempted to ex-
amine memory for personally traumatic events primarily
through non-experimental methods. Our discussion of emo-
tions and memory will first examine principles developed in lab-
oratory research and then turn to the application of these
principles in studies of memory for real life traumatic events.
a. "Tunnel Memory"
Sven-Ake Christianson and his colleagues have suggested a
three-stage process by which stress or arousal affects memory.61
First, in the "pre-attentive' stage, emotion-eliciting stimuli, such as
blood or personal threat, trigger an orienting response drawing
attention to the emotion-eliciting stimuli. Then, in the second
stage, active attentional mechanisms engage elaborative encod-
ing focused on the emotional material. This selective attention
and elaboration limits processing capacity for peripheral infor-
mation not central to the emotional aspects of the event. In
cases of very strong emotion, the person may become preoccu-
pied by intrusive thoughts regarding the threatening event, fur-
ther narrowing the focus of attention/processing.
The authors refer to the outcome of the narrowed attention
and heightened psychological focus on the source of the emo-
tional arousal as "tunnel memory. ",62 Events witnessed under this
narrow processing mode will tend to promote better memory for
central information-the details of the emotion provoking part
61 Sven-Ake Christianson & Martin A. Safer, Emotional Events and Emotions in
Autobiographical Memories, in REMEMBERING OUR PAST: STUDIES IN AUTOBIOGRAPHI-
CAL MEMORY 218 (D.C. Rubin ed., 1996); Martin A. Safer et al., Tunnel Memory for
Traumatic Events, 12 APPL. COGN. PSYCHOL. 99 (1993).
62 Safer et al., supra note 61, at 99.
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of the event. In contrast, it will tend to inhibit processing of and
memory for peripheral details-details that are either irrelevant or
spatially peripheral to the core source of arousal. A number of
studies have supported this conclusion.6 3
Memory also tends to be better for details that are spatially or
temporally associated with the main characters (or source of
emotion) for highly arousing events than for less arousing
events, but better for peripheral details in less emotional events
than in emotional events. In part, this tendency may result from
the tendency for memory to be more focused spatially for trau-
matic scenes than for either the actual scene or an equally large,
but non-emotional scene. The narrow focus of attention seems
to narrow the subjective range of perception. In contrast, sub-
jects tend to remember more neutral scenes as more wide-an-
gled than they actually were. 64
Finally, in contrast to memory for most things, memory for
highly emotional or traumatic events can sometimes become bet-
ter over time and with repeated questioning. As arousal and anx-
iety fades, all aspects of information processing become easier,
including efforts to remember. Thus, it is not unusual to find a
victim or witness who at first is unable to fully describe what hap-
pened, but is able to later provide much richer and coherent
reports.65 It is vitally important to consider, however, the nature
of post-event influences that may have contaminated the wit-
ness's memory. Memory may improve if left to itself, but may
become seriously distorted if the person is subjected to biasing
interviews or techniques for memory retrieval (see Section VII
infra).
i. How Do We Know What Attention Will Narrow to in a Witness
Under Stress?
Although there appears to be solid evidence that memory for
events that become the narrow focus of attention under stress
will be enhanced and memory for peripheral details will be di-
63 Sven-Ake Christianson, Emotional Stress and Eyewitness Memory: A Critical Re-
view, 112 PSYCHOL. BULL. 284 (1992); Christianson & Safer, supra note 61, at 218;
F. Heuer & D. Reisberg, Emotion, Arousal, and Memory for Detail, in THE HANDBOOK
OF EMOTION AND MEMORY: RESEARCH AND THEORY 151 (S.A. Christianson ed.,
1992).
64 Helene Intraub et al., Looking at Pictures but Remembering Scenes, 18 J. Exp.
PSYCHOL. LEARN. MEM. COGN. 180 (1992).
65 Christianson & Safer, supra note 61, at 218.
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minished, the difficulty is identifying exactly what becomes the
focus of narrowed attention.
Many of the laboratory studies on this topic have identified
the central characters in violent or stressful scenes as the proba-
ble focus of attention. In practice, however, it is much more
difficult to predict.
A. Reduction in Eyewitness Identification Accuracy Under
Stress
This problem has been identified in the eyewitness identifica-
tion literature, which has shown that memory for the perpetra-
tor of a violent action will not always be enhanced by the
emotion caused by the violence. When a perpetrator uses a
weapon, for example, the eyewitness's ability to later identify the
perpetrator is reduced 66 because attention goes to the weapon.
Some studies have examined general effects of arousal by ex-
posing witnesses to events that vary in either: (a) the degree of
violence involved in an event or (b) the intensity of personal
threat involved. In many such studies, higher arousal levels (as
created by violence or personal threat) have resulted in reduced
eyewitness accuracy for certain characteristics of the event.67
One study is worth describing in more detail. Douglas Pe-
ters68 had witnesses provide physical descriptions and identifica-
tions from photo lineups of a nurse who had recently inoculated
them at an immunization clinic, and of a second person who
- Steblay, supra note 48, at 413.
67 Robert K. Bothwell et al., An Exploratory Study of Personality Differences in Eye-
witness Memory, 2 J. Soc. BEHAV. PERS. 335 (1987); Robert K. Bothwell & H.M.
Hosch, Effects of Realistic Arousal Levels on Identification Accuracy of Bystand-
ers (unpublished data, on file with the University of Texas at El Paso) (1987);
John C. Brigham et al., The Effect of Arousal on Facial Recognition, 4 BAS. APPL. Soc.
PSYCHOL. 279 (1983); Sven-Ake Christianson & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Memory for
Traumatic Events, 1 APPL. COGN. PSYCHOL. 225 (1987); Clifford & Hollin, supra
note 56, at 364; C. Johnson & B. Scott, The Effects of Arousal on the Cognitive
Processing of Information in an Eyewitness Setting (unpublished work, on file
with Oklahoma State University) (1975); C. Johnson & B. Scott, Eyewitness Testi-
mony and Suspect Identification as a Function of Arousal, Sex of Witness, and
Scheduling of Interrogation, presented at the American Psychological Associa-
tion (Aug. 1976); Saul M. Kassin, Eyewitness Identification: Victims Versus Bystanders,
14J. APPL. Soc. PSYCHOL. 519 (1984); Elizabeth F. Loftus & Terrence E. Bums,
Mental Shock Can Produce Retrograde Amnesia, 10 MEM. & COGN. 318 (1982); Doug-
las P. Peters, Eyewitness Memory and Arousal in a Natural Setting, in PRACTICAL AS-
PECTS OF MEMORY: CURRENT RESEARCH AND ISSUES VOL. I: MEMORY IN EVERYDAY
LIFE 89 (M.M. Gruneberg et al. eds., 1988).
68 Peters, supra note 67, at 89.
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had taken their pulse two minutes later. The researchers had
measured actual physiological arousal in subjects during both
events.
Arousal was higher (as one might expect) during the inocula-
tion (88 beats per minute), as compared to the pulse measure-
ment (71 beats per minute).69 Further, even though the two
targets were equally memorable, physical descriptions of the
nurse were less accurate as compared to those of the pulse taker.
Witnesses also identified the nurse in target-present lineups at a
much lower rate than the pulse taker (41% versus 66%).70
Thus far, the results were similar to many of the studies cited
above. Peters, however, also included an analysis of the relation-
ship between individual arousal and identification accuracy.
The most physiologically reactive witnesses (an average eleva-
tion of 30 beats per minute at inoculation as compared with
pulse measurement) showed a considerably lower rate of correct
identification of the nurse (31%) than did the least physiologi-
cally reactive witnesses (59%), whose pulse elevation during in-
oculation averaged 2.8 beats per minute. 71 Thus, the results
indicate that regardless of the objective arousal potential of the
events with which a witness is confronted, later identification ac-
curacy is strongly predicted by the witness's own arousal level
during the event.
It is also important to note that extreme arousal at any time,
whether during encoding, storage or retrieval, debilitates infor-
mation processing. To understand its effects during retrieval,
for example, consider the case of test-taking anxiety (which
plagues many students). Students suffering from test-taking
anxiety may know the material very well, but nevertheless, do
very poorly on the test because their anxiety does not permit
them to retrieve the material from memory (usually until just
after they leave the testing situation and their anxiety drops).
B. The Role of Individual Differences in Anxiety/Arousal
Consistent with Peters' individual difference approach, Rob-
ert Bothwell 72 found that the debilitating effect of potentially
arousing external events depends upon the neuroticism level of
the witness (which is associated with chronic anxiety). They
69 Id. at 92.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 94.
72 Bothwell et al., supra note 67, at 335.
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found that subjects high in neuroticism (high in the tendency to
interpret stimuli as personally threatening) were particularly de-
bilitated by potentially arousing external events.73 The accuracy
of their perpetrator identifications decreased as the arousal po-
tential of the witnessed events increased.
High levels of either acute or chronic anxiety can affect mem-
ory in the same manner as heightened fear, stress, or emotion.
Anxiety generally interferes with information processing, as il-
lustrated in the test-taking example above. It will interfere with
attention and elaboration and thus, impair encoding; and later,
it will interfere with retrieval. Two studies, for example, showed
poorer eyewitness accuracy among witnesses high in anxiety
and/or self-preoccupation.7 4 Further, anxiety appears to nar-
row the focus of attention in much the same manner as other
sources of arousal or threat.7 5
C. The Importance of Self-Focus
Clearly, attention did not narrow to the perpetrators in the
above examples. Instead, attention to the perpetrator (whom
one might have predicted to become the central focus of atten-
tion) was compromised. Where then, did attention go?
In many cases, attention turns inward in response to stress.
The person may focus on thoughts of dying or on trying not to
panic. Thoughts may go to loved ones also in danger or to God
and worry over whether (s)he is or is not headed to heaven in
the event of disaster. The possibilities are many, and while one
person may focus on the central actors and action, others may
focus on their own feelings or those of companions around
them.
For this reason, when trying to assess the potential for error in
a witness' testimony one should always ask the witness what he
or she was thinking about and feeling during the incident. A
witness who reports that (s)he primarily focused on concern for
73 Id.
74Judith M. Siegel & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Impact of Anxiety and Life Stress Upon
Eyewitness Testimony, 12 BULL. PSYCHOL. Soc'y 479, 480 (1978); Matthew Dobson &
Roslyn Markham, Individual Differences in Anxiety Level and Eyewitness Memory, 119
J. GEN. PSYCHOL. 343, 348 (1992).
75 Michael W. Eysenck & Karin Mogg, Clinical Anxiety, Trait Anxiety, and Memory
Bias, in THE HANDBOOK OF EMOTION AND MEMORY: RESEARCH AND THEORY 429
(S.A. Christianson ed., 1992); Thomas H. Kramer et al., Weapon Focus, Arousal,
and Eyewitness Memory: Attention Must Be Paid, 14 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 167, 167-69
(1990).
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children, for example, would be expected to remember the chil-
dren and their reactions far better than other features that
might objectively be more central to the event.
b. Real-Life Trauma and Memory
Studies of memory for real-life traumatic events have fallen
into two categories: (1) those involving highly emotional and
significant but non-personal events, such as the Challenger ex-
plosion, assassination or death of public figures, and so on; and
(2) those involving personal trauma, such as sexual abuse or as-
sault, violent crime, or death of loved ones.
i. "Flashbulb" Memories for Shocking Public Events
Roger Brown and James Kulick 76 coined the term 'flashbulb
memories" to refer to recollections of novel and shocking events.
The authors proposed a mechanism called "Now Print!" through
which the brain acts like a camera flashbulb to 'freeze" the mem-
ory of the moment when we learn of the shocking event.7 7 To
examine this phenomenon, researchers have studied memories
of highly publicized and shocking public events such as the Ken-
nedy assassination, the Challenger explosion, the Martin Luther
King assassination and others. Participants are considered to
have a 'flashbulb memory" of the event if they report vivid memo-
ries of where they were and with whom at the time they learned
of the event, and how they learned of it. Research on the flash-
bulb memory phenomenon has generally shown the following.
First, most people remember shocking public events during
their lifetimes. For example, Brown and Kulick found that all
but one of eighty adults interviewed in 1976 possessed flashbulb
memories of the Kennedy assassination.7 8
Second, flashbulb memories are more likely for public events
that are personally significant. This is reflected in greater flash-
bulb memory for the King assassination among blacks than
among whites, for Margaret Thatcher's resignation among Brit-
ish than among Americans, and for the Loma Prieta earthquake
near San Francisco among those affected by it than those not






affected.79 Even among those to whom the event is significant,
those experiencing greater emotional arousal upon hearing of it
experience greater flashbulb memories.
Third, flashbulb memories are subjectively detailed, vivid and
compelling.
Fourth, as with other emotional events, the central subject of
flashbulb memories is clearly well remembered over very long
periods of time. People remember that the shocking event did
happen. But how well do they remember the peripheral detail,
i.e., where they were when they learned of it, who they were
with, how they learned of it, etc.?
Despite the subjectively compelling nature of flashbulb mem-
ories for these details, they can be quite inaccurate in some re-
spects. Researchers study accuracy by interviewing people both
immediately after a shocking public event and again months or
years later. This research has indicated that memory for shock-
ing emotional events is superior to that for more mundane
events. Like memory for mundane events, however, memory for
shocking events does decline over time. Further, memory for
the peripheral details of where, when, with whom, etc. can be-
come quite inaccurate over time, even as the person maintains
great confidence in its accuracy.8 °
The results of studies of memory for shocking, emotional, and
personally significant public events are generally consistent with
laboratory studies of memory for emotional events. People are
more likely to remember emotionally significant material and
events. However, while memory is better for the central facts to
which attention is drawn, it may be lacking or inaccurate for
peripheral details. But what about memory for traumatic per-
sonal events?
ii. Memory for Personal Trauma
Substantial controversy exists among psychologists over the is-
sue of how, if at all, memory for traumatic personal events is
different from memory for less emotional events. Are such
memories significantly more vivid, durable, and resistant to dis-
tortion? Do they engage different biochemical processes or
brain mechanisms? Are they subject to repression and later sud-
79 MARTIN A. CONWAY, FLASHBULB MEMORIES (1995); SCHACTER, supra note 2, at
195.
80 SCHACTER, supra note 2, at 195.
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den recovery? Are they more or less susceptible to distortion
through investigative interviews or memory retrieval aids?
Research on memory for traumatic personal events has re-
vealed both similarities and differences to memory for mundane
events.
A. Trauma and Persistence
First, consistent with the laboratory studies of emotional
event, and studies of flashbulb memories, case studies of real-life
tramata ranging from Holocaust survivors and war veterans to
childhood tramata such as kidnapping or sexual abuse have
shown that memories for these tramata are more likely to persist
over time than memory for other events."1 In fact, Daniel
Schacter8 2 suggested that "persistence," the seventh sin of mem-
ory, is particularly characteristic of memory for traumatic events.
"Persistence" refers to intrusive recollections that one would pre-
fer to forget but cannot.
Memories for most traumatic events are both persistent and
intrusive. Strategies to avoid or suppress the memories fail to
affect either the frequency or power of intrusive images and
thoughts.8 3 In fact, the persistence and intrusiveness of memo-
ries for traumatic events, and the interference with work and
family life that result, can become part of a claim for damages in
civil actions resulting from traumatic accidents.
B. Psychogenic Amnesia
Although memory for traumatic events is, more often than
not, both persistent and intrusive, psychological trauma can
temporarily create the exact opposite reaction. "Psychogenic am-
nesia" refers to loss of memory caused by psychological trauma.
Amnesia following psychological trauma has been documented
in the clinical psychology literature for well over a century. Pa-
tients may experience either very broad scale psychogenic amne-
sia, involving loss of most or all of their personal past, or very
specific amnesia for some or all aspects of the traumatic event
itself. At the broadest extreme, the victim may enter what is
81 Id. at 201.
82 Schacter, supra note 2, at 195-196.
83 Wilma Koutstaal & Daniel L. Schacter, Intentional Forgetting and Voluntary
Thought Suppression: Two Potential Methods or Coping with Childhood Trauma, in 16
REVIEW OF PSYCHIATRY 79 (LJ. Dickstein et al. eds., 1997); SCHACTER, supra note 2,
at 201; Schacter, supra note 2, at 195-196.
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called a 'fugue state" where (s)he has lost all sense of personal
identity without realizing it. At the narrow extreme, memory
loss may be very selective, even as narrow as selected compo-
nents of the traumatic event.
Psychogenic amnesias tend to be temporary, often serving as a
temporary escape from an intolerable situation. Typically, the
victim will recover his or her entire personal past with the excep-
tion of what happened during fugue.
Claims of amnesia occur in both victims and perpetrators of
trauma. Claims of limited amnesia, for example, are common
among perpetrators of violent crime. Research on violent
criminals has found perpetrator claims of amnesia for the crime
ranging between 25% and 65%."4 Clearly, some claims of amne-
sia among criminal defendants may be regarded as false. How-
ever, such claims tend to be associated with alcohol or drug use,
and thus may reflect true loss of memory. Schacter 5 argues that
most cases of limited amnesia involve intoxication, head injury,
or loss of consciousness during the trauma. For this reason,
clear evidence that memory loss is caused by psychological
trauma itself is lacking.
Claims of lost memories are common among victims, particu-
larly those of sexual abuse. Although there is general agree-
ment that any memory may be lost, including those of traumatic
events, disagreement exists concerning the mechanisms of for-
getting. Amnesia may occur either because of special defense
mechanisms such as repression or dissociation,86 or because of
normal memory processes such as decay, interference, inhibi-
tion, or intentional or unintentional failure to rehearse the
event.
8 7
84 Judith Lewis Herman, Crime and Memory, 23 BULL. AM. AcAD. OF PSYCHIATRY
& LAw 5 (1995); John F. Kihlstrom & Daniel L. Schacter, Functional Disorders of
Autobiographical Memory, in HANDBOOK OF MEMORY DISORDERS 337 (A. Baddeley et
al. eds., 1995); Daniel L. Schacter, Amnesia and Crime. How Much Do We Really
Know? 41 AM. PSYCHOL. 286 (1986); SCHACTER, supra note 2, at 218; David Spie-
gel, Hypnosis and Suggestion, in MEMORY DISTORTION: How MINDS, BRAINS, AND
SOCIETIES RECONSTRUCT THE PAST 129 (Daniel L. Schacter ed., 1995).
85 SCHACTER, supra note 2, at 218.
86 Lucy Berliner & Linda Meyer Williams, Memories of Child Sexual Abuse: A Re-
sponse to Lindsay and Read, 8 APPL. COGN. PSYCHOL. 379 (1994); John Briere &Jon
R. Conte, Self-Reported Amnesia for Abuse in Adults Molested as Children, 6J. TRAUMA.
STRESS 21 (1993); JUDITH L. HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY (1992); Judith L.
Herman & Emily Schatzow, Recovery and Verification of Memories of Childhood Sexual
Trauma, 4 PSYCHOANAL. PSYCHOL. 1 (1987).
87 D. Stephen Lindsay & J. Don Read, Psychotherapy and Memories of Childhood
Sexual Abuse: A Cognitive Perspective, 8 APPL. COGN. PSYCHOL. 281 (1994); Peter A.
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C. Traumatic Memory and Distortion
Although there may be room for debate over the relative sus-
ceptibility of memory for traumatic events to distortion, there
can be no question that such memories are not "burned in" pre-
cise recordings, impervious to distortion. Instead, memories for
traumatic events may be severely distorted and even fabricated
completely.
As noted earlier, traumatic or emotional memories are less
likely to fade over time and, on average, tend to be more accu-
rate regarding central but not necessarily peripheral details.
They are, however, nevertheless susceptible to distortion
through the same mechanisms as more mundane memories.
These mechanisms will be discussed in some detail in the sec-
tion below on biasing aids to memory retrieval. Here, however,
we will provide a few salient examples from studies of real life
trauma that illustrate the extent to which memory for traumatic
events can be distorted.
Several studies of children's memories for real-life trauma
have illustrated this potential for distortion. Lenore Terr, 8 for
example, studied the memories of the victims of the Chowchilla,
California school bus kidnapping. The children had been kid-
napped from their school bus and then buried underground for
sixteen hours. When Terr interviewed the children both imme-
diately and four to five years later, she found that about half of
the children made dramatic errors in recall.8 9 Some of the chil-
dren had remembered accurately immediately after the kidnap-
ping, but remembered incorrectly in the later interviews, even
to the extent of adding two additional kidnappers.90 Clearly,
even initially accurate traumatic memories are susceptible to
change and distortion over time.
Similarly, a study of children's memories for a sniper attack at
an elementary school in 1984 revealed distortions in memory
for events during the attack. More surprisingly, however, some
children who were not at school during the attack later
remembered that they were."'
Ornstein et al., Children's Memory for a Personally Experienced Event: Implications for
Testimony, 6 APPL. COGN. PSYCHOL. 49 (1992).
88 Lenore C. Terr, Psychic Trauma in Children: Observations Following the
Chowchilla School-Bus Kidnapping, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 14 (1981).
- Id. at 14-17.
90 Id. at 18.
91 Robert S. Pynoos & Kathi Nader, Children's Memory and Proximity to Violence,
28J. AM. AcAD. CHILD ADOLESC. PSYCHIATRY 236 (1989).
1464
WITNESS MEMORY
Willem Wagenaar and J. Groeneweg9 2 illustrated the "tunnel
memory" phenomenon of superior memory for central detail of
traumatic or emotional events in survivors of Nazi death camps.
Comparing the memories of survivors of Camp Erika a few years
after their release with those forty years later, the authors found
remarkable consistency regarding camp conditions and daily
routines but poor recall of the names of fellow prisoners and
guards.
Among the traumatic memories widely considered to be virtu-
ally exact replays of the original trauma are the 'flashbacks" ex-
perienced by victims of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
such as war veterans, rape victims, or victims of other violent
crime or disasters. However, research has shown that even such
flashbacks are sometimes more likely to represent a combina-
tion of real and feared or imagined events.93 In some respects,
such flashbacks represent the "worst fears" of the victim, rather
than precise memories.
Finally, research fueled by the currently raging controversy
over "recovered" memories of sexual abuse has documented
through both case studies and laboratory demonstrations that
memory for sexual abuse and other traumatic experiences can
be distorted and even fabricated completely through biasing
therapeutic and memory retrieval techniques.94
D. Are Memories for Traumatic Events More or Less
Accurate Than Those for Mundane Events?
Although no doubt exists that memory for traumatic events
can be inaccurate, controversy exists regarding whether memory
for traumatic events is superior to that for mundane events. As
noted earlier, laboratory studies have tended to indicate that
memory for central detail is superior under stress, whereas
memory for peripheral detail suffers.
Similar issues have been addressed in field studies of victims
or witnesses to traumatic events. Generally, these studies have
shown that memories for traumatic events can be quite accurate
and fade little with time. Studies of both victims and bystander
92 Willem A. Wagenaar &J. Groeneweg, The Memory of Concentration Camp Survi-
vors, 4 APPL. COGN. PSYCHOL. 77 (1988).
93 J.T. MACCURDY, WAR NEUROSES (1918); SCHACTER, supra note 2, at 266.
94 Elizabeth F. Loftus, The Reality of Repressed Memories, 48 AM. PSYCHOL. 518,
526-33 (1993); ELIZABETH F. Lonrus & KATHERINE KETCHAM, THE MYTH OF RE-
PRESSED MEMORY (1994); RICHARD OFSHE & ETHAN WATTERS, MAKING MONSTERS:
FALSE MEMORIES, PSYCHOTHERAPY, AND SEXUAL HYSTERIA (1994).
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witnesses to non-sexual events, for example, have compared wit-
ness reports immediately after the crime with recall months
later. Although some errors occur after the delay, reports are
generally stable across time.95 Sven Christianson and B.
Hubinette96 found, however, that victims' reports were more ac-
curate than those of bystanders.
Exactly the opposite was found in studies of the memories of
adult victims of rape. 7 They found the familiar tendency to-
ward better memory for central than peripheral details, along
with reasonable accuracy and good retention over time. How-
ever, when memories for rape were compared to memories for
other intensely unpleasant experiences, the authors found that
memories for rape were less accurate, less clear and vivid, less
meaningfully organized, less thought and talked about, but
more emotionally intense. Similarly, L.L. Keuhn98 found that
victim's ability to describe race, sex, age, height, weight, build,
complexion, hair color, and eye color of their assailants was in-
versely related to the severity of the crime. Rape victims and
injured victims were less accurate and complete than robbery
and uninjured victims.
Thus, at this point, no clear answer exists regarding whether
traumatic memories will be superior or inferior to memories for
more mundane events. On the other hand, it is abundantly
clear that they can be either very clear and accurate or very
inaccurate.
To evaluate the likelihood of memory distortion for any given
witness or victim, the memory expert would need to consider
the entire context in which the event took place and the nature
of the event itself in combination with the personality and back-
ground of the witness.
95 John C. Yuille & Judith Cutshall, A Case Study of Eyewitnesses of a Crime, 71 J.
APPL. PSYCHOL. 291, 294 (1986); Sven-Ake Christianson & B. Hubinette, Hands
Up: A Study of Witnesses' Emotional Reactions and Memories Associated with Bank Rob-
beries, 7 APPL. COGN. PSYCHOL. 365 (1993).
96 Christianson & Hubinette, supra note 95, at 365.
97 Mary P. Koss et al., Traumatic Memories: Empirical Foundation, Forensic, and
Clinical Implications, 2 CLIN. PSYCHOL. SCI. PRAC. 111 (1995); Shannon Tromp et
al., Are Rape Memories Different? A Comparison of Rape, Other Unpleasant, and Pleasant
Memories Among Employed Women, 8 J. TRAUMA. STRESS 607 (1995).
98 L.L. Keuhn, Looking Down a Gun Barrel: Perception and Violent Crime, 39 PER-
CEPT. MOT. SKILLS 1159 (1974).
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E. Brain Mechanisms Underlying Traumatic Memories
Evidence is accumulating that brain mechanisms underlying
encoding and persistence of traumatic memories may be
unique. Modern cognitive neuroscience has used technologies
such as PET scans to examine brain activity during encoding of
emotional versus non-emotional material. These studies, in
combination with studies of animals or patients with brain dam-
age, have indicated that the amygdala is crucial to encoding of
emotional but not unemotional material. The amygdala shows
increased activity during exposure to emotional material. The
degree of such activity is related to later memory for emotional
material but not to memory for unemotional material; and dam-
age to the amygdala is associated with failure to retain emotional
material but not unemotional material. These and other find-
ings indicate a unique role of the amygdala in encoding emo-
tional material.99
3. Injury
Although clear evidence of amnesia through psychological
trauma may be lacking,100 there can be no doubt that physical
trauma can create memory loss ranging from complete loss of
identity to temporary amnesia. The most common forms of
memory loss resulting from trauma to the head are "retrograde
amnesia," or failure to remember events preceding the physical
or psychological trauma, and "anterograde amnesia," or difficulty
remembering everyday events and activities following trauma.
The latter is more likely to become an issue in litigation as a
claim for damages.
"Retrograde" amnesia, however, is commonly an issue either as
a claim for damages or as a problem of witness testimony. It is
important to note that amnesia for a traumatic event that results
from head injury is often permanent. Thus, when confronted
with a witness who has apparently "recovered" memory for the
event, the attorney should carefully examine the potential for
post-event influences to have created confabulated memories.
Clear evidence exists to show that "retrograde amnesia" due to
physical trauma is not reversible, as it results from failure to
enter information into long-term memory. The ability to com-
9 Larry Cahill & James L. McGaugh, Mechanisms of Emotional Arousal and Last-
ing Declarative Memory, 21 TRENDS NEUROSCI. 294 (1998); Schacter, supra note 2, at
192.
100 SCHACTER, supra note 2, at 212.
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plete the consolidation of short-term into long-term memory is
interrupted by serious head injuries. Those sustaining such in-
juries are virtually inevitably unable to remember the accident
itself or the few minutes preceding it, and virtually never recover
those memories.'"1
Philip Yarnell and Steve Lynch cleverly demonstrated this. 10 2
The authors studied the memories of football players for the
play leading up to a "ding" (a particularly hard hit dazing the
player). Each time a ding occurred, the researchers rushed to
his side within roughly the first thirty seconds and interviewed
him about the play and again interviewed him twenty minutes
later after he had recovered. All dinged players were able to
remember what happened and what play they had run at the
initial interview, but by the second interview, they remembered
neither what happened to them nor what play was run.
C. FAILURES OF INTERPRETATION
"Memories are replicas of how we have experienced the events,
not replicas of the events themselves.''
Contrary to popular belief, memory does not work like a video
camera, recording exactly what it physically perceives. The act
of encoding does not simply create a visual or auditory memory
trace of exactly what happened, a judgment-free snapshot stored
unchanged and available for retrieval and review. Instead, the
act of encoding includes interpretation. We encode a combina-
tion of visual and semantic (meaning) aspects of the event,
something that holds the meaning, sense, and emotions the ex-
perience provided us. Often, these meanings will remain
clearer over time than the sensory memory, such that they be-
come the primary basis of later reports of the event.
1. Consequences of Failures of Interpretation
This role of interpretation would not be problematic if our
interpretations were uniformly accurate and unbiased. How-
ever, this is clearly not the case. Instead, it is clear that memory
may be compromised by failures of semantic encoding, includ-
ing either forgetting or distortion.
101 SCHACTER, supra note 2, at 134.
102 Philip R. Yarnell & Steve Lynch, The "Ding": Amnesic States in Football
Trauma, 23 NEUROLOGY 196 (1973).
103 SCHACTER, supra note 2, at 6.
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a. Forgetting Due to Inability to Understand
Forgetting will tend to occur when the witness cannot under-
stand what was observed sufficiently to engage semantic process-
ing (i.e., could not categorize or identify what was observed).
Since encoding into long-term memory tends to involve the
meaning of an event more strongly than simple physical features,
if meaning cannot be assigned, material will less likely enter
long-term memory. If, nevertheless, the material is stored in
long-term memory, it is more likely to be inaccurate.
b. Distortion Due to Incorrect Understanding
"The image at the eye has countless possible interpretations."'104
Distortion occurs when the observer does assign meaning to
what is observed, but for some reason chooses the incorrect inter-
pretation or label. As we will elaborate below, distortion tends
to occur as a result of either: (a) predictable distortion in sen-
sory perception (b) contextual cues that suggest a particular in-
terpretation (including social influence) or (c) characteristics of
the observer that might bias interpretation of what (s)he ob-
serves, such as existing attitudes, motivations, stereotypes, expec-
tations, thoughts, or understandings. A particularly unfortunate
example of this problem is the recent police shootings of un-
armed blacks who police mistakenly believe to possess a weapon.
Stereotypes associating blacks with violence lead police to "see' a
weapon rather than the actual object or empty hand.105 Keith
Payne compellingly demonstrated the power of expectations as-
sociating blacks with violence in a recent study. 106 Payne
demonstrated that merely seeing a black face led subjects to be
more likely to mistake objects for weapons, even when the ob-
jects were presented independently of the face. Thus, the as-
sociations to weapons and violence elicited by the black face
were so strong as to affect perceptions of objects not associated
physically with the black face.
104 D.D. HOFFMAN, VisuAL INTELLIGENCE 13 (1998).
105 Nancy Firor & Joshua Kurlantzick, Under Siege in Cincinnati, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT April 23, 2001, at 30.
106 B. Keith Payne, The role of automatic and controlled processes in misperceiving a
weapon, 81 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCHOL. 181-192 (2001).
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2. Failure of Interpretation Through Difficulty/Ambiguity of
Perception
A witness may be asked about any number of different facts
and events, some of which may be very difficult to accurately
perceive. In such cases, errors in witness reports may be com-
mon, occurring more likely than not. They will result from di-
rect failures of perception due to difficulty, from greater
susceptibility to distortion in interpretation through contextual
cues or social influence from other observers, or through the
influences of the observer's own personal motivations and
biases.
Years of research on persuasion and social influence, for ex-
ample, have demonstrated that perceptions and opinions are
most malleable through influence when the person is less cer-
tain of his(her) existing views. Solomon Asch, 10 7 for example,
demonstrated this process using a perception task where he va-
ried the difficulty of the perceptual judgment. He found that
subjects' reported judgments were more affected by those of
other participants as the ambiguity of the stimulus increased.
Generally, conformity is greater when a person feels incompe-
tent or uninformed, when the task is difficult, or when (s)he
really cares about being right.1 0 8 Thus, under certain circum-
stances, the potential for influence from others to affect the
meaning a witness encodes into semantic memory is great.
Similarly, perception research has illustrated the importance
of motivation on perceptions of ambiguous stimuli. A hungry
person, for example, is more likely to interpret an ambiguous
stimulus to be food. On the other hand, research on perceptual
defense has shown that people show resistance to accurate per-
ceptions of ambiguous objects related to anxiety-provoking
motivations. This resistance may be manifested in longer times
to recognize the objects, or tendencies to mislabel them in less
anxiety-provoking- terms.
While social influence and motivational processes operate
broadly and can affect interpretation of less ambiguous objects
and events, ambiguity increases the opportunity for distortion
through either mechanism.
107 Solomon E. Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, Sci. AM. 31 (Mar. 1955).
108 Alice H. Eagly, Sex Differences in Influenceability, 85 PSYCHOL. BULL. 86 (1978);
Alice H. Eagly et al., Causal Inferences About Communicators and Their Effect on Opin-
ion Change, 36J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCHOL. 424 (1978).
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a. The Importance of Knowledge, Expertise and Familiarity
As a general rule, familiarity, knowledge or expertise regard-
ing either the general type of objects and events being observed
or with the specific objects, persons and events in question in-
creases the ease, efficiency and accuracy of encoding. Think of
chess masters, for example, who can remember the entire con-
figuration of a chessboard with one glance, and even play full
matches with one another in their heads. Novices, in contrast,
may have difficulty even labeling the pieces and find it impossi-
ble to remember their location. Similarly, while a pilot might
glance briefly at the plane's instrument panel and accurately en-
code and remember the status of the gauges, a novice passenger
would be unlikely to either understand or later remember them.
Generally then, witness reports regarding unfamiliar objects
and events are more susceptible to error. The unfamiliar is in-
herently more ambiguous to the observer, and therefore more
difficult to understand. This renders the observer more suscep-
tible to both direct errors of interpretation and indirect errors
due to internal and external influences on interpretation, such
as personal motivations or influence from other observers or
contextual cues.
Sometimes expertise or familiarity is tied to gender. One
study of eyewitness performance examined male and female
ability to accurately recall features of an event considered more
male or female oriented (i.e., of greater interest and familiarity
to males versus females). As expected, each sex was more accu-
rate and less easily influenced by misleading questions on the
issues "oriented' toward their gender."°9 Thus, to the extent that
gender-related features of an event are the subject of witness tes-
timony, it is important to note that each gender (or indeed,
each individual) will tend to be more accurate in areas of partic-
ular interest or expertise. In aviation cases, for example, males
may tend to be more accurate observers and recorders of the
technological flight-mechanics-oriented features of the event
than females.
Expertise may also be tied to age. Clearly young children do
not have well-developed or elaborate knowledge structures in
many areas-including those regarding objects or actions in air-
craft, or situations leading to disaster. Not being able to under-
stand what they see, they will later be unable to remember.
10 PA. Powers et al., Eyewitness Accounts of Males and Females, 64 J. APPL.
PSYCHOL. 339 (1979).
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b. Some Specific Areas of Difficulty in Perception
"Shall we henceforth distrust the witness of vision,
knowing now its penchant to pejure?"110
While psychological research on fundamental perceptual
processes has identified some difficult areas of perception, other
difficult areas have been identified in the eyewitness literature.
1. Duration
Generally, people tend to overestimate the duration of com-
plex events. Studies of witness time estimations have shown that
witnesses consistently tend to overestimate the duration of
events by a factor sometimes as high as thirty-to-one or more.
On the average, overestimations tend to be more in the range of
two or three to one. However, while underestimations are rare,
overestimations are common and sometimes extreme. Eliza-
beth Loftus and her colleagues, Schooler, Boone, and Kline,111
for example, found that some subjects remembered a thirty-sec-
ond bank robbery tape as having lasted over fifteen minutes.
Further, arousal and stress tend to lead to even greater overes-
timation.1 12 The high stress and complexity characteristic of avi-
ation accidents would be expected to compromise time
estimations among passengers and ground crews alike.
2. Speed, Distance and Direction
a. Speed
Estimates of both speed and distance are notorious for their
susceptibility to error.113 Both are important in cases involving
vehicular accidents of all kinds, and are subject to both over-
and underestimation.
Estimates of speed, for example, depend upon the size of the
moving object, such that large objects appear to move more
slowly than small objects. Herschel Leibowitz and D. Alfred
110 HOFFMAN, supra note 104, at 3.
111 Elizabeth F. Loftus et al., Time Went by So Slowly: Overestimation of Event Dura-
tion by Males and Females, 1 APPL. COGN. PSYCHOL. 1 (1987).
112 Christianson & Loftus, supra note 67, at 225; Loftus et al., supra note 111, at
1; A.L. SCHNEIDER ET AL., PORTLAND FORWARD RECORDS CHECK OF CRIME VICTIMS
(1987).
113 LoFrus & DOYLE, supra note 11; Keith K. Niall, The Art of Descrying Distance,
41 HUM. FACTORS 511 (1999).
1472
WITNESS MEMORY
Owens" 14 reported this phenomenon with respect to airplanes
and trains. For example, they noted that although all jets land
at roughly the same speed, jumbo jets appear to land more
slowly than smaller jets. Similarly, large locomotives appear to
move more slowly than their actual speed, a factor Leibowitz
and Owens believed to contribute to the many accidents each
year in which a car tries to cross the tracks in front of a too
rapidly approaching train. In contrast, Elizabeth Loftus and
James Doyle' 15 illustrated the reverse problem, citing a case
where the speed of a relatively small vehicle (a motorcycle) was
seriously overestimated.
Generally then, although estimates of speed are common in
trials involving vehicular accidents of various kinds, they tend to
be unreliable. They vary substantially between witnesses to the
same event'1 6 and may tend to over- or underestimate actual
speed depending upon the size of the object in question." 7
b. Distance
Estimates of distance are similarly difficult. Distortion of dis-
tance in spatial memory becomes greater with longer distan-
ces.' People may produce systematic over or underestima-
tions, or may show asymmetries. For example, they may esti-
mate the distance from their house to a mailbox as different
from the distance from the mailbox to the house."' i
Distance estimates can be affected by the nature of the inter-
vening space. For example, Kazunori Hanyu and Yukio It-
sukushima1 20 showed that estimated distances and times for
walking were greater for stairways than for equally long flat
paths. Similarly, other studies have examined the relationship
114 Herschel W. Leibowitz & D. Alfred Owens, We Drive by Night, 20 PSYCHOL.
TODAY 54 (1986).
115 LoFTus & DOYLE, supra note 11, at 22.
116 J. MARSHALL, LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONFLICT (1966).
117 Leibowitz & Owens, supra note 114, at 20; but see RobertJ. Herstein & Mar-
garet L. Walker, Perception of Vehicle Speed as a Function of Vehicle Size, 31 BuLL.
PSYCHO. Soc. 566 (1993).
118 Linda J. Anooshian & Megan K. Kromer, Children's Spatial Knowledge of Their
School Campus, 22 DEV. PSYCHOL. 854 (1986).
119 Nora Newcombe et al., What Do Misestimations and Asymmetries in Spatial Judg-
ment Indicate About Spatial Representation, 25 J. Exp. PSYCHOL. LEARN. MEM. COGN.
986 (1999); Niall, supra note 113, at 511.
120 Kazunori Hanyu & Yukio Itsukushima, Cognitive Distance of Stairways: Dis-
tance, Traversal Time, and Mental Walking Time Estimations, 27 ENVTL. BEHAV. 579
(1995).
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between travel time, effort, and distance estimates. 121  Some
studies of distance estimations have been conducted with blind-
folded walkers, 22 having potential application in cases of ab-
ducted witnesses.
Distance tends to be overestimated when a barrier is placed
between objects, or when spatial "clutter" exists such as many
turns or landmarks.123 Estimates also differ between "egocentric"
(distance between oneself and other objects) and "exocentric"
(distance between two other objects), such that egocentric esti-
mates tend to be underestimated. 24 Distance estimates are also
affected by characteristics of the observer. Adults, for example,
are more accurate than children.125
Estimates of distance and size reciprocally affect one an-
other,126 and size estimates become more difficult with increas-
ing distance.2 7
Distance estimates for moving objects are affected by per-
ceived speed and vice versa.' 28  Some investigators have ex-
amined the foibles of distance and speed estimates among
drivers in an attempt to understand causes of accidents. For ex-
ample, Ota Hiro129 showed that when drivers drove at higher
121 James F. Herman & Christine A. Klein, The Effect of Travel Effort on Children's
Distance Estimations, 4 BR. J. DEV. PSYCHOL. 353 (1985); James F. Herman et al.,
Children and Adults' Distance Estimations in a Large-Scale Environment: Effects of Time
and Clutter, 36J. Exp. CHILD PSYCHOL. 453 (1983); James F. Herman et al., Time
and Distance in Spatial Cognition Development, 7 INT'L J. BEHAV. DEV. 35 (1984).
122 Erik Lindberg & Tommy Gaerling, Acquisition of Locational Information About
Reference Points During Blindfolded and Sighted Locomotion: Effects of a Concurrent Task
and Locomotion Paths, 144 UMEA PSYCHOL. REP. 19 (1978).
123 Mary Gauvain, Sociocultural and Practical Influences on Spatial Memory, in MEM-
ORY DISTORTIONS AND THEIR PREVENTION 89 (Margaret J. Itons-Peterson &
Deborah L. Best eds., 1998).
124 Jack D. Reising & Elizabeth L. Martin, Distance Estimation Training with Night
Vision Goggles Under Low Illumination, in JSAF AMRL TECHNICAL REPORT AL/HR-
TR-1994-0138 11994-0138 iii-22 (Jan. 1995).
125 John T. Corlett et al., Locomotor Estimation of Distance After Visual Scanning by
Children and Adults, 14 PERCEPT. 257 (1985).
126 Mark F. Bradshaw et al., The Interaction of Binocular Disparity and Motion Par-
allax in Determining Perceived Depth and Perceived Size, 27 PERCEPT. 1317 (1998); Eli
Brenner & Wim J M van Damme, Perceived Distance, Shape and Size, 39 Vis. RES. 975
(1999); Tadasu Oyama, Perceived Size and Perceived Distance in Stereoscopic Vision and
an Analysis of Their Causal Relations, 16 PERCEPT. PSYCHOPHYS. 175 (1974).
127 William Epstein & Krishan D. Broota, Attitude ofJudgment and Reaction Time
in Estimation of Size at a Distance, 18 PERCEPT. PSYCHOPHYS. 201 (1975).
128 Robert Gray & David Regan, Do Monocular Time-to-Collision Estimates Necessa-
rily Involve Perceived Distance, 28 PERCEPT. 1257 (1999).
129 Ota Hiro, Distance Perception and Driving, 55 TOHOKV PSYCHOLOGICA FOLIA
92 (1996).
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speeds, they underestimated the distance between their own
cars and others, compared with estimations made at lower
speeds. Donald Gordon and his colleagues3 0 showed that driv-
ers could not correctly estimate overtaking and passing dis-
tances. Average errors of estimation for various conditions
varied between 20% and 50% of actual overtaking distance. Fur-
ther, errors of underestimation increased with speed. At 18
mph, 15% of estimates were low, whereas at 50 mph, 68% were
low.
Some studies have specifically examined the accuracy of speed
and distance estimations for aircraft in flight, including the ef-
fectiveness of training in aircraft recognition and velocity judg-
ments. They include accuracy for both unaided and
technologically assisted estimates, ability to visually estimate the
distance to high-speed jets, and ability to track aircraft by ear.
These studies also attempted to determine the distances at
which various aircraft structural features could be recognized."'
One study specifically examined memory for distance.3 2 Per-
formance was best for estimates made while the objects were visi-
ble. Accuracy declined for estimates made from memory (even
when made immediately after seeing the stimulus objects), par-
ticularly when subjects had to integrate several pieces of spatial
information to estimate distance.
Finally, some studies have examined estimates of distance
from sound.133 The results have suggested that distance hearing
is accurate mainly in detecting variations in the distance of the
source, but is relatively inaccurate for estimation of absolute
distance.
c. Direction
Distortions in directional perception and memory are com-
mon when complex inferences are required; for example, tak-
ing many turns and/or reversing directions, even along a
130 Donald A. Gordon, & Truman M. Mast, Drivers'Judgments in Overtaking and
Passing 12 HUMAN FACTORS 341 (1970).
13, R.D. Baldwin, Capabilities of Ground Observers to Locate, Recognize, and Estimate
Distance of Low-Flying Aircraft, in MUNRRO TECHNICAL REPORT 56 (1973); E.W.
Frederickson et al., Aircraft Detection, Range Estimation, and Auditory Tracking Tests
in a Desert Environment, in HuMRRO TECHNICAL REPORT 38 (1967).
132 Gabriel A. Radvansky et al., Uncertainty in Estimating Distances from Memory,
23 MEM. & COGN. 596 (1995).
133 E.V. Kozhevnikova, Auditory Estimate of the Distance of a Sound Source, 4 SENS.
Sys. 156 (1990).
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familiar route. Such distortions are more common among chil-
dren than adults, and are smaller for familiar routes or spaces.
Further, the ability to use available markers or landmarks in a
particular space increases with experience in that space or simi-
lar spaces."3 4
One reason for distortions under complex conditions is the
tendency for people to normalize angles toward ninety degrees.
When drawing roads from memory, for example, all kinds of
angles are distorted toward ninety degrees. Generally, spatial
distortions reflect tendencies toward simplification, regulariza-
tion (distortion toward familiar angles and shapes), and
organization. 3 5
3. Sequence
Memory for the sequence of events is often poor. This prob-
lem is found in memory for single events, in which the sequence
of specific actions within the event may be an issue (who hit who
first, for example). However, the problem can become particu-
larly acute for sequences of events ranging over longer time
spans, such as those typically involved in complex civil litigation.
Studies of autobiographical memory have shown that memory
for when something happened is far less accurate than memory
for what happened. 136
4. Color
Color is often a crucial feature of evidence. Witnesses in crim-
inal trials are routinely asked to describe the appearance of the
perpetrator or other participants, including the color of hair,
skin, or clothing (and perhaps that of objects or weapons in-
volved in the action). Witnesses to a hit and-run accident may
be asked to describe the color of the car. Often, the object in
question is more unusual, such as the color of a pill, a gauge, or
a piece of paper. Whatever the object in question, proper color
identification may well affect the outcome of the case.
134 Gauvain, supra note 123, at 89.
135 See id.
36 Steen F. Larsen et al., Time in Autobiographical Memory, in REMEMBERING OUR
PAST: STUDIES IN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY 129 (D.C. Rubin ed., 1996); Willem
A. Wagenaar, My Memory: A Study of Autobiographical Memory Over Six Years, 18
COGN. PSYCHOL. 225 (1986); Willem A. Wagenaar, Autobiographical Memory in
Court, in REMEMBERING OUR PAST: STUDIES IN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY 180
(D.C. Rubin ed., 1996).
1476
WITNESS MEMORY
Perception of color may seem simple, something most of us
take for granted. In fact, color vision is far from a simple pro-
cess. Rather, it is a complicated system that may be compro-
mised by either organic dysfunctions of the vision system or
contextual circumstances interfering with its ability to operate
properly. If color is an important issue in a witness' testimony, it
would be important to know if (s)he suffers from any organic
problem that would compromise color vision, or whether other
internal or external factors may have compromised color vi-
sion-such as colored sunglasses.
a. Organic Problems With Color Vision
A person may be "color blind' in varying type and degree.
Some who have no functioning cones (the structures responsi-
ble for color vision) are "monochromatic," or totally color blind,
and see the world in shades of white, gray, and black. Mono-
chromats are rare (about one in a million) and tend to have
poor visual acuity, and difficulty seeing at all in bright lights.137
"Dichromats" lack one of three pigments typically found in the
cones. Some are red-green blind and see the world in shades of
blue and yellow. Others, although fewer, are blue-yellow blind
and thus, see shades of red and green. Each dichromatic disor-
der is more common among males than females, as it is caused
by a recessive sex-linked gene that women may carry but rarely
express.1 3 8
Color blindness will cause an obvious problem with correct
identification of color. However, it can also cause difficulties
with one's ability to distinguish one object from another. Just as
camouflage can prevent a person with normal vision from see-
ing an object against a background of similar color, the restric-
tion in range of color among color blind individuals can, in
effect, function as camouflage for many objects. For monochro-
mats, many colors will appear to be the same or similar shades of
gray. Thus, each can provide camouflage for the others. Simi-
larly, for those who cannot distinguish blue from green, a blue
object may not be visible against a green background.
Most color blindness is genetic and therefore present from
birth. However, problems of color perception may also be
caused by diseases such as alcoholism, glaucoma, diabetes, or
137 YvEs LEGRAND, LIGHT, COLOR AND VISION (1957).
138 Jeremy Nathans et al., Molecular Genetics of Human Color Vision: The Genes
Encoding Blue, Green, and Red Pigments, 232 Sci. 193 (1986).
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age-related macular degeneration, or by trauma to the visual
cortex.1 39 Age-related macular degeneration and diabetes are
both associated with destruction of cones. After age fifty or so,
blues can begin to look darker and become more readily con-
fused with greens. Thus, an older person may confuse one pill
for another, one car for another, one color panel or dial with
another, or fail (because of fading color contrast) to distinguish
two objects from one another at all.140
An opposite condition occurs for those suffering from "night
blindness"-difficulty in dark adaptation. Such persons have rods
that fail to operate sufficiently in poor light. Thus, they experi-
ence poor visual acuity under poor illumination, seeing objects
as fuzzy and indistinct, and may also have difficulty recognizing
familiar faces under dim street lamps or driving at night.
b. Context and Color Perception
Under most circumstances, we enjoy good color "constancy"-
the ability to see the same color even when viewing context
changes. Nevertheless, there are certain viewing conditions that
substantially alter color perception.
i. Illumination
The most important contextual influence on color vision is
illumination. As illumination decreases, two important changes
take place.
A. Shift From Cone to Rod Vision
First, color vision dims and then fades completely. We shift to
rod vision, and the cones necessary for color vision cease to
function. Thus, at night under moonlight everything appears as
shades of gray. Lacking color contrast, objects appear less clear,
and our ability to distinguish between them is compromised.
The features (including color) of people, clothes, objects, and
actions become more difficult to clearly perceive and identify.
Blood, for example, may be misidentified in moonlight because
139 AJ. Adams, Chromaticity and Luminosity Changes in Glaucoma and Diabetes, in
COLOR DEFICIENCIES, VI: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH SYMPOSIUM OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL RESEARCH GROUP ON COLOR VISION DEFICIENCIES 413 (Guy Verriest ed.,
1982); E. BRUCE GOLDSTEIN, SENSATION AND PERCEPTION (1999).
140 P.D. Hurd &J. Blevins, Aging and the Color of Pills, 310 N. ENGL. J. MED. 202




it will appear to be black in the absence of sufficient
illumination.
B. "Purkinje Shift"
Second, objects that appear relatively brighter in daylight will
appear relatively darker under moonlight, a phenomenon
called the "Purkinje shift. "I' Thus, while objects at the red (long
wavelengths) end of the color spectrum will appear brighter in
daylight, those at the blue (short wavelengths) end will appear
brighter in moonlight (for example, a red tomato will appear
brighter than the green vine in daylight, but the vine will appear
brighter at night). Failure to understand this shift in apparent
brightness may lead police or other investigators to search for
clothing or other objects of the wrong color. A blue shirt
(which appears brighter at night than an orange one) could
lead to a search for a lighter colored shirt, notwithstanding the
fact that the actual blue shirt in question appears relatively dark
in normal daylight.
C. Band and Band Width
Even when there is apparently sufficient illumination, color
vision may be compromised by the nature of the lights in ques-
tion. Narrow band lights (red or blue, for example) or sodium
lamps found in many parking lots will narrow the range of visi-
ble color toward those in the narrow spectrum of the light.
Thus, witness reports of color must be understood in the con-
text of the lighting conditions under which the event was wit-
nessed, including both the degree of illumination and the width
of the light's color band.
ii. Changes in Illumination: Light and Dark Adaptation
Further, one must consider sudden changes in illumination.
Light adaptation, which occurs in response to changes from
darker to lighter conditions, takes place relatively quickly, within
a matter of a few seconds. Dark adaptation, on the other hand,
occurs more slowly. When plunged from bright illumination
into darkness, humans have difficulty seeing at first. Full recov-
141 Joseph Brozek, Contributions to the History of Psychology: LII. Perkinje Phenome-
non: The Original and a Later Account, 68 PERCEPT. MOT. SKILLS 566 (1989); Josef
Brozek & Vilem Kuthan, Contributions to the History of Psychology: LXXI. "Purkinje
Phenomenon ": The Genesis and the Early Uses of the Term in French, German, and En-
glish, 71 PERCEPT. MOT. SKILLS 1253 (1990).
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ery of the cones can take about five minutes, whereas full recov-
ery of the rods can take about thirty minutes, depending upon
the length and brightness of the previous illumination. During
that time, one will first have difficulty distinguishing objects at
all and subsequently have difficulty seeing clearly and distin-
guishing brightness between objects. When dark adaptation is
complete, most people can see reasonably well under dim illu-
mination, excluding color.
While the focus of this paper is on witness memory, it is worth
mentioning that issues of color vision may be important with
regard to product liability aspects of aviation litigation. That is,
to the extent that instrument panels and other displays that af-
fect the operation of an aircraft or the ability of crew and pas-
sengers to respond to emergency situations use color in ways
that impair ability to rapidly identify and interpret necessary ob-
jects, portals or signals, the product may be deemed defective.
Color vision experts are hired to aid in the design of aircraft for
just these reasons, and may be similarly engaged as expert wit-
nesses on product design.
3. Failures of Interpretation Through "Schematic" Processing
Theories of information processing converge on the assump-
tion that all information processing is "schematic" in nature.
That is, it is driven by expectations and assumptions based on
previous experience and existing knowledge. The following sec-
tions will summarize the basic effects of schematic processing on
interpretation of information or events. For a detailed review of
literature documenting the processes we will describe, see texts
on "Social Cognition. "142
a. The Nature of Schemas
"Schemas" are defined as cognitive structures representing
knowledge about a concept or type of stimulus, including its at-
tributes and the relationships among those attributes. A schema
includes a dictionary definition of the concept, object, or event,
along with a host of expectations concerning what it is like, how
it behaves, what it should look like, and much more. As noted
earlier, we possess a variety of schema types including: (a) cate-
gory schemas telling us what the members of particular social or
object categories are like; (b) person schemas telling us what to
142 KUNDA, supra note 53, at 23; FisKE & TAYLOR, supra note 51, at 10.
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expect of particular individuals (c) self-schemas consisting of how
we think about ourselves (d) role schemas telling us what individu-
als occupying particular social roles should be like and how they
should behave; (e) event schemas (or scripts) containing expecta-
tions for particular events or event categories; and (f) causal
schemas, telling us what tends to cause what, and how it does so.
These schemas are crucial for information processing. They
allow us to instantly identify people, objects, and events and to
understand what we see. Without schemas, we would not know
what to expect from individuals or categories of individuals or
how to treat them. We would not know how to behave in vari-
ous social situations or how to evaluate the behavior of others.
Generally, schemas allow us to understand and evaluate what we
see and plan what to do-in other words, they allow us to func-
tion in the world.
Like memory, we cannot function without schemas and sche-
matic processing. However, also like memory, schemas have a
dark side, leading to predictable errors in memory and
judgment.
b. How Schemas Affect Interpretation
1. Inference: Filling in with "Default Assumptions"
By definition, schemas include expectations concerning the
nature of people, objects and situations, and how they will be-
have. When we perceive, we cannot encode the entire set of
information we see. Instead, we encode the "gist" of what we
encounter. Both at the time, and later as we remember the in-
formation, we tend to 'fill in"what we have seen with the "default
values" suggested by our schemas and expectations. A number
of experiments have demonstrated this tendency to remember
both more and less than what we actually see. We do not re-
member schema-irrelevant information as well as schema-rele-
vant information, and we add information that makes sense
based on what we did see and what our expectations, knowl-
edge, and schemas would lead us to expect that we should have
seen.
2. Biased Interpretation
"Ideas of the cavern are the ideas of every man in particular; We every
one of us have our peculiar den, which refracts and corrupts the light
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of nature, because of the differences of impressions as they happen in a
mind prejudiced or prepossessed. ,143
Just as schemas tell us what to expect in certain situations and
from certain people, they also tell us how to interpret what we see.
Imagine, for example, attending a circus with no schema for
what a circus is, who the performers are, or what they are doing.
Everything would seem confusing.
We need the interpretive function of schemas to understand
and function in the world. However, just like all of our other
information processing systems, the same things that make the
interpretative function of schemas so important also give it the
potential to lead us astray.
The effects of schemas on how we interpret what we see have
been documented in countless domains. For example, we are
more likely to interpret a person's behavior as involving psycho-
pathology if we know (s)he is a mental patient, more likely to
interpret a black than a white person's behavior as criminal, a
person's comments as hostile if we think of them as a hostile
person, and so on. Our schemas can lead us to see what we
expect to see rather than what is truly there.
c. What Determines Which Schemas Influence Perception?
A number of factors determine what schemas will be activated
and affect perception in a given person or situation, ranging
from current moods, what we happened to recently encounter
or think about, salient goals, what schemas we characteristically
use or think about, and so on. We will not review all determi-
nants of schema use. However, the following are some of those
most pertinent to witness perceptions.
1. Situational Context
Often, the situation we are in will activate a particular schema.
When we enter a restaurant, for example, our "restaurant script"
becomes activated, and we expect things to happen in general
conformity with this script.
2. Social Context and Influence
Interpretation may be biased through the influence of others.
For example, imagine that you saw a man take the upper arm of




a woman in his hand as he talked to her. The physical act you
observed may be interpreted in a number of ways-varying from
hostility and aggression to love and affection. Now, imagine in-
stead that someone else had said, "Look, he's hurting her!" before
you turned to observe the man holding the woman's arm. Your
perception and interpretation of the event would be biased by
the label applied by the other person, causing you to activate a
schema for "aggressive," "fighting," "danger," etc. You would be
more likely to perceive the act as aggressive and more likely to
remember it as aggressive later.
3. Individual Witness Differences
"We don't see things as they are, we see them as we are.
a. Personal History
"As the central point of the perceptual field, the phenomenal self is the
point of orientation for the individual's every behavior. It is the frame
of reference in terms of which all other perceptions
gain their meaning.'45
We do not encounter the events of our lives as a blank slate.
Current motivations and emotions, in combination with our vast
accumulated store of knowledge, opinions and past experiences,
provide the template against which new experience is instantly
evaluated, understood and categorized.
The O.J. Simpson trial provided a perfect illustration of the
way in which accumulated life experiences shape interpretation.
Recall the difference in how blacks and whites interpreted the
potential for police planting or contaminating evidence. It was,
well, "black and white." Whites believed the DNA evidence and
discounted stories of the planting of the glove and other evi-
dence. Blacks believed the DNA evidence was faked and that
police planted the physical evidence. These differences were
clearly based on experience.
Blacks live in a world where police stop them for "DWB" (driv-
ing while black), where they are searched and accused falsely,
and where they or their friends and family are suspected of and
charged with crimes they did not commit-because they are
black. These experiences provide the backdrop against which
all police actions are evaluated. Why would they not believe the
14 THE TALMUD.
145 ARTHUR W. COMBS & DONALD SNYGG, INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR 145 (1959).
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evidence could have been planted? Whites, on the average,
have no such experiences and, thus, far less reason to suspect
the police might be untrustworthy.
As the wisdom of the Talmud suggests, who we are is inextri-
cably woven into what we see and later into what we remember
of it.
b. Expectations
Further, expectations may affect interpretation. For example,
returning to our earlier example of the man and woman, if you
knew the man in question and thought he was a hostile or ag-
gressive person, or perhaps thought that he did not like the wo-
man in question, these expectations could lead you to see his
actions as being consistent with your preconceptions of him.
Generally, expectations may be based in part on stereotypes
that, for example, may cause you to perceive the action of a
member of one race differently than the exact same action by a
member of another. Your impressions of a particular person
(such as in the above example) or your expectations for the situ-
ation in which the event occurs (for example, if you saw the
same physical actions of taking the woman's arm in the man's
hand in a romantic restaurant on Valentine's day versus in a
dark alley) can greatly affect perceptions of the event.
Expectations can also influence sensory perceptions. This is
illustrated by the relationship between color and taste or smell.
We have learned through experience to associate objects of par-
ticular color with specific tastes, such as lemon with yellow or
cherry with red. In effect, the color leads to the expectation of a
particular taste. That expectation can interfere with the experi-
ence of taste when the actual taste is inconsistent with expecta-
tions generated by the color of the food or drink. For example,
when Arnold Hyman"' asked subjects to identify the taste of
samples of white birch beer, he found that subjects correctly
identified it 70% of the time if the samples were colorless. How-
ever, when colored red, accuracy dropped to 25%. Some sub-
jects reported that the red-colored beer tasted like cherry cough
medicine, cherry soda, mint flavor, or dentist's mouthwash.
146 Arnold Hyman, The Influence of Color on the Taste Perception of Carbonated
Water Preparations, 21 BULL. PSYCHOL. SOC. 145 (1983).
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Similarly, C. N. DuBose and his colleagues147 found that the
tastes of cherry, orange, and lime beverages were judged cor-
rectly an average of 67% of the time if the colors matched their
beverages' taste, but only 37% of the time if they were colorless
or color did not match actual taste. Analogous results have
been obtained with smell, such that when colors and odors
match expectations, subjects are better at identifying the
odor. 148
c. Motivation, Interests, and Current Goals
"A clear conscience is often the sign of a bad memory. 149
Interpretations are biased by motivation, including promi-
nently those of self-protection and self-interest. This principle
has been documented repeatedly by research showing that our
own motivations distort perceptions of the entire world around
us, from simple objects to complex human events. Cognitive
processes are affected at all stages by motivation, from initial
perceptions to later memories.
That is, these motives can affect both the interpretation (encod-
ing) of events as they happened and constructive and recon-
structive processes occurring later. These possibilities are
discussed further in the section on contamination between
witnesses.
Further, the jury will not understand that motivation can actu-
ally distort memory, as opposed to simply provide an incentive
for dishonesty. The jury will be more adequately equipped to
evaluate the potential for motivations that may lead to deliber-
ate false testimony. However, they would be unlikely to suffi-
ciently understand the potential for motivation to affect
encoding and memory processes.
d. Characteristic Criteria for Categorizing and Evaluating the
World
Interpretations may be biased by the person's individual char-
acteristic criteria for evaluating the world and the people in it.
147 C.N. DuBose et al., Effects of Colorants and Flavorants on Identification, Perceived
Flavor Intensity, and Hedonic Quality of Fruit-Flavored Beverages and Cake, 45 J. FOOD
Sci. 1393 (1980).
148 Richard G. Davis, The Role of Nonolfactory Context Cues in Odor Identfication,
30 PERCEPT. PSYCHoPHYs. 83 (1981); Debra A. Zellner et al., Influence of Color on
Odor Identification and Liking Ratings, 104 AM. J. PSYCHOL. 547 (1991).
149 ROBERT BYRNE, THE 2,548 BEST THINGS ANYBODY EVER SAID (1996).
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For example, a person who considers agreeableness to be one of
the most important things about people would be more likely to
interpret the man's action (in our earlier example) in terms of
either hostility or affection. Another, who thinks of people
more in terms of intensity or level of engagement may have as-
sumed the man was "serious" or that he "really cared" about
what they were discussing.
e. Self-Schemas
"It is not as ye judge that ye shall be judged, but as you
judge yourself so shall you judge others. "150
Substantial evidence exists suggesting that people possess or-
ganized, generic concepts of themselves termed "self-schemas."
Dimensions central to the self-concept tend to be used for evalu-
ation of others and their actions. We tend to notice and remem-
ber characteristics and behaviors related to these traits in others
and give greater weight to them in forming impressions of
others. We tend to use ourselves as reference points for evalua-
tion of others.
V. STORAGE
"Storage' refers to the process by which recollections are kept
in long-term memory. The term retention interval refers to the
amount of time between the time the event is witnessed (en-
coded) and the time it is retrieved. During this time, memory
may be compromised by several factors. The most prominent
factors are: (1) the simple passage of time, during which mem-
ory tends to decay; and (2) other information acquired during
the storage interval.
A. TRANSIENCE AND SIMPLE DECAY
Memory for information typically becomes less accessible over
time, particularly information that is not revisited and re-
hearsed. 5 1 Daniel Schacter 152 labeled this phenomenon "tran-
sienc' and called it the first of the seven "sins" of memory.
150 HARRY S. SULLIVAN, CONCEPTIONS OF MODERN PSYCHIATRY 349 (1947).
151 Robert A. Bjork, Retrieval Practice and the Maintenance of Knowledge, in PRACTI-
CAL ASPECTS OF MEMORY: CURRENT RESEARCH AND ISSUES, VOL. 1: MEMORY IN EVE-
RYDAY LIFE 396-401 (M. M. Gruneberg & Morris eds., 1988); Wilma Koutstaal et
al., Post-Event Review in Older and Younger Adults: Improving Memory Accessibility of
Complex Everyday Events, 13 PSYCHOL. AGING 277 (1998).
152 Schacter, supra note 2, at 182.
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Research involving witness memory specifically has clearly docu-
mented significantly greater forgetting with longer retention
intervals.153
As first described in Hermann Ebbinghaus's15 4 well-known
studies, forgetting tends to occur most rapidly at first and slows
down with the passage of time. The 'forgetting curve" over time is
best described mathematically as a power function.155 The rate
of forgetting for real life events, however, varies considerably.
First, memory for the "gist" of an event declines much more
slowly, if at all, than memory for less central detail. 5 6 John W.
Shepherd found, for example, that although memory for the
fact of a hostile encounter with a stranger remained intact, the
ability to accurately identify the stranger declined over time
(from 65% to 10% after eleven months). Even more disturbing,
false identification can escalate as accurate identifications
decline.
Second, memory for personally salient events can remain
quite stable over time, while that for less important events fades
away. 157
Third, memory for very familiar information declines more
slowly. For example, H.P. Bahrick and his colleagues 158 found
that memory for pictures of high school classmates remained
almost perfect after thirty-five years and very good after an aver-
age of forty-five years.
Finally, the rate of forgetting depends in part upon the per-
son. Forgetting occurs more quickly in children, for example,
than in adults.'59
153 Kenneth A. Deffenbacher, On the Memorability of the Human Face, in ASPECTS
OF FACE PROCESSING 61 (H.D. Ellis et al. eds., 1986); Kenneth A. Deffenbacher,
Forensic Facial Memory: Time is of the Essence, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON FACE
PROCESSING 563 (Andrew W. Young & Hadyn D. Ellis eds., 1989); Shapiro & Pen-
rod, supra note 11, at 139.
154 HERMANN EBBINGHAUS, MEMORY: A CONTRIBUTION TO EXPERIMENTAL PSY-
CHOLOGY (1964).
155 John T. Wixted & Ebbe B. Ebbesen, Genuine Power Curves in Forgetting: A
Quantitative Analysis of Individual Subject Forgetting Functions, 25 MEM. & COGN. 731
(1997).
156 John W. Shepherd, Identification After Long Delays, in EVALUATING WITNESS
EVIDENCE 173 (S. Lloyd-Bostock & B. R. Clifford eds., 1983).
157 DAVID C. RUBIN ED., REMEMBERING OUR PAST: STUDIES IN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL
MEMORY (1996).
158 H.P. Bahrick et al., Fifty Years of Memory for Names and Faces: A Cross-Sectional
Approach, 104J. Exp. PSYCHOL. GEN. 54 (1975).
159 C. J. Brainerd et al., The Development of Forgetting and Reminiscence,
MONOGRAPHS OF THE SOCIETY FOR RESEARCH IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT 55 (1991); R.
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There are some circumstances under which memory can actu-
ally become stronger over time. When people are repeatedly
asked to recall stimuli they have seen (but without suggestions as
to what they might have seen), the overall percentage of correct
answers tends to increase over time, a phenomenon labeled
"hypermensia" by psychologists. This rehearsal seems to both
minimize forgetting and promote consolidation and recovery of
previously unrecalled information. Note, however, that this ef-
fect of repeated requests for recall is not equivalent to the ef-
fects of suggestive or coercive interviewing.
1. Buried in Mothballs: The Role of Disuse in Forgetting
Forgetting over time is greater when the memories are not
retrieved and rehearsed in any way.16° Conversely, retrieving
and rehearsing experiences produces better memory over time.
For example, some studies have found a positive relationship
between the number of interviews with a witness and accu-
racy. 61 However, rehearsal in certain contexts can also serve to
distort memory,112 as subsequent sections will illustrate.
For the majority of civil litigation (including aviation litiga-
tion), years have passed between the event and trial, with even
greater lag between trial and events leading up to the acute
event, such as issues of aircraft maintenance or warnings of dys-
function. In the intervening period, a number of both internal
and external influences affect witness memory.
B. INTERFERENCE
Information encountered either before or after the event in
question can interfere with memory for the target event, in
processes known as proactive and retroactive interference (dis-
cussed earlier in the section on attention and complexity). This
interference can occur with respect to information immediately
preceding and following the target event and information across
Flin et al., The Effect of a Five-Month Delay on Children's and Adults'Eyewitness Mem-
oiy, 83 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 323 (1992).
160 Koutstaal et al., supra note 151, at 277; Schacter, supra note 2, at 182.
161 Gail S. Goodman et al., Children's Testimony About a Stressful Event: Improving
Children's Reports, 1 J. NARR. LIFE HIST. 69 (1991); Ellen Scrivner & Martin A.
Safer, Eyewitnesses Show Hypermnesia for Details About a Violent Event, 73 J. APPL.
PSYCHOL. 371 (1988).
162 Amye R. Warren & Peggy Lane, Effects of Timing and Type of Questioning on
Eyewitness Accuracy and Suggestibility, in APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY: INDIVIDUAL, SOCIAL
AND COMMUNITY ISSUES 44 (M.S. Zaragoza et al. eds., 1995).
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much longer periods of time. In fact, Daniel Schacter 163 sug-
gests that much forgetting is the result of interference from the
many events following the one in question.
Events that are substantially similar can become confused with
one another, their separate memories being lost. For example,
many visits to a favorite haunt may become blended and indis-
tinct. This phenomenon can become particularly important in
the context of litigation. To the extent that a particular action
becomes important, blended memories of many similar occa-
sions can severely compromise the accuracy of the testimony.
C. CONSTRUCTIVE AND RECONSTRUCTIVE PROCESSES
"It isn't so astonishing, the number of things I can remember,
as the number of things I can remember that aren't so. "164
Mark Twain
Recall Nevada politician Seale's testimony that he had
feathered the propeller when his engine failed on take-off. Why
did he "remember" feathering the propeller when the pictures of
the cockpit at the scene clearly showed he did not?
Memory research would suggest that Seale's "memory"of feath-
ering the propeller derived in part from his assumptions about
what he would do under those circumstances. He expected to
feather the propeller, knew he should feather the propeller, had
practiced feathering the propeller during engine out maneuvers,
and therefore, he assumed he must have done it when the time
came. Seale's memory was "constructed" from the combination
of the actual experience and his preexisting expectations and
assumptions about what he would and should do.
Alterations in memory caused by preexisting expectations and
knowledge (such as in Mr. Seale's case) or by new information
acquired after the fact are what memory researchers refer to as
"constructive" and "reconstructive" memory processes.
1. Constructive Processes
"Out of a few stored bone chips, we remember a dinosaur"165
Constructive processes refer to the tendency to elaborate on
what was originally perceived, such that other information is ad-
163 SCHtACTER, supra note 2, at 72.
164 Mark Twain as quoted in WITNESS FOR THE DEFENSE by E. Lotus and K
Ketchum.
165 ULRIC NEISSER, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 285 (1967).
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ded to the original memory. The tendency to add "default as-
sumptions" discussed earlier, for example, is one form of
constructive memory process. Information added to memory
through constructive processes most commonly comes from two
sources.
a. Schema-Based Inferences
Constructive processes result in part from the tendency of the
person to draw inferences from the information or event that
they did see, and to remember the inferred additions as if they
were real. Often these inferences are based on expectations, ste-
reotypes, personal desires, and so on-all of the same factors
that can lead to biased interpretation during encoding.
For example, imagine a person who has watched a scene
where two persons enter a restaurant, sit down at a table, order,
and eat. The film did not show the waitress offering the guests a
menu or show them looking at one. Many people who watch
such a scene will later remember inaccurately that they did see
the waitress offer the menu (and that the guests looked at it)
before ordering. They do so in part because their expectations
for what happens in restaurants include the idea that guests will
be offered and use a menu.
Constructive memory processes in which persons add informa-
tion to the memory of an event they witnessed have been
demonstrated from information as simple as a list of words that
are related to a word not presented to information as elaborate
as a complex enactment of a crime. 166
It is important to note that persons with a more highly devel-
oped schema or script for a particular situation tend to be more
susceptible to constructive and reconstructive memory processes
for that situation. Although "experts" will generally be better able
to understand and interpret what they see, they also have more
developed and powerful expectations that may engage construc-
tive or reconstructive processes of both perception and memory.
This will be especially true when the observer was not paying full
attention during the event. Whereas an expert observer might
notice inconsistencies with what (s)he expects when paying full
attention and remember them later, that same expert may fail to
notice inconsistencies when devoting minimal attention, thus al-
lowing their schema- or script-based expectations to fill in miss-
166 SCHACTER, supra note 2, at 101; Schacter, supra note 2, at 182.
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ing information through constructive or reconstructive
processes later on.
b. Influence
Constructive processes may also occur because additional in-
formation about an event that is acquired after the original en-
coding essentially becomes confused with the memory of the
original event. This information may later be remembered as if
it had actually been witnessed.
In the eyewitness literature, this phenomenon has been illus-
trated through studies of various ways in which witnesses are ex-
posed to other information or accounts of a crime, such as
newspaper reports, the accounts of other witnesses, interviews by
police, counselors and so on. Laboratory demonstrations of
such phenomena have examined witnesses who have been ex-
posed to new information (that they did not personally witness)
about an event they did earlier witness. These witnesses some-
times later remember falsely that they had actually personally
witnessed the new information. In other words, we cannot al-
ways distinguish between what we have actually seen for ourselves
and what we believe we have seen because we have heard (from
other sources) that it was there. These tendencies will be dis-
cussed and documented in more detail under "Vagaries of Source
Monitoring," below.
2. Reconstructive Processes
Reconstructive memory processes refer to changes in memory
as a result of information acquired after the original encoding.
Like constructive memory processes, reconstructive processes re-
sult from both inferences of what would probably be the case
given the new information and influence from others who might
promote a particular interpretation. Such reconstructive
processes have been well documented both in the general mem-
ory literature and in the eyewitness memory literature in
particular.
Returning to the earlier illustration of the man gripping the
woman's arm, imagine that the witness had seen this event with
no idea of who the two people were or of the nature of the rela-
tionship between them. Subsequently, the witness learns that
the woman was murdered later that night, and that the man is a
suspect. Research on reconstructive memory processes would
suggest that many witnesses in such a situation would "recon-
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struct" their memories of the original event such that the man
would appear more angry or violent, the women more afraid,
and the event as essentially more hostile in nature than those
who did not later learn of the murder.
Claudia Cohen illustrated this process in a classic study.167
Participants watched a videotape of a woman interacting with
her husband. The video portrayed many of the woman's attrib-
utes, behaviors and appearance. Of these, some were consistent
with the stereotype of librarians, but inconsistent with the stere-
otype of waitresses (e.g., wears glasses, listens to classical music).
Others were consistent with the waitress stereotype, but not the
librarian (e.g., affectionate with her husband, drinks beer rather
than wine).
Subjects were divided into four groups. Half were told that
the woman was a waitress and half that she was a librarian. For
each of these groups, half were told her occupation before seeing
the videotape and half after. Later, memories for the woman
and her actions in the tape were assessed.
The results clearly demonstrated the biasing effects of expec-
tations activated either when information is first perceived or
when activated later. Those who were told the woman was a
waitress tended to remember her appearance and behavior as
more consistent with a waitress stereotype (e.g., blond hair,
drinks beer, affectionate with her husband, listens to rock and
roll, etc.), whereas those told she was a librarian tended to re-
member librarian consistent behaviors and attributes (e.g.,
brown hair, drinks wine, listens to classical music, etc.).
Many subsequent studies have shown similar reconstructive ef-
fects of information acquired after the fact.
a. Post-Event Sources of Information/Schematic Activation
The typical witness does not remain an inviolate repository,
storing an exact replica of the events in question. Instead, from
the first moments of the relevant events, witnesses are exposed
to constant sources of influence on their memories. These
sources range from interviews or interrogations by police, attor-
neys, or other investigators to conversations with friends, family,
therapists or other witnesses, to media publicity. Each of these
sources may provide additional true information not originally
167 Claudia E. Cohen, Person Categories and Social Perception: Testing Some Bounda-




observed by the witness or misleading false information. They
may offer interpretations that activate particular schemas and
engage constructive or reconstructive processes.
Constructive and reconstructive memory processes lead to al-
terations or additions in memory outside the awareness of the
witness. When later asked to retrieve memories, the witness may
suffer a phenomenon called "source confusion," as a result of
which (s)he cannot accurately remember where the information
in the memory comes from (for example, from his or her origi-
nal observations versus from subsequent media publicity).
Recently, prominent memory expert Elizabeth Loftus 168 has
offered an account of media and other potentially biasing influ-
ences on eyewitness reports of the intensely publicized crash of
TWA Flight 800 on July 17, 1996. Her description of the history
of witness reports in that case illustrates the power of reconstruc-
tive processes to shape witness memory.
Within days after the crash, the media began to present and
discuss the theory that the plane had been shot down by a mis-
sile. Media reports of the "missile theory" included graphics illus-
trating how the missile shooting may have occurred and reports
of witnesses who saw "a flare" streaking toward the plane imme-
diately preceding the explosion. In one witness report, a Na-
tional Guard helicopter pilot flying in the area during the time
of the crash reported seeing a streak of red-orange light ending
in a small explosion followed by a larger explosion turning into
a huge fireball descending slowly into the ocean. His observa-
tions were broadcast on Rivera Live (CNBC, July 19) two days
after the crash.
Three days after this broadcast, ten more unnamed witnesses
reported seeing something streaking toward the plane before
the explosion. This "missile" theory was pursued and continu-
ously discussed in the media for much of the next year.
The testimony of pilot Meyer and his co-pilot Baur became
crucial in the investigation of the crash. However, as Loftus and
G. Castelle 169 describe in detail, both were subjected to a num-
ber of post-event sources of influence. These included media
publicity of the missile theory, conversations between the pilots
and crew of the helicopter, repeated questioning by media and
- Elizabeth F. Loftus & George Castelle, Crashing Memories in Legal Cases, in
RATIONALITY, INFORMATION AND PROGRESS IN LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY 207 (Peter J.
Van Koppen & Nikolas Roos eds., 2000).
169 See id. at 207.
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investigators, and the use of questionable memory recovery
techniques such as hypnosis, guided imagery and relaxation
techniques.
The pilot Meyer reported recovering a fully detailed memory
of the missile impact in a dream. In fact, however, there is no
evidence that dreams reliably replay real memories. The co-pi-
lot "remembered" the missile impact for the first time after the use
of hypnosis, guided imagery and relaxation, and well after expo-
sure to media accounts and repeated conversations with investi-
gators and the pilot Meyer (the one who had first described
seeing events consistent with the theory of an oncoming missile
and impact). The reports of each changed as time went on, be-
coming more explicit and more consistent with the possibility of
a missile attack. Not surprisingly, the confidence of these wit-
nesses in their reports increased along with the changes.
By October 1997 (more than one year after the crash), the
NTSB had identified 183 witnesses who claimed to have ob-
served a streak of light prior to the explosion of the plane. Did
each of the 183 witnesses who eventually reported seeing the
streak leading toward the plane actually see it? Or did pilot
Meyer and the media reports of the missile theory influence
them? Did they actually see a moving streak? Or did they see
the trace well after it was stationary and "reconstruct" the direc-
tion based on the missile theory?
Ultimately, the CIA concluded that the crash was not caused
by missile attack. They prepared an elaborate video simulation
of the real cause of the crash, explaining that the plane could
have briefly ascended after an explosion blew off the nose caus-
ing the ascending streak seen by the witnesses. Nevertheless,
many witnesses and much of the general public remained un-
convinced, doubtlessly believing to this day that the plane was
brought down by a missile.
Clearly, media and other post-event sources of information in-
fluence memory through reconstructive processes. Once ac-
complished, these reconstructive changes can be highly resistant
to influence. Embedded in a host of beliefs and other informa-
tion that make them seem not only real but also plausible (or
even logically necessary), the new "memories" can become virtu-
ally unassailable.
Research documenting these effects and typical post event
sources of these effects will be discussed in Section XIII.A(2)




b. Memory In Retrospect
"[Memory, the would-be anchor of selves and lives, constructs
the materials from the past that an earlier, more innocent view
would have us believe it merely stored. "170
One of the most powerful causes of reconstruction in memory
is present knowledge. Several lines of research have docu-
mented the influence of present beliefs on memories of our past
behaviors, experiences and beliefs. Generally, this research has
shown that we tend to believe that our past beliefs, behaviors,
and experiences are more consistent with our current beliefs
than they actually were.
1. The "Retrospective Bias"
Studies concerned with the "retrospective bias" have shown that
reports of past attitudes or behaviors are biased by current atti-
tudes or recently acquired information. Recollections of past
political attitudes, for example, tend to be distorted significantly
by current political beliefs.1 7 1 Similarly, recollections of one's
own behavior have been shown to change to conform to newly
acquired information about how one should behave. In other
words, we reconstruct memory of the past so that we believe we
behaved in a more sensible or desirable way than we actually
did. These kinds of distortions toward consistency have long
been known to survey researchers with interest in past behavior,
and underlie the common recommendation to have respon-
dents, when possible, consult records before answering ques-
tions regarding the past.
How could the "retrospective bias" become important in litiga-
tion? Generally, both tragic events and the lawsuits that follow
them tend to identify actions we should have taken but did not,
and those we should not have taken but did. The retrospective
bias would tend to lead us to misremember our actions as more
correct and desirable than they actually were. Just as self-protec-
tive motivations may lead to deliberately false testimony, the ret-
rospective bias may cause "honest" false testimony.
170 Eakin, supra note 4, at 291.
171 Robyn M. Dawes, Biases of Retrospection, 1 ISSUES CHILD ABUSE ACCUSATIONS
25 (1991); LindaJ. Levine, Reconstructing Memoyfor Emotions, 126J. Exp. PSYCHOL.
GEN. 165 (1997).
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2. "Hindsight is 20/20," or Is It?
Just as the proverbial Monday morning quarterback is certain
he could have predicted the outcome of the "Hail Mary" pass
lofted in the final moments of the playoff game, human observ-
ers typically feel they could have predicted the outcomes of eve-
ryday events, such as a neighbors' divorce, a political election, a
business investment, career choices or foreign policy decisions.
Past events appear simple, comprehensible, and predictable in
comparison to the events of the future. This tendency to be-
lieve, in hindsight, that we knew in foresight that particular
events or actions would lead to specific outcomes is called the
"hindsight bias. 172
Once an outcome is known, victims of this "hindsight bias"
have been shown to not only overestimate, in hindsight, how
likely that particular outcome was to occur, but to also overesti-
mate what others could have or should have anticipated in fore-
sight, thus giving them undue credit or blame for the outcome.
Further, blissfully ignorant of their own hindsight biases, they
cannot accurately remember their own judgments or behavior
before the outcome was known, recalling instead that they were
wiser ("I knew it all along!") and more confident ("And I was sure
of it!") and that their behavior was more consistent with that
knowledge ("I told you that would happen" or "I checked that seal
before we took off') before the event than was actually the case.
Finally, having rewritten the history of their judgments and thus
not acknowledging their mistakes, victims of hindsight feel less
need to reevaluate and improve their decision-making processes
and evidence-gathering strategies and therefore do not learn ef-
fectively from their errors.
173
Baruch Fischhoff1 74 called this tendency to perceive past
events as inevitable consequences of their predecessors "creeping
172 Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight Does Not Equal Foresight: The Effect of Outcome
Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. ExP. PSYCHOL. HUM. PERCEPT. PER-
FORM. 288 (1975); Baruch Fischhoff, Perceived Informativeness of Facts, 3 J. Exp.
PSYCHOL. HUM. PERCEPT. PERFORM. 349 (1977); Baruch Fischhoff, For Those Con-
demned to Study the Past: Heuristics and Biases and Hindsight, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 162 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
173 Deborah Davis, What Would I Think If I Didn't Know the Patient Died, in FROM
THE MIND'S EYE 1 (Deborah Davis ed., 1991); Scott A. Hawkins & Reid Hastie,
Hindsight: Biased Judgments of Past Events After the Outcomes Are Known, 107
PSYCHOL. BULL. 311 (1990).
174 Fischhoff, Hindsight Does Not Equal Foresight, supra note 171, at 288;
Fischhoff, Perceived Informativeness of Facts, supra note 171, at 349; Fischhoff, For
Those Condemned to Study the Past, supra note 171, at 162.
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determinism." In other words, in retrospect, we seem to perceive
the past as a sequence of events that follow logically from one
another. Since the outcome is perceived to follow logically from
events preceding it (determinism), we develop the perception
that no other outcome was possible under the circumstances,
that we knew it all along, that we were behaving accordingly,
that others should have known it too, and that because they
should have known better, they are responsible for any negative
outcomes of their actions.
A number of studies have examined the implications of this
"hindsight bias" in the legal system. Some of the focus of this
research has simply been the fact that judgments in hindsight can
be inappropriately harsh because people blame themselves or
others for making the wrong decision even though in foresight
the decision made sense based on the information available at
the time. For example, several studies showed that judgment of
medical and financial decisions and of behaviors on a date are
affected by knowledge of the outcome. The exact same actions,
judged without knowledge of the outcome, are viewed as more
competent or appropriate in foresight. In hindsight, however, if
the patient died, the money was lost, or the girl was raped, the
same behaviors are judged as incompetent or inappropriate.
Thus, many lawsuits and verdicts may be caused by harsh judg-
ments in hindsight.'75
However, the effects of hindsight also include reconstructive
memory processes. That is, the outcome (or result) of a behavior
that took place in the past is a new piece of information that can
cause reconstructive memory processes in the same way as any
other new information. In this case, as with other new informa-
tion, memory is altered so that the previously stored information
is changed to appear more consistent with the new information.
If the outcome is negative, for example, the observer may recon-
struct the memory of the behaviors leading up to the outcome
(such as conversations, precautions, information searches and
so on) such that they appear more inappropriate or inadequate.
On the other hand, one's own behavior may be reconstructed to
appear more appropriate.
Interestingly, one of the first studies of hindsight in the legal
setting dealt with biases in production of evidence rather than in
reactions to it. That is, rather than biases in judgments of the
175 Davis, supra note 172, at 1.
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jury and judiciary, it dealt with distortions in witnesses' recollec-
tion of the events preceding the outcome at issue in trial.
a. John Dean and the Watergate Cover-up
"I began by telling him there was a cancer growing on the Presidency,
and that if the cancer was not removed, the President himself
would be killed by it."
John Dean176
Once the Watergate cover-up failed and President Nixon and
his staff became the target of Watergate investigators, John Dean
confidently reported that he had known all along that the cover-
up would fail and that Nixon would be in jeopardy as a result.
Was this confident assertion just an example of the hindsight
bias in operation, or did Dean actually foresee the outcome and
warn the president?
Cognitive psychologist Ulric Neisser 177 analyzed the portion of
John Dean's testimony during the Watergate hearings recount-
ing his conversations with the President. This analysis provided
an ideal opportunity to examine the effects of hindsight on re-
call. Unlike most evidentiary situations, Dean's testimony could
be compared to an objective record of the events in question-
i.e., the subsequently released recording of his conversations
with the President. 178
Neisser traced many errors in Dean's testimony to events sub-
sequent to the conversations he recounted, clearly demonstrat-
ing that Dean's testimony concerning events prior to exposure
of the cover-up was biased by his knowledge of later events.
Dean claimed, as quoted above, that he had warned Nixon of
the danger of exposure of the cover-up which hindsight clearly
exposed as dangerous and of the consequences for Nixon him-
self that were also confirmed in hindsight, although the tapes
later revealed that he had given no such warnings. Dean re-
ported with likely absolute belief in their verity things that should
have occurred given his hindsightful knowledge of the
outcomes.
Such objective comparisons of testimony with fact are, unfor-
tunately, rare. However, studies of the biasing effects of hind-
176 Hearings before the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities of the
United States Senate, 93d Cong. 988 (1973).
177 Ulric Neisser, John Dean's Memory: A Case Study, in MEMORY OBSERVED: RE-
MEMBERING IN NATURAL CONTEXTS 263 (Ulric Neisser ed., 1982).
178 JOHN DEAN, THE PRESIDENTIAL TRANSCRIPTS (1974).
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sight, and of retrospective biases in general, on memory suggest
that distortions due to hindsightful knowledge of subsequent
events will be pervasive.
Civil litigation routinely involves lengthy sequences of events
involving many people leading up to a particular outcome. Avi-
ation litigation, in particular, often involves testimony reaching
back twenty years or more, covering the design and manufac-
ture of the model aircraft involved, the history of its ownership
and maintenance, the actions of owners and maintenance per-
sonnel covering the period before the crash, and the actions of
ground personnel, crew, passengers and others immediately
preceding the crash.
Hindsight will distort testimony among many, if not most,
such witnesses. Some will remember the status of the plane as
more dangerous in hindsight than they perceived in foresight.
Others will remember that they performed maintenance and in-
spection procedures that they should have but did not. Passen-
gers may remember that they asked the pilot about maintenance
and were reassured, as in our Nevada case, whether they did or
not. The pilot may remember that he performed appropriate
emergency maneuvers that were never done, as when Nevada's
state politician Seale "remembered" that he feathered his propeller
when his engine failed although he did not. In many ways,
through many voices, hindsight will permeate the fabric of the
case.
D. COLLABORATION/INFLUENCE BETWEEN WITNESSES
The first author recently testified in the trial of Mr. Strode, a
man accused of an Oregon bank robbery. The perpetrator was
described to police over the phone during the initial report of
the robbery. As police operators were asking for a description,
they were told to wait, "We're getting a consensus on that." The
witnesses continued to discuss the propir description of the per-
petrator, and finally provided a description of an Asian or His-
panic man with long black hair wearing a running suit. They
provided estimates of height and weight and a description of the
suit.
Police then picked up the only dark skinned man who could
pass as Asian or Hispanic in the area, although he was not in a
jogging suit, and brought him to the bank. The defendant was
made to stand in front of the police car outside the window of
the bank for witnesses to identify. As soon as she saw him, the
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teller who was robbed burst into tears and collapsed on the
floor.
How should we interpret the testimony of the bank witnesses?
Should we trust the initial description arrived at after resolving
any individual differences through discussion? How might the
other witnesses have been influenced by the reaction of the
teller? Similarly, how should we interpret the testimony of heli-
copter co-pilot Baur from the TWA case (or the other 183
ground witnesses) in light of their exposure to pilot Meyer's tes-
timony through his media appearances and to the accounts of
both Meyer and other witnesses through descriptions from me-
dia reporters? Social science research would indicate that we
should be wary. The way in which influence may occur between
witnesses is amply documented in the social science literature.
The potential of people to influence one another's judgments
is well documented in a well-known series of studies on con-
formity conducted by Solomon Asch in the 1950's. Generally,
the method employed in Asch's original research and that of
those who followed was to expose subjects to a stimulus of some
sort and ask for a judgment. The judgment could be objective,
such as the length of a line, distance between points of light,
height, etc. or subjective, such as the quality of a work of art,
pleasantness of taste, and many more. The subjects were asked
for their judgments under various conditions of potential for
group influence.
Typically, conditions with high potential for influence, such as
when others have announced their judgment first, when the
subject must announce his or her judgment in front of the
group, when the subject is less sure of his or her own judgment,
etc., are contrasted with those with less potential, such as when
the subject announces his or her judgment without knowing the
judgment of others, when the subject's judgment can be made
anonymously, when the subject is more expert than the others,
etc. Uniformly, these studies have found that subjects' judg-
ments are influenced by the judgments of others. Further, they
are more influenced by the judgments of those they perceive as:
(a) more expert than they are, or particularly credible for any
reason; (b) well-liked; or (c) part of their own in-group. Sub-
jects are also more influenced on judgments of stimuli where
they are uncertain of their own judgment.
It is important to note that when subjects announce their
judgment when they know of others' judgments, they announce
judgments different from those they make when judging alone.
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This occurs for two reasons. First, they are sometimes unsure of
the correct answer and use others' judgments as a source of in-
formation about what is true. Second, they sometimes conform
just to please others or avoid social rejection.
It is also important to note the extremity of distortion that can
result from knowledge of others' judgments. In the original
studies of this topic, Solomon Asch had groups of subjects judge
the length of lines. He exposed subjects to a target line (on one
presentation card) and three comparison lines (on another
card). The subjects' task was to choose which comparison line
matched the target line. Asch constructed the comparison lines
such that the task was very easy. There was no doubt of the cor-
rect response. When subjects did this task alone (for twenty-
four comparisons), the error rate was practically zero.
However, Asch set up another condition where he had varying
numbers of confederates announce incorrect judgments on
eighteen of twenty-four trials before the subjects' turn. Among
subjects who heard the incorrect responses from others, only
10% remained free of error. A full 90% of the subjects gave
incorrect responses on at least one of eighteen possible trials,
and 25% responded incorrectly on all trials.
Asch's results were impressive because: (a) virtually no sub-
jects completely resisted the influence of what they could clearly
see were false judgments of others; and (b) so many subjects
completely succumbed to that influence. Asch's findings have
been replicated over and over in many studies that followed.
These findings have also been replicated in the context ofjury
decision-making, where it has been shown that when jurors take
a show of hands to vote on guilt there is substantial conformity
to others. A show of hands is more likely to result in an immedi-
ate verdict than an anonymous poll because jurors who might
otherwise maintain a minority opinion are swayed by the knowl-
edge of the majority opinion.
The social influence and conformity literature has conclu-
sively demonstrated the power of social influence to alter re-
ported judgments. Additionally there is direct evidence from
the eyewitness literature demonstrating that co-witnesses can in-
fluence both the accuracy of one another's testimony as well as
their confidence in those accounts. For example, Elizabeth Lof-
tus and Edith Greene 179 (1980) found that participant-witnesses
179 Elizabeth F. Loftus & Edith Greene, Warning: Even Memory for Faces May be
Contagious, 4 LAw AND HUM. BERAV. 323 (1980).
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incorporated misleading details from other witnesses' written
descriptions into their own descriptions of target faces. More
recently, Wright, Self and Justice,8 0 demonstrated that other
witnesses can influence memory for cars, and Betz, Skowronski,
and Ostrom 8 have demonstrated that bogus responses of
others can influence people's later memory reports for details
from a written story.
These memory studies focused on later reports from a witness
after that witness had already been exposed to co-witness state-
ments. However, there is also evidence for immediate effects of
co-witness reports. Perhaps the clearest demonstration of these
efforts can be seen in a series of three studies by Shaw, Garven
and Wood. 18 2 In the first study, student witnesses were ques-
tioned in ways that were intended to be analogous to the experi-
ence of a witness who receives information from an interviewer
or questioner about what other witnesses have already said. A
second and third study simulated the situation where witnesses
received the information directly from co-witnesses. In all three
studies, witness reports were significantly affected by informa-
tion about the reports of other witnesses, whether they received
the information directly from the co-witnesses or indirectly from
the interviewer.
Further, the experimenters varied whether the interviewer
conducted the interview in a misleading way by suggesting par-
ticular incorrect responses. The misleading interview questions
created more errors in witness reports. The most errors, how-
ever, were committed by witnesses who received incorrect infor-
mation both directly from other witnesses and indirectly via the
misleading questions of the interviewers. These results suggest
that discussions between co-witnesses have great potential to in-
fluence the testimony of all of the witnesses. When interviews by
police or other investigators suggest information similar to that
being conveyed by other witnesses, a target witness will be partic-
ularly likely to adopt the suggested account.
The potential for immediate influence between witnesses has
far reaching consequences. They not only shape one another's
initial reports. A witness' first statements have been shown to
180 Daniel B. Wright et al., Memory Conformity: Exploring Misinformation Effects
Wen Presented by Another Person, 91 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 189 (2000).
181 Andrew L. Betz et al., Shared Realities: Social Influence and Stimulus Memory, 14
Soc. COGN. 113 (1996).
182 John S. Shaw III et al., Co-Witness Information Can Have Immediate Effects on
Eyewitness Memory Reports, 21 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 503 (1997).
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shape that witness' later reports during subsequent interviews or
court appearances. In other words, once a witness has told his
or her version of what happened, that witness is likely to stick
with that account in the future. Loftus183 has referred to this
phenomenon as the 'freezing effect." As time goes by, it becomes
increasingly difficult for a witness to change or back down from
an initial statement or identification. The pressures to continue
to be consistent can overwhelm virtually any witness.
Further, the first statements of even a single witness may influ-
ence the subsequent investigation of a case, just as helicopter
pilot Meyer's initial report of the TWA explosion triggered the
"missile theory" of the crash and thousands of hours of investiga-
tion of that theory, and influenced countless reports of witnesses
who heard Meyer's account on TV before being interviewed
themselves. Similarly, based upon one witness's initial account
of a criminal incident, the police may construct a lineup, choose
particular mug shots, interview specific witnesses, formulate de-
tailed theories about the commission of the crime, and even
make an arrest. Thus, even minor errors, misstatements, or
omissions in one witness's initial memory report can have far
reaching effects on the investigation of the case, 184 whether civil
or criminal.
1. Inflation of Witness Confidence Through Collaboration/
Corroboration
We have discussed earlier how witness confidence is minimally
associated with witness accuracy. Thus, it is important to point
out that witness confidence can be inflated through discussions
with other witnesses and the knowledge that they agree with the
witness's own account of the events in question. For example,
Luus and Wells1 8 5 showed that confidence became inflated in wit-
nesses who knew another witness made the same perpetrator
identification. They staged a theft in front of seventy pairs of
witnesses. Witnesses who were told that their co-witness identi-
fied the same person they had identified showed an increase in
confidence in their identifications, as expressed to an ostensible
police officer. Those who thought their co-witness disagreed
showed deflation of confidence.
183 ELIZABETH F. LoFrus, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979).
184 Shaw III et al., supra note 181, at 503.
185 Luus & Wells, supra note 16, at 714.
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Luus and Wells then showed tapes of the seventy witnesses to
other mock jurors who judged the credibility of their testimony.
Witnesses who had heard that other witnesses agreed with their
identifications were judged as more credible by the mock jurors
than those who had heard that other witnesses had disagreed or
who had not been given any information. In other words, wit-
ness confidence was affected by information about the opinions
of other witnesses, and the witnesses' confidence, in turn, af-
fected mock jurors' judgments of their credibility.
Finally, it is important to point out that social influence be-
tween witnesses may occur due to both the influence of the infor-
mation conveyed between them and the potential for motivational
distortions in memory created by any desire they may have to
avoid rejection or to help or support others, whether it be other
fact witnesses, investigators, or parties to the case. To the extent
this motivation exists, it would tend to both distort their own
memories in the direction consistent with the interests of the
other person and to render them more susceptible to the influ-
ence of any source who might be reporting the events in line
with the other's interests.
Expert testimony on issues of witness contamination will be
useful since jurors will not understand the potential for wit-
nesses to influence one another's memories. Jurors will also not
understand that collaboration among witnesses will inflate their
confidence. Instead, jurors will tend to assume the inflated con-
fidence the witnesses may display means they are accurate.
VI. RETRIEVAL PROCESSES
"[Elven the seemingly simple act of calling to mind a memory of a par-
ticular past experience... is constructed from influences operating in
the present as well as from information you have stored
about the past. "186
Even if the witness has accurately encoded and stored infor-
mation until asked to retrieve and report it, accuracy may still be
compromised during the process of retrieval as we attempt to
reconstruct our original observations. Recall, we do not store a
precise record of what we observe. We store bits and pieces that
provide the basis for reconstructing the event much like, as Neis-
186 SCHACTER, supra note 2, at 8.
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ser 8 7 suggested, the paleontologist reconstructs a dinosaur from
fragments of bone.
However, just as the paleontologist's reconstruction is part
fact and part inference, so are the memories we reconstruct
when asked to retrieve them. Particularly when the real memo-
ries of the event are not clear, our reports of them become sus-
ceptible to a wide variety of influences.
A. CONFIDENCE AND COMMITMENT ENHANCING PROCESSES
Recall our earlier discussion of the impact of witness confi-
dence on juror belief in the witness' testimony. Processes associ-
ated with retrieval of memories can have profound effects on
the content of witness testimony as well as the confidence of the
witness. These processes include both post-event interviews and
discussions with other witnesses, police, investigators and attor-
neys, as well as specific memory retrieval techniques designed to
enhance retrieval of difficult or lost memories.
1. Confirmatory Feedback
Among the processes that lead to enhanced confidence is
feedback suggesting that witness reports are correct. Gary Wells
and Amy Bradfield""8 illustrated this problem in the eyewitness
identification context, where police often praise witnesses who
have identified a suspect for having picked the right one. As the
authors note, the witness' confidence will be inflated by feed-
back that (s)he identified the same suspect police believe to be
guilty.
Similarly, confirmation is provided by police for other aspects
of witness reports and by attorneys and other witnesses among
others. All confirmatory feedback has the potential to both arti-
ficially inflate confidence and to interfere with any true but con-
tradictory memories the subject may have had.
2. "Illusory Truth" Through Repeated Rehearsal, Questioning or
Recounting
In legal settings, once something is witnessed or experienced,
memories of the event are typically retrieved repeatedly as the
witness thinks about what happened. Particularly when the
187 NEISSER, supra note 164, at 285.
- Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, "Good, You Identified the Suspect": Feedback
to Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. APPL. PSYCHOL.
360 (1998).
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event is unexpected, before a witness recounts them even for
the first time, the memories are continually "constructed" by the
witness' efforts to understand and process what happened.
Before trial, the average witness will have retrieved and reported
relevant memories countless times for many different audiences,
ranging from other witnesses on the scene to police interview-
ers, friends, family, counselors, corporate employees, doctors,
attorneys, media, and many others. On each of these occasions,
memory is changed. It may simply begin to seem more certain
or real, or details may be added or changed. No matter the na-
ture of the change, it will have the potential to affect the jury's
assessment of the witness.
Even the simple act of repeating a statement can increase the
strength of one's belief in its truth. Memory researchers have
dubbed this effect the "illusory truth effect. "I The effect occurs
from the mere act of repetition, even when statements are sim-
ply repeated in the laboratory with no implication the statement
is true, and out of context, without the personal involvement
and very real consequences inherent in case-relevant testimony.
How much stronger would such effects become when the other
influences around a witness are consistent with the statements
being repeated?
A witness may or may not alter a memory as a result of re-
counting. The repeated recounting may simply cause the wit-
ness to have increased confidence in the memory. However,
increased confidence will tend to increase the witness' credibil-
ity, thereby affecting the jury's reaction to the testimony. More
seriously, post-event discussions may substantially alter memory
and completely mislead the jury. Thus, whether large or small,
the changes in witness memories that come from post-event in-
terviews and discussions are rarely trivial.
a. Preparation for Cross-Examination
Repetition and rehearsal in the context of cross-examination
have exceptional potential for enhancing witness confidence.
The context of a trial team's preparation for trial is, by its na-
ture, focused on promoting one point of view. The witness may
189 Hal R. Arkes et al., Determinants of Judged Validity, 27 J. Exp. Soc. PSYCHOL.
576 (1991); Hal R. Arkes et al., The Generality of the Relation Between Familiarity and
Judged Validity, 2J. BEHAV. DEC. MAFiNG 81 (1989); Ian M. Begg, et al., Dissociation
of Processes in Belief. Source Recollection, Statement Familiarity, and the Illusion of Truth,
21 J. Exp. PSYCHOL. GEN. 446 (1992).
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be exposed to the full arguments and evidence for that point of
view. Further, with a good trial team, sometimes including trial
consultants, the witness may be led repeatedly through expected
testimony, practicing direct testimony and how to handle cross-
examination. Mere exposure to the arguments and evidence
consistent with one's testimony will build confidence, as will the
successful experiences of handling mock cross-examination.
VII. FAILURES OF RETRIEVAL
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXTUAL CUES FOR RETRIEVAL
"Recollection is a kind of perception, . . . and every context
will alter the nature of what is recalled. "190
One of the most well-established phenomena in memory re-
search is the fact that our ability to retrieve a memory is strongly
affected by the context in which we try to remember. All of us
experience this effect every day as memories are constantly trig-
gered by something we see, read, or hear that "reminds" us of
something associated in memory with what we just encountered.
Similarly, we fall victim to failures of memory triggered by con-
textual features that temporarily block the memory we are look-
ing for, as when we cannot remember one person's name
because a recent encounter with a person with a similar name
has blocked it. Thus, to understand how retrieval can be either
compromised or enhanced, it is important to understand how
context affects retrieval.
1. Finding the Path to Memory
Retrieval of memories tends to occur through associative
pathways connecting related information in memory. Forget-
ting occurs, in part, because as time passes, interference from
new information makes it progressively more difficult to find a
retrieval cue that triggers the associative pathway.191
a. Start with Cues Associated with the Event
A particular memory can become easier to retrieve if the per-
son is first reminded of related information-a principle called
"context-dependent memory." This process has been illustrated, for
example, in studies of "cued recall, "showing that providing "cues"
190 ISRAEL ROSENFELD, THE INVENTION OF MEMORY: A NEW VIEW OF THE BRAIN
89 (1988).
191 SCHACTER, supra note 2, at 77.
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related to the information to be retrieved aids retrieval; for ex-
ample, in studies demonstrating that returning victims to the
scene of a crime helps them remember details they could not
otherwise remember, 9 2 that scuba divers can remember lists of
words learned in water better when they are again in water than
when on land and lists learned on land better when again on
land than when in water, 193 in studies of "state-dependent learn-
ing, "indicating that retrieval is superior when attempted in the
same state as the person was in when the information was origi-
nally encountered (such as when using drugs or alcohol), and in
studies of "mood-congruent retrieval, ,194 showing that it is easier to
retrieve pleasant memories when in a pleasant mood and un-
pleasant memories when in an unpleasant mood.195
b. Interfering Contextual Cues and Memory "Blocking"
Just as retrieval may be facilitated by useful contextual cues,
interfering contextual cues may also block it. Even if a person
has encoded an event deeply and it has not been lost from stor-
age over time, (s)he may be temporarily unable to retrieve the
memory. Daniel Schacter 196 included this among his list of
seven sins of memory under the name "blocking." Very often,
memory is "blocked" by something in the current context making
it more difficult to think of the desired information. Typically,
information that tends to block retrieval is related in some way
to the information sought as, for example, when the attempt to
retrieve one person's name is blocked by another similar name.
Although blocking is usually temporary, it may occur over a
longer term. This was illustrated in a witness memory para-
digm,197 where it was shown that repeated retrieval of some as-
pects of a witnessed event can block retrieval of other related
aspects of the event. Participants viewed photographs of a crime
192 RONALD P. FISHER & R.E. GEISELMAN, MEMORY-ENHANCING TECHNIQUES FOR
INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING: THE COGNITIVE INTERVIEW (1992).
193 Duncan R. Godden & Alan D. Baddeley, Context-Dependent Memory in Two
Natural Environments: On Land and Underwater, 66 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 325 (1975).
194 Gordon H. Bower, How Might Emotions Affect Learning, in THE HANDBOOK OF
EMOTION AND MEMORY: RESEARCH AND THEORY 3 (S. Christianson ed., 1992); Su-
san Mineka & Kathleen Nugent, Mood-Congruent Memory Biases in Anxiety and De-
pression, in MEMORY DISTORTION: How MINDS, BRAINS AND SOCIETIES RECONSTRUCT
THE PAST 173 (Daniel L. Schacter ed., 1995).
195 Christianson & Safer, supra note 61, at 218; SCHACTER, supra note 2, at 211.
196 Schacter, supra note 2, at 182.
197 JOHN S. SHAW III ET AL., RETRIEVAL-INDUCED FORGETTING IN AN EYEWITNESS
MEMORY PARADIGM 2 (1995).
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scene and then were repeatedly questioned about certain cate-
gories of objects in the scene. Subjects were repeatedly ques-
tioned about some objects from the category in question but not
others. Later, compared to objects in other categories, subjects
had poorer memory for the non-reviewed objects in the target
category. That is, the repeated retrieval of some objects in a
particular category (such as clothes) appeared to block memory
for related others that had not been similarly rehearsed.
The implication of this later research is that post-event ques-
tioning leading the witness to focus selectively on some aspects
of the event can cause difficulty in remembering other details
that may be very important.
c. Led Down the Wrong Path: The Effects of Biasing
Retrieval Cues
Schacter' 98 argued that memory is not simply "cued" by con-
textual cues; it is shaped and constructed by these cues. He ar-
gued that retrieval cues combine with the stored memory
"engram" to yield "a new, emergent entity-the recollective experience of
the rememberer-that differs from either of its constituents. "9
Schacter 20 0 reported an experiment in which college students
looked at photographs of people they had heard speak in either
a pleasant or irritating tone of voice. Later, they were asked to
recall the speaker's tone of voice. They were cued with photo-
graphs of the speaker posing with either a slight smile or slight
scowl. Regardless of the actual. original tone of voice of the
speaker, subjects who were cued with a smiling face were more
likely to "remember" a pleasant tone of voice and those cued with
a scowling face were more likely to "remember" an irritating tone
of voice. In other words, memory was greatly influenced by the
retrieval cue, drifting toward consistency with the cue. Similar
biasing influence of questions as retrieval cues can be seen in
studies of the "misinformation effect" found in 2.e below. 20 '
To summarize, memory is affected in many ways by the con-
textual cues present during retrieval. These cues may either fa-
cilitate or interfere with memory. Thus, it is important for the
attorney (or the memory expert) to consider the context in
198 Schacter, supra note 2, at 104.
199 See id.
200 SCHACTER, supra note 2, at 70.
201 See infra Section VII.C(1) (e).
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which the memory was retrieved and be aware of the potential
for bias.
B. CONFUSING THE PRESENT WITH THE PAST: THE IMPORTANCE
OF CURRENT MOTIVATIONS, GOALS, AND BELIEFS
Recall our earlier discussion of the "retrospective bias." Current
motivations, goals, and beliefs provide powerful cues that both
direct retrieval and color interpretation of what is retrieved. In
the earlier section, we reviewed evidence that current beliefs
and motives cause us to remember the past as more consistent
with the present than it actually was.
There is also evidence that present motivation affects this ten-
dency directly through its effect on the ability to retrieve consis-
tent versus inconsistent information. For example, the
phenomenon called "mood-congruent retrieval," referred to above
as affecting retrieval through contextual cueing processes, may
also result from motivated-retrieval processes or the desire to avoid
mood-incongruent memories.0 2
C. DISSOCIATION AND THE VAGARIES OF SOURCE MONITORING
On the evening of October 4, 1992, shortly after take-off, an
El Al Boeing 747 crashed directly into an eleven-story Amster-
dam apartment building. The plane crashed almost straight
nose-down, immediately bursting into flames as it fell to the
ground. Media coverage never included the crash itself, but be-
gan within the first hour after the crash and included films of
the ensuing fire and rescue operations. Coverage continued for
some time and reached most of the country.
In a study appropriately titled "Crashing Memories and the Prob-
lem of Source Monitoring," Hans Crombag and his colleagues,
Wagenaar, and Van Koppen,2 °3 examined the memories of
Dutch citizens exposed to media accounts of the El Al crash.
The authors were interested in the potential for media accounts
to cause reasonably intelligent adults to believe they had wit-
nessed the crash they could not actually have seen themselves.
Although the crash was not filmed and never shown on TV,
many accounts were given in both television and written media.
In two separate surveys, ten months after the crash, the authors
asked respondents, "Did you see the television film of the mo-
202 Bower, supra note 193, at 3.
203 Hans F. M. Crombag et al., Crashing Memories and the Problem of Source Moni-
toring, 10 APPL. COGN. PSYCHOL. 95 (1996).
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ment the plane hit the apartment building?" Those who an-
swered "yes" were then asked whether they could remember
how long it was until the plane caught fire. Startlingly, notwith-
standing the implausibility of the media having caught the mo-
ment of the crash on film, more than half of the respondents
reported having seen the crash (55% and 66%, in the first and
second surveys). Of those who "remembered" seeing the crash,
more than 80% "remembered" when the fire started, although
some did so incorrectly. Many gave vividly detailed descriptions
of the crash they could not have actually seen.
Did these Dutch residents really remember seeing the crash?
Did they just report what they believed happened? If they did
remember the crash, how could these pseudo-memories de-
velop, and why did the residents not understand that they were
not real? These are the questions examined by memory re-
searchers concerned with the problem of "source monitoring. '4
Crombag's21 1 5 dramatic illustration of the ease with which we
can "remember" things that never were is one among a growing
literature documenting the facility with which false memories
can be created, and the mechanisms through which they are
produced.
Crombag,20 6 for example, attributed the false "crashing memo-
ries" of the Dutch citizens to problems of "source monitoring, " or
failure to understand where the vivid images of the crash they
"remembered" came from. The authors argued that the false
memories reported by their respondents were based on vivid in-
ternal images the respondents had created through imagining
the various scenes described in the media. Eventually, exper-
iencing failures of "source monitoring, "the respondents confused
these internally created images with actual memory for the
event.
Crombag20 7 suggested that source-monitoring failure may be
even more common for memories of dramatic, highly publi-
cized events such as a plane crash than for more mundane
events. Events tending to provoke both publicity and discussion
204 Marcia K. Johnson, Discriminating the Origin of Information, in DELUSIONAL
BELIEFS: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 34 (Thomas F. Oltmanns & B.A. Maher
eds., 1988); Marcia K. Johnson & Carol L. Raye, Cognitive and Brain Mechanisms of
False Memories and Beliefs, in MEMORY, BRAIN, AND BELIEF 35 (D.L. Schacter &
Elaine Scarry eds., 2000).
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and to evoke vivid images are more likely to impair our ability to
accurately track the sources of these images. °8
Still, "How?" we might ask. How can we confuse knowledge of
facts we gained from watching television with the actual memory
of seeing an event? Marcia K. Johnson offered an explanation
based on cognitive studies of the contributions of reality moni-
toring and source monitoring to the delusions and confabula-
tions of the brain damaged or mentally ill.2°9 She argued that
the characteristics making a perception, a belief, or an event memory
seem real are common to all three. Because the basis of the
sense of reality is the same for a belief as for an actual event
memory, the potential for confusion between them is high.
According to Johnson, the bases of the sense of reality include
sensory detail, embeddedness in spatial and temporal context,
embeddedness in supporting memories, knowledge, beliefs and
"the absence of consciousness of or memory for the cognitive operations
producing the event or belief. ,21o
Notice, all of the factors Johnson cited as sources of the feel-
ing of "reality" are often present even when one did not witness
or experience an event. We can receive a host of information
from other sources, such as interviews, conversations with
others, or accounts in the media (as in the El Al and TWA
cases). The information can provide a great deal of detail, help-
ing us to form our own visual images of the events discussed. It
can include more than sufficient contextual and historical infor-
mation to give us a sense of how the event fits into time, place,
and situation and how it makes sense in the context of other
relevant knowledge and memories. The high visual imagery for
an event that makes sense contextually creates the sense of real-
ity that can become confused with actual reality. Thus, the
sense of reality associated with false event memories can be cre-
ated through any number of pathways, ranging from simply
thinking about or imagining something oneself, or describing it
to others, to the massive and redundant publicity associated with
dramatic public events, of which aviation disasters are powerful
examples.
208 Marcia K. Johnson et al., Phenomenal Characteristics of Memories for Perceived
and Imagined Autobiographical Events, 117 J. Exp. PSYCHOL. GEN. 371 (1988).
209 Johnson, Discriminating the Origin of Information, supra note 203, at 34; Mar-
cia K Johnson, Reality Monitoring: Evidence from Confabulation in Organic Brain Dis-
ease Patients, in AWARENESS OF DEFICIT AFTER BRAIN INJURY: CLINICAL AND
THEORETICAL ISSUES 176 (G.P. Prigatano & D.L. Schachter eds., 1991).
210 Johnson, supra note 203, at 57.
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The eyewitness literature has identified a number of factors
common to witnesses in a host of events that tend to induce
false memories through problems of source monitoring. In the
sections that follow, we will first discuss the nature of difficulties
in memory caused by dissociation and inaccurate source moni-
toring. We will then consider specific areas of testimony in
which source monitoring causes problems.
Next, we will consider common causes of source monitoring
errors, such as pretrial publicity or suggestive interviews, and re-
view what is known about interviewing techniques that enhance
or minimize memory distortion. We will then turn to the discus-
sion of techniques commonly employed to aid in retrieval of
"lost" memories that have been shown to distort memory, and
even to create confabulation, or false memories. Finally, we will
consider organic causes of source amnesia, including brain dam-
age and aging.
1. The Nature of Dissociation and Source Misattribution
Accurate recollection depends in part on the ability to recall
exactly where, when, and with whom an event occurred and
from where one's own exposure to the event came (i.e., being
present versus hearing about it later). In others words, accurate
recollection includes accurate memory of the context in which
events or information were encountered. These contextual as-
sociations are referred to as "source memory."
Source memory is absolutely crucial to everyday life. It lies at
the heart of our ability to distinguish actual memories from in-
tentions, fantasies, delusions and other products of our imagina-
tion. Mistakes in these crucial distinctions are not confined to
the mentally ill. As asked earlier, how many of us over forty have
wondered whether we actually took a pill, mailed a letter, locked
the door, etc. or only thought about it?
Our ability to make such everyday distinctions between what
we thought about doing and what we actually did depends upon
accurate source memory in the same manner as distinctions be-
tween reality and fantasy, or between what we actually witnessed
during the course of a crime or accident and what we saw and
heard described in later media accounts.
Unfortunately, memory research has clearly shown that
source memory is extremely fallible. Several lines of research in
basic cognitive processing have demonstrated that experiences
are often encoded or retained at a level below conscious aware-
ness. In other words, the subject may have no conscious mem-
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ory of the experience. Yet, these experiences have
demonstrable effects on subsequent behavior, including the
feeling of familiarity with the stimulus, with no memory of hav-
ing been previously exposed to it, and confusion of the source
of familiarity among many other effects. These phenomena are
documented in literature on what is called "automatic process-
ing' 211 and "implicit memory. '' 212 Together, this research exam-
ines the way in which material is registered in memory without
conscious awareness, and the way in which the material in mem-
ory outside conscious awareness affects current memory and be-
havior so that the person does not understand the source of the
memories or the reasons for current behavior. These processes
have been explicitly addressed in the witness memory literature.
In fact, errors in source memory are responsible for a number
of the common failures of witness memory.
2. Common Distortions Due to Difficulties in Source Monitoring
a. Remember When ... ? Difficulties in Memory For
Timing of Autobiographical Events
Among the most common failures of source memory is re-
membering when something happened. 13 What if we were
asked what we did two weeks ago on Tuesday night? Many of us
who have no regularly scheduled activities on Tuesday nights
would be at a loss. Or what if we were asked when we last had
our oil changed? Even worse, what if we had to recall the year
that we read a certain book? Most of us fail miserably when
asked such questions.
Memory for times and places is especially poor for events that
occur repetitively. Victims of repeated physical or sexual abuse,
for example, remember the gist of their experiences. However,
they often confuse the details of particular incidents, including
the time or dates of particular assaults and which specific actions
occurred on which specific occasion. As events recur, it can be-
211 Bargh, supra note 47, at 9.
212 Henry L. Roediger & Kathleen B. McDermott, Implicit Memory in Normal
Human Subjects, in HANDBOOK OF NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 63 (H. Spinnler & F. Boller
eds., 1993).
213 Norman R. Brown et al., The Subjective Dates of Natural Events in Very-Long-
Term- Memory, 17 COGN. PSYCHOL. 139 (1985); WilliamJ. Friedman, Memory for the
Time of Past Events, 113 PSYCHOL. BULL. 44 (1993); Elizabeth F. Loftus et al., Cogni-
tive Psychology Meets the National Survey, 40 AM. PSYCHOL. 175 (1985).
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come difficult to remember exactly when specific actions oc-
curred even though memory for what happened is clear.214
Notwithstanding our inability to accurately report times and
dates, witnesses are commonly asked to do so. A slate of sus-
pects must report their alibi on the date and time of a crime. To
verify one of their alibis, two weeks after the crime the bartender
must report whether or not he saw the defendant (a frequent
patron) in the bar on the night of the murder. Aircraft or automo-
bile owners or mechanics must report when they last performed
a particular maintenance activity. Fact witnesses in countless
criminal and civil suits report on when they had specific conver-
sations or sent a particular piece of mail. In some cases, objec-
tive records may be available. However, witness reports of the
timing or sequence of events should be regarded with extreme
skepticism when there is no external objective verification of
their reports. As with any other information where the witness
may be uncertain, the potential for distortion due to motivation,
self-interest, and other sources of external influence is high.
b. Remember Who ... ? Misidentification Through
Unconscious Transference
The term "unconscious transferencd' refers to a process whereby
a witness confuses an innocent but familiar-looking person with
the perpetrator. The feeling of familiarity can lead the person
into a false identification during police identification proce-
dures (line-ups, show-ups, examination of mug shots, etc.). The
witness may incorrectly believe the person is familiar from the
crime context rather than from the true context of exposure to
him/her.
Technically, the concept of unconscious transference is de-
fined as "the transfer of one person's identity to that of another person
from a different setting, time, or context. ,215 It is considered uncon-
scious in that the witness misidentifies the familiar innocent per-
son without having a conscious recollection of the previous
exposure to him/her and without awareness of the true context
214 R. Fivush, Learning About School. The Development of Kindergartners' School
Scripts, 55 CHILD. DEV. 1697 (1984); R. Fivush et al., Children's Long-Term Memory
for a Novel Event: An Exploratory Study, 30 MEMRLL-PALMER Q. 303 (1984); Kathe-
rine Nelson & Janice M. Gruendel, Generalized Event Representations: Basic Building
Blocks of Cognitive Development, in ADVANCES IN DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 1 (A.
Brown & M. Lamb eds., 1981).
215 Read et al., supra note 16, at 3.
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of the previous exposure. The process of unconscious transfer-
ence is illustrated in a frequently cited case.2 16
A ticket agent in a railroad station was the victim of an armed
robbery and later identified a sailor from a police lineup. The
sailor, however, had irrefutable proof that he could not have
been at the station at the time of the robbery. When questioned
about why he misidentified the sailor, the ticket agent claimed
the sailor looked familiar to him. An investigator later discov-
ered that the sailor lived near the train station and had pur-
chased tickets from the agent on three different occasions prior
to the robbery. Thus, the ticket agent had clearly seen the sailor
before but did not remember him as a customer. Instead, the
feeling of familiarity led the ticket agent to assume he recog-
nized the sailor as the robber.
Ironically, one of the more strange and dramatic instances of
source confusion on the part of an eyewitness victimized a psy-
chologist whose research had focused on memory distortion and
eyewitness identification. Donald Thompson, who had testified
frequently as an expert witness on the vagaries of eyewitness
memory, himself became the victim of mistaken eyewitness iden-
tification. Dr. Thompson was interrogated as a suspect for a
rape.217 Fortunately, Thompson had an airtight alibi. Ironi-
cally, shortly before the rape, he was doing a live television inter-
view describing how people can improve their ability to
remember faces. It later came to light that the victim had been
watching Thompson on television prior to the rape. Incredibly,
the victim appeared to have confused her memory of Thompson
from the television show with her memory of the rapist.218
Again, memory had committed a virtually unthinkable error.
Such confusions are far from rare. A number of similar cases
have been reported, each sharing in common an encounter be-
tween the victim and the accused outside the context of the
crime. Later, failing to accurately recall the source of their
memories of the accused, the victims nevertheless felt a linger-
ing strong sense of familiarity with the accused that misled them
into erroneous identification of the accused as the perpetrator.
216 M. HOUTS, FROM EVIDENCE TO GUILT (1956); Elizabeth F. Loftus, Uncon-
scious Transference, 2 LAw & PSYCHOL. REv. 93 (1976); Read et al., supra note 16, at
3; Ross et al., supra note 46, at 918.
217 See SCHACTER, supra note 2, at 114.
218 Read et al., supra note 16, at 3; Ross et al., supra note 46, at 918; Donald M.
Thomson, Context and False Recognition, in MEMORY IN CONTEXT: CONTEXT IN MEM-
ORY 285 (Graham M. Davies & Donald M. Thomson eds., 1988).
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1. Scientific Evidence of Unconscious Transference
This process of "unconscious transference" has been demon-
strated experimentally specifically in the eyewitness context in at
least two ways. First, some research has directly examined the
potential for innocent but familiar persons to be misidentified
as the perpetrator of a crime. Generally, subjects in these stud-
ies are exposed to a crime (or other incident). For some sub-
jects the innocent person is present during the crime, but is not
the perpetrator. For other subjects, the innocent person is not
present at all. At varying later intervals, subjects are asked to
inspect a line-up that includes the innocent person. Several
such studies have found that the innocent person is more likely
to be identified as the perpetrator if (s)he was present at the
scene of the crime (incident) than if (s)he was not. Thus, the
rate of false identification is increased by the presence of an in-
nocent but familiar person.2 19
2. Who Said What?
Generally, studies described as concerning "unconscious trans-
ference" have addressed confusion of one person's behavior with
that of another. However, some studies have addressed the ten-
dency to mistakenly attribute one person's statements to another.
This research has shown that confusion of the source of state-
ments tends to occur for people perceived as belonging to the
same salient social category. For example, the statements of
those forming a minority in social groups are more frequently
confused than those in the majority. Justice Ruth Bader Gins-
burg, for example, noticed that she tends to be confused with
Justice O'Connor by attorneys addressing the Supreme Court.220
Similarly, source errors for statements are more likely to occur
219 Robert Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony, 231 Sci. AM. 23 (1974); Brown et al.,
supra note 17, at 311; Loftus, supra note 215, at 93; Douglas Peters, A Naturalistic
Study of Earwitness Memory: Does the Addition of Voice to a Lineup Influence Accuracy
and/or Confidence, in ANNUAL MEETING OF THE EASTERN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIA-
TION (1985); Read et al., supra note 16, at Experiment 5-10; Ross et al., supra note
46, at 918; M. Phillips et al., Some Boundary Conditions for Bystander Misidentification,
24 CRIM. JUSTICE & BEH. 370-390 (1997); D. Ross et al., Unconscious Transference
and Mistaken Identity: When a Witness Misidentifies a Familiar with an Innocent Person,
79J. APPL. PSYCHOL. 918-930 (1994); R. Geiselman et al., Unconscious Transference
and Characteristics of Accurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses, 2 PSYCHOL. CRIME & LAW
197-209 (1996); R. Geiselman et al., Transference of Perpetrator Roles in Eyewitness
Identifications from Photoarrays, 11 AMER. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 5-15 (1993).
220 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The New Look of Liberalism on the Court, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 5, 1997, at § 6 (Magazine) at 60.
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between members of the same race than between those of differ-
ent races. Highly prejudiced people for whom race is a more
salient social category show greater tendency to confuse within
race sources than those low in prejudice. 2 '
c. Biased Identification Procedures
Unconscious transference has also been shown to create false
identifications in police line-ups. For example, studies of identi-
fication procedures have shown that innocent persons who were
present in mug books are often misidentified during a line-up
procedure.222 This is presumed to occur because the person's
face is familiar to the witness from the context of looking at mug
shots. The witness then confuses the source of the person's fa-
miliarity and concludes that the person is the perpetrator.
John Shepherd223 recommended that if one witness identifies
a suspect from a mug-shot array, other witnesses should attempt
the line-up identification if possible. This would avoid a line-up
identification that resulted inappropriately from familiarity with
the suspect strictly from exposure to his or her picture in the
mug book rather than from the scene of the crime. A number
of other problems with eyewitness identification procedures
have been identified.224
d. Effects of Pre-Trial Publicity: Is This Real or Did I See It
on TV?
Many cases, particularly those involving multiple victims,
highly unusual events, high profile parties, or dramatic, interest-
ing crimes, find their way into the mass media long before they
appear in court. Media accounts include many details of the
event, the parties involved, speculations regarding the causes,
motives, consequences, and so on. They often show pictures of
221 KUNDA, supra note 53, at 46.
222 Brown et al., supra note 17, at 311; Cutler et al., supra note 26, at 223;
Anthony N. Doob & H. M. Kirschenbaum, Bias in Police Lineups-Partial Remember-
ing, 1 J. POLICE Sc. & ADMIN. 287 (1973); Gabriel W. Gorenstein & Phoebe C.
Ellsworth, Effect of Choosing an Incorrect Photograph on a Later Identification by an
Eyewitness, 65 J. APPL. PSYCHOL. 616 (1980);JOHN SHEPHERD ET AL., IDENTIFICATION
EVIDENCE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION (1982).
223 SHEPHERD ET AL., supra note 221.
224 BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE EvE-
WITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW (1995); Gary L. Wells, What Do We Know About
Eyewitness Identification, 48 AM. PSYCHOL. 553 (1993); Gary L. Wells et al., From the
Lab to the Police Station: A Successful Application of Eyewitness Research, 55 AM.
PSYCHOL. 581 (2000); Wells et al., supra note 8, at 603.
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the scene, the victims, accused perpetrators and much more.
Both the TWA 800 crash and the Dutch El Al crash provided
excellent real-life demonstrations of the power of the media to
shape memories both among witnesses to the original event and
among later consumers of media portrayals. Hans Crombag's 221
study of memories of the El Al crash showed that verbal descrip-
tions in media accounts can create elaborate, subjectively real
and compelling pseudo-memories of seeing the physical event.
The witness accounts of the TWA crash illustrated the power of
media accounts to influence reconstructive memory processes.
"Hindsight" and "retrospective" biases caused witnesses to recon-
struct memories of what they saw in the sky to fit the missile
theory of the explosion that had permeated press accounts for
over a year.226
Social science research has clearly demonstrated the biasing
effects of exposure to pre-trial publicity. Most of this research
has focused on potential effects on jurors, primarily with regard
to criminal trials. Generally, it has been demonstrated that the
more people know about a case, the more likely they are to pre-
sume the defendant guilty even when they claim to be impar-
tial,227 and the more jurors know about a case, the more likely
they are to vote for conviction.228 The biasing impact of such
publicity is even more powerful when the news is seen on televi-
sion rather than in print.22 9
Such demonstrations show clearly that beliefs are influenced
by information acquired from the media among those who hear
about the event from secondary sources. The media present far more
incriminating information than exculpatory information. Thus,
not surprisingly, those who are exposed to it tend to presume
guilt.
What about the effects on witnesses who watch and read all of
the same reports of the incident as the potential jurors? Again,
source confusion plays a crucial role. Witnesses may confuse the
face of a suspect presented on television with that of the real
225 Crombag et al., supra note 202, at 95.
226 Loftus & Castelle, supra note 167, at 207.
227 Gary Moran & Brian L. Cutler, The Prejudicial Impact of Pretrial Publicity, 21 J.
APPL. Soc. PSYCHOL. 345 (1991).
228 N.J. Kerr et al., On the Effectiveness of Voir Dire in Criminal Cases with Prejudicial
Pretrial Publicity: An Empirical Study, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 665 (1991).
229 James R. P. Ogloff & Neil Vidmar, The Impact of Pretrial Publicity on Jurors: A
Study to Compare the Relative Effects of Television and Print Media in a Child Sex Abuse
Case, 18 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 507 (1994).
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perpetrator. They may become more confident of their mem-
ory as a result of hearing their own or others' reports presented
on television. They may hear reports of events or descriptions
of persons they did not directly witness and later "remember"
these memories as if they were their own. They may hear that a
suspect is in custody and therefore assume (s)he is in a line-up
they later inspect.
Just as in the case of unconscious transference, the informa-
tion or person becomes 'familiar" because the witness did see or
hear it somewhere (in this case in media reports). This feeling
of familiarity is later confused with actual memory of personally
witnessing the event or of personally observing the information
or evidence in question. In addition, the media can have direct
persuasive effects, giving the witness confidence that the evi-
dence reported is true or that the suspect presented is the actual
perpetrator.
The tendency of media accounts to directly persuade and to
create source confusion among witnesses can carry a double
whammy. When it offers potentially unreliable post-event re-
ports, media coverage may simultaneously present false informa-
tion to the witness, causing the witness to later remember it as if
(s)he had personally witnessed it and present information that
the witness at first discounts as incredible, but later finds
persuasive.
Persuasion research has shown that we are typically sensitive
to the expertise, knowledgeability, and trustworthiness of the
source of information when wefirst hear it. We are more likely to
believe those that are more credible and trustworthy than those
who are not.
This crucial ability to distinguish information likely to be true
from information likely to be false is compromised, however, by
another failure of source monitoring termed source dissociation.
This term refers to the situation in which a person does remem-
ber information (s)he has heard but forgets where it came from.
Source dissociation tends to occur with the passage of time so
that we later become more persuaded by information coming
from a low-credibility source. We tend to forget that the source
lacked credibility and consequently forget to discount the
information.230
230 Anthony R. Pratkanis et al., In Search of Reliable Persuasion Effects: IIl. The




Generally, research has shown that we have a bias toward be-
lieving in the truth of what we hear, and that it takes more cog-
nitive effort to disbelieve than to believe. 231 Thus, particularly
when we fail to remember source cues that would cast doubt on
the truth of particular information, we will tend to accept it as
truth. 2  Thus, source dissociation leads to a general failure in
witness ability to accurately report where information has come
from and in their ability to remain unaffected by unreliable
information.
e. The Misinformation Effect
The power of suggestive questions has been illustrated in Eliz-
abeth Loftus's classic studies on (mis)leading questions. In
some of her early studies, she showed that (mis)leading ques-
tions can cause witnesses to falsely remember seeing a yield
rather than a stop sign, a conspicuous barn in a bucolic scene
that actually contained no buildings at all, broken glass and tape
recorders that were not present, a white instead of a blue vehicle
in a crime scene, incorrect colors of objects, curly rather than
straight hair, and Minnie Mouse when they actually saw Mickey
Mouse.
In other studies, Loftus and her colleagues showed that the
language of the questions asked may shape reports of events.
For example, when asked how fast a car was going when it "hit'
versus when it "smashed into" another car, subjects gave higher
estimates of speed when the wording "smashed into" was used.
Later, they were also more likely to report having seen broken
glass (since this occurs more often with higher speed collisions).
Thus, these studies showed that (mis) leading questions can lead
people both to add things to their memories and to alter memo-
ries of those things they did see.23 3
Misleading questions tend to induce the greatest distortion
when introduced after a delay rather than immediately after the
231 Daniel T. Gilbert, How Mental Systems Believe, 46 AM. PSYCHOL. 107 (1991).
232 Begg et al., supra note 188, at 446; Gilbert, supra note 230, at 107.
233 Elizabeth F. Loftus & Edith Greene, Warning: Even Memory for Faces May Be
Contagious, 4 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 323 (1980); Elizabeth F. Loftus & John C.
Palmer, Reconstruction of Automobile Destruction: An Example of the Interaction Between
Language and Memory, 13J. VERB. LEARN. & VERB. BEHAV. 585, 586-588 (1974);
Elizabeth F. Loftus, Leading Questions and the Eyewitness Report, 7 COGN. PSYCHOL.
560 (1975); Elizabeth F. Loftus, Shifting Human Color Memory, 5 MEM. & COGN.
696 (1977); Lovrus, supra note 182.
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event,23 4 when the wording of the misleading question is more
definite (e.g., "Did you see the stop sign?" versus "Did you see a
stop sign?"),235 when encountering or retrieving suggested infor-
mation under conditions of limited attentional resources, 3 6 and
when the source of the misleading information is of high status
or apparently unbiased. 37
Misleading information also creates more distortion among
children than adults, 238 for peripheral rather than central de-
tail, 2 9 for more poorly remembered information, 24 ° and when it
is subtle rather than blatant.2 4' On the other hand, less distor-
tion is observed for negative information with high personal
significance.242
Nevertheless, in the years since Loftus's original demonstra-
tions of the misinformation effect, research has shown how
(mis)leading questions can cause a person to develop false
memories of much more dramatic incidents, including inci-
dents involving the self as well as others. For example, this pro-
cess has been illustrated by studies on child witnesses. In these
studies, children are first subjected to an event about which they
are later questioned in a leading and repetitive fashion (includ-
ing repeated leading and suggestive questioning about an aspect
of the event that did not happen). Many of the children will later
report that the suggested events did occur. Thus, although it
may be debated whether actual memory or simply the report of the
234 Elizabeth F. Loftus, Reactions to Blatantly Contradictory Information, 7 MEM. &
COGN. 368, 372-373 (1979).
235 Elizabeth F. Loftus & Guido Zanni, Eyewitness Testimony: The Influence of the
Wording of a Question, 5 BULL. PSYCHON. Soc'v 86 (1975).
236 Maria S. Zaragoza & Sean M. Lane, Processing Resources and Eyewitness Suggest-
ibility, 3 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 305 (1998).
237 Norman J. Bregman & Hunter A. McAllister, Eyewitness Testimony: The Role of
Commitment in Increasing Reliability, 45 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 181 (1982); Stephen J.
Ceci et al., Suggestibility of Children's Memory: Psycholegal Implications, 116 J. Exp.
PSYCHOL. 38 (1987); David H. Dodd & Jeffrey M. Bradshaw, Leading Questions and
Memory: Pragmatic Constraints, 19J. VERB. LEARN. & VERB. BEHAV. 695, 701 (1980);
Elizabeth F. Loftus, Impact of Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of
Eyewitness Identification, 65 J. APPL. PSYCHOL. 9 (1980).
238 Ceci et al., supra note 236, at 38.
239 LoFrus, supra note 182, at 42.
240 Kent H. Marquis et al., Testimony Validity as a Function of Question Form, At-
mosphere, and Item Difficulty, 2 J. APPL. Soc. PSYCHOL. 167 (1972); J. Don Read &
Darryl Bruce, On the External Validity of Questioning Effects in Eyewitness Testimony, 33
INT'L REV. APPL. PSYCHOL. 33 (1984).
241 Lo-rus, supra note 182, at 57; Ornstein et al., supra note 87, at 49.
242 Maggie Bruck et al., Reliability and Credibility of Young Children's Reports: From
Research to Policy and Practice, 53 Am. PSYCHOL. 136 (1998).
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event is altered, clearly the process of questioning alters the wit-
ness' testimony.
In one experiment, for example, Stephen J. Ceci and his col-
leagues243 asked preschool children about some everyday events
that had actually occurred and others that had never happened
(as verified by the children's parents). In one of these, the
"mousetrap" incident, they asked children to recall when they "got
a finger caught in a mousetrap and had to go to the hospital to get the
trap off" For the next ten weeks, the interviewer repeatedly
asked children to think hard about the incidents and try to visu-
alize them.
At the end of the ten weeks, children were asked, "Tell me if
this ever happened to you: Did you ever get your finger caught in a
mousetrap and have to go to the hospital to get the trap off?." Over half
of the children "remembered" at least one of the made-up inci-
dents. More astonishing was the richness and fabricated detail
of the false memories. The children included long descriptions
of what led up to the finger getting caught, detailed descriptions
of the hospital personnel and procedures, how they got there,
and incidents that happened on the way, among others.
Clearly, misleading questioning can lead to autobiographical
confabulations in children.244 They can also result in false re-
ports of recent everyday events. Leichtman and Ceci found that
a visitor to their school could mislead children into false reports
of a number of behaviors. A number of other studies have
found similar results.245
Although some may question the extent to which children
may be misled, both the real-life cases of fantastic confabula-
tions in preschoolers and the hundreds of studies of the suggest-
ibility of children's memories have shown beyond doubt that
children can be misled into false reports of events both mundane
and bizarre. Such false memories are likely the result, in part, of
impaired source memory.246
In fact, studies of source monitoring in children have shown
that compared to older children and adults, younger children
243 STEPHEN J. CECI & MAGGIE BRUCK, JEOPARDY IN THE COURTROOM (1995).
244 Maggie Bruck & Stephen J. Ceci, Amicus Brieffor the Case of State of New Jersey
v. Michaels Presented by Committee of Concerned Social Scientists, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL.
L. 246, 272 (1995); Stephen J. Ceci & Maggie Bruck, Suggestibility of the Child Wit-
ness: A Historical Review and Synthesis, 113 PSYCHOL. BULL. 403 (1993); CECI &
BRUCK, supra note 242.
245 Ceci & Bruck, supra note 243, at 403; CECI & BRUCK, supra note 242.
246 SCHACTER, supra note 2, at 118.
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are less able to accurately identify the source of suggested infor-
mation,2 47 are more likely to confuse actions they did perform
with those they only imagined performing,248 and make more
errors in source monitoring when confronted with similar
rather than dissimilar sources. 249 Although both children and
adults are more susceptible to source confusion with similar
than dissimilar sources, children are more susceptible.
Nevertheless, adults are not immune to source monitoring
difficulties, and may also be led to falsely report autobiographi-
cal memories. Loftus 250 succeeded in implanting a memory of
being lost in a shopping mall as a child among college students.
In this study, the "misinformation" came from the researchers,
who gave subjects a description of an incident in which they
were supposedly lost in a mall for an extended period, became
upset and cried, and were comforted by an elderly woman. The
descriptions supposedly came from the subjects' parents. The
parents, however, had verified that the incident had never
occurred.
Subjects were asked to write as much as they could recall
about the incident that never was. Later, in follow-up interviews,
subjects were asked to report as much detail about the incident
as they could remember. Fully 25% of their subjects falsely
"remembered" having been lost in the mall, and many provided
very detailed descriptions of the event, including much detail
not included in the original suggested event. Similar results
were obtained for other implanted childhood events.25'
Some evidence suggests that the ability to "implant" memories
may depend on the plausibility of the events suggested. 252 Simi-
larly, Kathy Pezdek and C. Roe 25 found that it is easier to
247 Jennifer K. Ackil & Maria S. Zaragoza, Developmental Differences in Eyewitness
Suggestibility and Memory for Source, 60 J. Exp. CHILD PSYCHOL. 57 (1995).
248 Janat Fraser Parker, Age Differences in Source Monitoring of Performed and
Imagined Actions on Immediate and Delayed Tests, 60 J. Exp. CHILD PSYCHOL. 84
(1995).
249 D. Stephen Lindsay et al., Developmental Changes in Memory Source Monitoring,
52J. Exp. CHILD PSYCHOL. 297 (1991).
250 Elizabeth F. Loftus & Jacqueline E. Pickrell, The Formation of False Memories,
25 PSYCHIATRY ANNALS 720 (1995).
251 Id. at 720; Ira E. Hyman et al., False Memories of Childhood Experiences, 9 APPL.
COGN. PSYCHOL. 181 (1995).
252 Kathy Pezdek et al., Planting False Childhood Memories: The Role of Event Plausi-
bility, 8 PSYCHOL. Sci. 437 (1997).
253 Kathy Pezdek & C. Roe, The Suggestibility of Children's Memory for Being




change or distort memory for something that did occur than to
implant memories for something that did not occur.
Further, it is possible to introduce "resistance" to the effects of
misleading interviews. Witnesses who are warned, for example,
of the potential for incorrect information are less affected by
it,2 54 with more explicit warnings being more effective.2 55
f. Coercive Interrogations/Interviews
Perhaps the most startling demonstrations of the power of
suggestive questions to elicit false memories are those of the
ability of coercive interrogation to elicit false confessions. These
demonstrations have shown that people can be led to falsely re-
member or least report their own past behavior, even to the ex-
tent of falsely remembering murder, sex abuse, or other
heinous crimes.
Police interrogation techniques include two general ap-
proaches designed to encourage confession. The first is to be-
friend the suspect, offer sympathy and friendly advice, and
"minimize" the offense by offering face-saving excuses, including
blaming the victim. The second is designed to intimidate the
suspect by exaggerating the charges or pretending to have dam-
aging evidence such as fingerprints or an eyewitness, leading the
suspect to feel it is useless to deny the crime.256
Such tactics can be useful in eliciting true confessions. Unfor-
tunately, however, they are known to elicit false confessions as
well. Some, of course, are knowingly false, perhaps the result of
exhaustion and desperation to escape further pressure or abuse
from the police. Others, however, occur because the witness be-
comes genuinely convinced (s)he committed the crime.
The first step toward false memory is often false belief. A per-
son who does not remember committing a crime or believe
(s)he committed the crime may nevertheless become convinced
254 Robert E. Christiaansen & Kathleen Ochalek, Editing Misleading Information
from Memory: Evidence for the Coexistence of Original and Postevent Information, 11
MEM. & COGN. 467 (1983); Read & Bruce, supra note 239, at 33; Edith Greene et
al., Inducing Resistance to Misleading Information, 21 J. VERB. LEARN. & VERB. BEHAV.
207 (1982).
255 Lynn Hasher et al., I Knew It All Along: Or Did I?, 20 J. VERB. LEARN. & VERB.
BEHAV. 86 (1981).
256 GISLI H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS,
AND TESTIMONY (1992); F.E. INBAU ET At., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFES-
SIONS (3d ed. 1986); Saul M. Kassin, The Psychology of Confession Evidence, 52 AM.
PSYCHOL. 221 (1997).
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of his or her own guilt through the constant pressure and false
claims of proof provided by police. Faced with seemingly con-
vincing evidence of guilt, the person first begins to believe (s)he
committed the crime, then begins to picture doing the crime,
and finally, the person "remembers" having done it.
1. The Inextricable Relationship Between Memory and Belief
"Memories are beliefs about what happened, and beliefs are
constructed from, and reinforced by, memories. '57
Among the many stories of false confessions, perhaps the
most astonishing is the story of Paul Ingram, a man accused by
his two daughters of rape and a host of satanic ritual cult atroci-
ties, including ritual sexual abuse and murders of infants. Faced
with more than five months of incessant interrogation by detec-
tives, a psychologist and a minister, Paul Ingram (chief civil dep-
uty of the sheriffs department, chair of the local Republican
party, conservative Christian churchgoing pillar of his commu-
nity) confessed to sexually abusing his two daughters over a pe-
riod of seventeen years. He acknowledged his role as high priest
of a satanic cult involved in ritual sodomy, murder, dismember-
ment, and cannibalization of infants.258 How could Ingram con-
fess and believe that he committed such outrageous acts if they
never occurred? A close analysis of the case revealed the crucial
role of belief throughout.
The case began when one of Ingram's daughters attended a
revival where another participant, Karla Franko, held the partici-
pants in thrall with reports of her many "visions." The meeting
was highly emotional and had produced a number of "visions"
related to abuse, as well as sudden revelations among other par-
ticipants. Subsequently, while praying over Ingram's daughter,
Franko announced that she knew the "truth" and that Ericka,
Ingram's daughter, had been abused as a child. Further, she
identified the abuser as Ericka's father and said the abuse had
taken place over many years. She advised Ericka to seek coun-
seling in order to uncover the traumatic memories.
Belief first impacted this case with Ericka's assumption, based
on her religious beliefs, that Franko's vision would be true.
Shortly after, both Erica and her sisterJulie accused their father
and their two brothers of rape and long-term abuse.
257 Johnson & Raye, supra note 203, at 36.




Over the next five months, Ingram was subject to repeated
interrogations. At the same time, the stories his daughters told
escalated from rape and abuse to ritual Satanic abuse, infant
abuse, murder, and sex with dogs, goats, and witches. Further-
more, the list of accused expanded from their father to their
mother, as well as to other members of the community.
At first, Ingram denied any memory of sex with his daughters
or of any ritual abuse. Nevertheless, while still possessing no
memory of any of the crimes of which he was accused, after the
first four hours of interrogation, Paul Ingram confessed to abus-
ing his daughters. During those four hours, the police had con-
vinced Ingram that he committed the crime. How could they
have convinced Paul Ingram that he was guilty of behaviors of
which he never before imagined himself capable?
The answer lies in the power of preexisting beliefs. First, Paul
Ingram believed in his daughters. He believed they were de-
cent, honest girls who would not lie about something as serious
as abuse. The police reinforced this belief by constantly asking
him why his daughters would say such things if they were not
true and exhorting him to help his daughters by telling the
truth. In addition, the police were his friends and colleagues
whom he trusted. He believed they would not try to deceive
him.
Secondly, Paul Ingram believed in repression. He believed
that violent criminals and sex offenders often repress memories
of their crimes, unable to face the horror of what they have
done. He personally witnessed such denial and apparent repres-
sion as a member of the sheriff's office. In addition, Ingram
believed in Satan and in the power of Satan both to cause evil
behavior and to destroy the memory of it (a belief suggested and
reinforced by his family minister).
Finally, Ingram believed in the restorative power of confes-
sion. He believed the only way to find the truth was to admit his
guilt. If he confessed, he believed, his memory would return.
These three beliefs made Ingram willing to believe he had done
what his daughters claimed he had done. All that remained was
to remember.
The first step, he believed, was to confess. So, he confessed.
But he described his behavior in terms of inference. Instead of
saying, "I went into her bedroom," he would describe what he did
with the preface, "I would have." He had no real memory-only
belief in his guilt.
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The next morning, Ingram was visited by psychologist Richard
Peterson, whom Ingram asked why he was unable to remember
the events of which he was accused. Peterson told Ingram it is
not unusual for sex offenders to repress memories of their
crimes. Peterson even went so far as to suggest that Ingram had
been the victim of sexual abuse as a child and that Ingram had
learned to repress as a child when he had to repress his memo-
ries of his own abuse. Finally, Peterson, as the detectives and
Ingram's minister had done, assured him that once he con-
fessed to the crimes his memories would come back.
Throughout the investigation preceding his trial, Ingram re-
mained convinced that he must be guilty and focused on trying
to remember what he had done. Meanwhile, his daughters con-
tinued to change and add to their stories. Day after day, the
sheriff or others would tell Ingram of his daughters' accusations,
and he would try to remember. He practiced a nightly ritual in
an effort to remember, putting himself into a trance-like state
where he emptied his mind of all else and tried to visualize and
remember the events in which he had been told he participated.
By the next day, he would provide detailed "memories" to the
investigators.
Meanwhile, a similar confluence of belief, persuasion and co-
ercive interrogation convinced Ingram's son to first believe and
then "remembd' that he had been raped by his father's friends
and colleagues, a story he retracted within the next month. In-
gram's wife was induced to confess to involvement in the abuse
and to sex with the same friends and poker partners alleged to
have raped Ingram's son. These colleagues, in turn, spent over
a year in jail, having confessed, like Ingram, that they must have
committed (and repressed) the alleged crimes if all those peo-
ple said they did.
Amid the wild escalation of accusations and confession, noted
sociologist Richard Ofshe was called in to consult. Unconvinced
by Ingram's confessions, Dr. Ofshe259 resolved to test their
source. Having reviewed the records to date, Dr. Ofshe made
up an event that had not previously been discussed (an occasion
when Ingram presumably made his children have sex with one
another while he watched) and told Ingram his children had
reported it. As usual, Ingram at first failed to remember it.
However, also as usual, Ingram began to "remember" after think-
ing about it and trying to remember, and eventually he pro-
259 OFSHE & WATTERS, supra note 94.
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duced a three-page confession, including dialogue and great
detail.2 60 This time, however, there was no doubt whatsoever
that the confession was false. Even his children testified that this
event never happened.
Clearly, Paul Ingram was the victim of powerful forces leading
to the creation of false memories. They are the same forces,
some in exaggerated form, that occur in the more common sug-
gestive interviews of police and other investigators and counsel-
ors with fact witnesses that first give the witness an idea or belief
that something may be true which later becomes a "memory." Re-
peated suggestion, building on a foundation of readiness to be-
lieve created by already existing beliefs, motivation to find the
truth, lingering doubt about what really happened, and desire
to know, subtly or blatantly creates the belief from which the
"memories" are finally born. Paul Ingram came to "remember"
something much more strange and extreme than most, al-
though the process that led him to it was commonplace.
Even Ingram, however, eventually understood that his "memo-
ries" were false. Once he pleaded guilty to hundreds of inci-
dents of abuse, satanic abuse, rape, and much more, he was
finally left alone with his thoughts. Soon he began to doubt the
reality of his confessed deeds, and eventually recanted, too late,
in court.
Paul Ingram's confessions of sexual abuse are the latest mod-
ern manifestation of the age-old relationship between core be-
liefs and false confessions or memories. Several hundred years
ago, belief in God and the devil inspired tens of thousands to
confess to witchcraft and to implicate friends, family and even
animals in Satan's circle. More recently, scores of people report
abductions by aliens or recovered memories of past lives.
Clearly, firm belief in the possibility of such events precedes false
beliefs in and later false memory of their actuality.
2. False Confessions in the Laboratory
Saul M. Kassin and Katherine L. Kieche1261 proposed that two
factors increase the risk of false confession among those con-
fronted with coercive interrogations: (1) a suspect with unclear
memory of the event in question; and (2) presentation of false
evidence against him/her. The authors tested this proposition
2-60 Lovrus & KETCHAM, supra note 94, at 257.
261 Saul M. Kassin & Katherine L. Kiechel, The Social Psychology of False Confes-
sions: Compliance, Internalization, and Confabulation, 7 PSYCHOL. Sci. 125 (1996).
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in the laboratory by causing a computer to crash while under-
graduate subjects were using it. Half were working on a fast-
paced task and the other half on a slow-paced task, thereby mak-
ing it more or less difficult for the subject to remember what
actually happened immediately before the crash. The subjects
were falsely accused of having caused the crash by hitting a key
they had been specifically warned to avoid. All students at first
denied the charge. However, half were confronted by a second
student who had been present at the time of the crash (actually
a confederate of the experimenter) who claimed to have seen
the student hit the forbidden key.
As the authors expected, students were most likely to deny
publicly and to later admit guilt privately when their own memo-
ries were less clear (i.e., those who were performing the fast-
based task), and when they were confronted with "evidence" that
the other student saw them cause the crash.
g. Lost and Found: Biasing Aids to Memory Retrieval
Techniques commonly used as aids to memory retrieval are
known to produce distortion and confabulation, but also some
enhancements in true memory. Such techniques include hyp-
nosis, relaxation and guided imagery, memory recovery groups,
memory recovery "homework," and other common therapeutic
techniques. The potential for memory distortion and outright
fabrication through these techniques is well documented in the
literature on "recovery" of memories of child sex abuse. 262
To the extent that an alleged victim or other witnesses report
use of such techniques, the memories recovered through their
use must be regarded with caution. It is well worthwhile to ask
witnesses about the source of their memories, and whether they
used any special techniques to try to help them remember what
happened.
1. Efforts to Remember
When a witness experiences difficulty remembering some or
all of an event, (s)he is typically encouraged to try to remember.
Recommendations for how to try to remember vary from the
simple instruction to "try" to a variety of memory recovery tech-
niques as discussed below. All of these techniques share in the
common instruction to think about the event. Some instruct




the subject to write down their thoughts and feelings about the
event (whether or not they currently remember anything about
it). Others instruct the subject to imagine or visualize the event
or to concentrate on certain aspects to try to remember them
better.
Although these kinds of efforts may appear to be legitimate
paths to recovery of lost memories, all have been shown to in-
crease the probability of distortion, as discussed below.
2. Direct and Indirect Suggestion
Efforts to recover memories are typically subject to both direct
and indirect suggestions regarding what might have happened
from police, investigators, therapists, other witnesses, friends
and family, and others. The previously cited literature on the
"misinformation effect" has clearly shown that suggestions can alter
or fabricate memories. However, when the suggestions come in
the context of memory retrieval processes (such as hypnosis,
etc.), they have even greater potential to distort memory.
3. Hypnosis
Hypnosis is widely believed to be an effective aid to memory
recovery among police, mental health professionals, and the
general public. Over 90% of the public, for example, endorses
such beliefs as: "A person can remember more while hypnotized;"
"Memory works like a video camera;" or "Hypnosis improves memory."
Roughly three quarters or more believe that one cannot lie
while hypnotized. In other words, hypnosis is widely believed
not only to increase the amount one can remember, but also to
improve the accuracy of one's memories.
Unfortunately, nothing could be farther from the truth. Al-
though people do tend to remember more while hypnotized, the
additional information is just as likely .to be false as it is to be
true. Further, to make matters worse, hypnosis also tends to in-
crease the subject's confidence in the accuracy of the new memo-
ries. Thus, the ratio of correct to incorrect information may
actually decline even as subjects' conviction of the truth of their
memories increases.263
263 Kevin M. McConkey, The Effects of Hypnotic Procedures on Remembering, in CON-
TEMPORARY HYPNOSIS RESEARCH 405 (E. Fromm & M.R. Nash eds., 1992); ALAN W.
SCHEFLIN &JERROLD LEE SHAPIRO, THE GUILFORD CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYP-
NOSIS SERIES (1989); Spiegel, supra note 84.
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By its nature, hypnosis is a state of aroused, attentive, focused
concentration, including heightened imagination, and height-
ened sensitivity and responsiveness to social cues (including sug-
gestion). Thus, by its nature, it enhances the subject's
susceptibility to influence and suggestibility.
These external forces are enhanced by the nature of the per-
sons who tend to be hypnotizable. Three essential ingredients
characterize the hypnotic experience: (1) absorption, or the im-
mersion in a focal experience at the expense of other aspects of
the context; (2) dissociation, or the tendency to restrict conscious
processing of perceptions, thoughts, memories, motor activities,
or sensory experiences that are not the focus of attention (such
as not feeling pain); and (3) suggestibility, or the uncritical ac-
ceptance of instructions or suggestions. Each of these ingredi-
ents is more characteristic of hypnotizable than of non-
hypnotizable individuals, even when they are not under hypno-
sis. Thus, hypnotizable individuals are already more suggestible
before they are hypnotized, and this suggestibility is further en-
hanced while they are hypnotized.26 4
Finally, the potential for hypnosis to generate distortions in
memory is enhanced by the concurrent use of other memory
retrieval techniques known to create distortion on their own.
These include repeated questioning, direct and indirect sugges-
tion, age regression, and guided imagery (as discussed below).
Hypnosis for the purpose of memory retrieval is, more often
than not, accompanied by one or more of these additional tech-
niques, thus magnifying the potential for each of them to create
distortion.
4. Guided Imagery/Imagination
"Guided imagery" and imagination-based techniques are com-
mon to several different techniques of memory retrieval, includ-
ing hypnosis, relaxation techniques, home memory exercises
involving visualization, and attempts to recover memory by im-
agining the events sought in memory. The subject is asked to
imagine the situation (s)he is trying to remember and then pic-
ture (visualize) the event. Unfortunately, both visualization and
deliberate imagination have been shown to create or alter
memory.
2-64 McConkey, supra note 262, at 405; SCHEFLIN & SHAPIRO, supra note 262;
Spiegel, supra note 84.
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a. Memory and Visualization: From Seeing in the Mind to
Remembering as Fact
Marcia K. Johnson's 265 source-monitoring theory suggests that
the feeling of reality for memories is directly associated with sen-
sory detail. Thus, when a person retrieves event-related infor-
mation, it will more likely seem like an actual "memory" of the
event itself if it includes a lot of sensory detail, such as visual
imagery of the details of the event. For example, people often
argue for the validity of memories of autobiographical events
based on their "memory" of visual detail266 further reported confi-
dence in the reality of memories is associated with the level of
detail.267  Simply thinking about events, whether real or
imagined, maintains the vividness of memories.268
Unfortunately, sensory detail may come from external sources
or one's own imagination and self-created visual imagery rather
than from the actual event. For example, visual imagery during
reading leads people to later say they "remember" seeing in a pic-
ture what they actually only read about in the text.269 Similarly,
hearing the sound associated with an object (such as the barking
of a dog) leads people to later "remember" seeing a picture of a
dog.270
265 Johnson, supra note 203, at 34.
266 William F. Brewer, Memory for Randomly Sampled Autobiographical Events, in 2
EMORY SYMPOSIA IN COGNITION, REMEMBERING RECONSIDERED: ECOLOGICAL AND
TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF MEMORY 21 (Eugene Winograd &
Ulric Neisser eds., 1988); Johnson et al., supra note 207, at 371.
267 Shahin Hashtroudi et al., Aging and Qualitative Characteristics of Memories for
Perceived and Imagined Complex Events, 5 PSYCHOL. AGING 119 (1990).
26 Aurora G. Suengas & Marcia K. Johnson, Qualitative Effects of Rehearsal on
Memories for Perceived and Imagined Complex Events, 117 J. ExP. PSYCHOL. GEN. 377
(1988).
269 Robert F. Belli et al., Memory Impairment and Source Misattribution in Postevent
Misinformation Experiments with Short Retention Intervals, 22 MEM. & COGN. 40
(1994); Helene Intraub & James E. Hoffman, Reading and Visual Memory: Remem-
bering Scenes That Were Never Seen, 105 AM. J. PSYCHOL. 101 (1992); Maria S. Zara-
goza et al., Confusing Real and Suggested Memories: Source Monitoring and Eyewitness
Suggestibility, in MEMORY FOR EVERYDAY AND EMOTIONAL EVENTS 401 (N.L. Stein et
al. eds., 1997).
270 Linda A. Henkel et al., Cross-Modal Source Monitoring Confusions Between Per-
ceived and Imagined Events, 26J. ExP. PSYCHOL. LEARN. MEM. COGN. 321 (2000).
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b. "Imagination Inflation"
"Ten thousand different things that come from your memory
or imagination-and you do not know which is which,
which was true, which is false."
Amy Tan, 1991
Elizabeth Loftus coined the term "imagination inflation" to re-
fer to the process of creating or strengthening memories
through imagination. 7' Subjects in her "imagination inflation"
research began by reporting whether a number of life events
had or had not happened to them as children. Two weeks later,
they were asked to imagine several of the same events. For ex-
ample, subjects who reported initially that they had never bro-
ken a window with their hand were asked to imagine a scene
where this happened (including how they tripped and fell, who
else was there, and how they felt when it happened). Later, in
the final stage of the experiment, subjects again reported on
whether they ever experienced any of the original long list of
events. For each of the imagined events, imagination inflated
confidence that the event had actually occurred in childhood.272
An experiment by Johnson, Foley, Suengas and Raye 273 may
help to explain why false memories of childhood can be created
by imagination. They asked subjects to either think of an actual
memory from childhood or to imagine the events and then to
rate these remembered and imagined events on thirty-nine dif-
ferent characteristics. They also performed the same procedure
for recent events. Results indicated that there were almost no
differences between the rated characteristics of real and
imagined memories for childhood events, although the memo-
ries for real and imagined recent events differed in a number of
respects.
The authors reasoned that when real memories are vague and
lacking in vivid detail, as when they are from the distant past or
were never encoded richly in the first place, it will be easier to
confuse imagined and real events. If genuine memories cannot
be distinguished from false memories on the basis of vividness,
richness of perceptual detail, and other contextual information,
271 Maryanne Garry et al., Imagination Inflation: Imagining a Childhood Event In-
flates Confidence That It Occurred, 3 PSYCHON. BULL. REv. 208 (1996).
272 Hyman et al., supra note 250, at 181.
273 Johnson et al., supra note 207, at 371.
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both will seem equally real and easier to confuse, just as Amy
Tan observed.
Thus, the "imagination inflation" phenomenon suggests that
witnesses who are testifying about events that are not recent,
that were never encoded deeply, or were without rich imaging
and contextual embedding will be particularly susceptible to
memory distortion or creation through the use of imagination
based techniques.
Although Loftus' work has primarily addressed the issue of
autobiographical memory in an effort to understand the mecha-
nisms underlying creation of false memories of sexual abuse,
other work has examined the ability of imagination to create
more mundane event predictions or memories. Imagining a fu-
ture event, for example, has been shown to increase the subjec-
tive confidence that the event will actually occur.274 Those
future events that are more easily imagined produce greater in-
flation in confidence.275
Similarly, imagination can influence memory of a variety of
events. For example, in a 1988 study, Johnson, Foley and Leach
showed that if people imagine another person's voice as op-
posed to their own, they are subsequently more likely to claim
the other person actually said those words. Further, Johnson,
Raye, Wang and Taylor 276 showed that the more often something
is imagined, the more likely people will later "remember" it as real,
and those who are better at imagining are more likely to de-
velop false memories than those who are poor. Other research
has shown that subjects will misremember having performed ac-
tions they had only imagined themselves performing. 277 Clearly
then, imagination can become confused with reality.
274 John S. Carroll, The Effect of Imagining an Event on Expectations for the Event:
An Interpretation in Terms of the Availability Heuristic, 14 J. Exp. Soc. PSYCHOL. 88
(1978); W. Larry Gregory et al., Self-Relevant Scenarios as Mediators of Likelihood
Estimates and Compliance: Does Imagining Make It So ?, 43 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCHOL. 9
(1982).
275 Steven J. Sherman et al., Imagining Can Heighten or Lower the Perceived Likeli-
hood of Contracting a Disease: The Mediating Effect of Ease of Imagery, 11 PERS. & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 118 (1985).
276 Marcia K. Johnson et al., Fact and Fantasy: The Roles of Accuracy and Variability
in Confusing Imaginations with Real Experiences, 5 J. Exp. PSYCHOL. HUM. LEARN. &
MEM. 229 (1979).
277 Rita E. Anderson, Did I Do It or Did I Only Imagine Doing It?, 113 J. Exp.
PSYCHOL. GEN. 594 (1984); Mary A. Foley & Marcia K. Johnson, Confusions Between
Memories for Performed and Imagined Actions, 56 CHILD. DEV. 1145 (1985); Lyn M.
Goff & Henry L. Roediger III, Imagination Inflation for Action Events: Repeated Imag-
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This tendency can be quite dangerous in legal contexts.
Memory-recovery techniques emphasizing imagination (hypno-
sis or guided imagery, for example) can lead to the creation of
false memories in which the subject has great confidence, as il-
lustrated in many cases of recovered memories."' Unfortu-
nately, such techniques are often recommended. For example,
Maltz279 encourages clients to "[sipend time imagining that you were
sexually abused, without worrying about accuracy, proving anything, or
having your ideas make sense. As you give rein to your imagination, let
your intuitions guide your thoughts." With rampant use of such
techniques, the flood of accusations of sex abuse based on "re-
covered' memories should be no surprise.
Although false memories are often created in the context of
therapeutic use of these techniques, law enforcement personnel
sometimes attempt to induce suspects to engage in repeated acts
of imagination of the criminal act as a means of inducing the
suspect to confess. 280 In part, such imagination exercises were
responsible for Paul Ingram's confessions.
c. Age Regression
Nicholas Spanos and his colleagues 21 have developed a pro-
cedure for demonstrating how not only false, but also impossible
memories may be created by the common therapeutic tech-
nique of "age regression." Subjects were misled to believe they
had been born in a hospital with swinging, colored mobiles over
the crib. Half were then hypnotized, age-regressed to the day
after birth and asked what they remembered. The other half
were led though a mnemonic procedure using age regression.
They were encouraged to imagine the infant experiences and
try to recreate them. The majority of subjects in each group
reported "memories" of the hospital, hospital personnel and/or
mobiles (95% of the imagination group and 70% of the hypno-
tized group).
ingings Lead to Illusory Recollections, 26 MEM. & COGN. 20 (1998); Lindsay et al.,
supra note 248, at 297.
278 Lorrus & KETCHAM, supra note 94; OFSHE & WAlTERS, supra note 94; Loftus,
supra note 94.
279 WENDY MALTZ, THE SEXUAL ABUSE HEALING JOURNEY 50 (1991).
280 Richard J. Ofshe, Inadvertent Hypnosis During Interrogation: False Confession
Due to Dissociative State: Mis-Identified Multiple Personality and the Satanic Cult Hypoth-
esis, 40 INT'L J. CLIN. Exp. HYPN. 125 (1992).
28, Nicholas P. Spanos et al., Creating False Memories of Infancy with Hypnotic and




a. Do Dreams Replay Actual Events?
Some time after his initial descriptions of the event, helicop-
ter pilot Meyer (the witness to the TWA 800 explosion) reported
to investigators that he finally "saw" what happened clearly in a
dream. At that point, his description included a previously un-
reported detail. He added the "memory" of having seen an im-
pact and explosion preceding the explosion of the plane itself.
His dream had shown him a vision of the event much more con-
sistent with the missile theory that had become widely publi-
cized after his initial reports. Like many people, he believed
that dreams could be exact reenactments of events we have par-
ticipated in or witnessed. Armed with that belief, he confidently
reported his dream version of the explosion as if it was a video
recording of the actual event itself.
Sigmund Freud popularized the notion that dreams are sym-
bolic representations of emotions, experiences and motives
outside conscious awareness (the "royal road" to the uncon-
scious). Thus, with proper interpretation, Freud argued,
dreams provide the key to the unconscious mind, including "re-
pressed" memories of actual events . 82
Modern dream research, however, has shown that the content
of dreams is less symbolic than Freud believed. Dreams tend to
reflect what is happening in daily life.283 If a person is thinking
about something during the day, there is a good chance the per-
son may dream of it at night. However, the dream is simply the
residue of the day's concerns and not an authentic memory of
actual events. As the source-monitoring framework suggests, be-
cause dreams are high in visual imagery and often in emotion
and other perceptual details, they can seem very real. This
sense of reality increases the chance of confusion with a real
memory.
b. Creation of False Memories Through Dream
Interpretation
Clearly, dreams do not replay events exactly as they hap-
pened. Nor does dream interpretation reliably identify actual
282 SIGMUND FREUD, THE INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS (1900).
283 D. F. HALL & R. L. VAN DE CASTLE, THE CONTENT ANALYSIS OF DREAMS
(1966); Tore A. Nielsen & Russell A. Powell, The Day-Residue and Dream-LagEffects:
A Literature Review and Limited Replication of Two Temporal Effects in Dream Forma-
tion, 2 DREAMING: J. Assoc. STUDY DREAMS 67 (1992).
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events. Instead, research has shown that the process of dream
interpretation can create false memories of events suggested by
the interpretations.
Guiliana Mazzoni and her colleagues"8 4 have shown that bo-
gus dream interpretations (i.e., the same interpretation given to
all subjects, regardless of the dream reported and with no rea-
son to believe the interpretation applied to each subject) can
lead to false memories for mildly traumatic suggested events.
Since Freud developed his theory of the unconscious and
characterized dreams as the "royal road" to the unconscious
mind, dream interpretation has been pervasive as a clinical tool,
including as a tool for recovery of "repressed" memories. How-
ever, dream interpretation can be a suggestive enterprise. As
Mazzoni's work clearly demonstrated, incorrect suggestions or
interpretations offered by therapists may lead to the develop-
ment of false memories and beliefs. Although in most legal
cases one cannot separate the influence of the many memory
recovery techniques (since they tend to be used conjointly),
dream interpretation has been among the techniques used in
most cases of recovered memories of sex abuse,285 many later
recanted.
h. Brain Damage and Source Amnesia
In some witnesses, susceptibility to source-monitoring errors is
increased by injury. Source-monitoring errors are common, for
example, among patients with some patterns of brain dam-
age.286 In the extreme, such a patient may be able to learn new
facts but be completely unable to remember the source of the
information, even immediately after it is encountered. Patients
without general amnesia who have damage to specific areas of
the frontal lobes tend to show greater susceptibility to source
amnesia.28 7 Such injuries can also be associated with extensive
284 Guiliana A. L. Mazzoni & Elizabeth F. Loftus, When Dreams Become Reality, 5
CONSCIOUS. & COGN. 442 (1996); Guiliana A. L. Mazzoni et al., Creating a New
Childhood: Changing Beliefs and Memories Through Dream Interpretation, 13 APPL.
COGN. PSYCHOL. 125 (1999); Giuliana A. L. Mazzoni et al., Dream Interpretation and
False Beliefs, 30 PROF. PSYCHOL. RES. & PRAc. 45 (1999).
285 RENEE FREDERICKSON, REPRESSED MEMORIES (1992); Loftus, supra note 94;
Lorrus & KETCHAM, supra note 94; Elizabeth F. Loftus, Creating False Memories,
277 Sci. AM. 70 (1997).
286 Daniel L. Schacter et al., Retrieval Without Recollection: An Experimental Analy-
sis of Source Amnesia, 23 J. VERB. LEARN. & VERB. BEHAV. 593 (1984).
287 Jeri S. Janowsky et al., Source Memory Impairment in Patients with Frontal Lobe
Lesions, 27 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 1043 (1989); SCHACTER, supra note 2.
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false recollections of events that did not occur or could not oc-
cur.288 Such imagined events are called confabulations. More
generally, right frontal lobe injuries appear to interfere with the
ability to distinguish actual memories from convictions that
something happened coming from another source, such as post-
event publicity, conversations with others, or inferences based
on other knowledge and expectations.8 9 In fact, some of the
most severe cases of confabulation come from patients with both
medial-temporal and frontal damage.29 °
Since head injuries and brain damage are common among
accident victims of all types, it is important to consider the po-
tential effects of any head injuries on memory, including suscep-
tibility to source-monitoring errors. Those with increased
susceptibility to source confusion will also be more susceptible
to the common errors of witness memory resulting from failures
of source monitoring.
i. Source Monitoring Problems in the Aging Witness
"When I was younger, I could remember anything, whether it had hap-
pened or not; but my faculties are decaying now, and soon it shall be
so I cannot remember any but the things that never happened."
Mark Twain
Ever the astute observer of human nature, Mark Twain no-
ticed in himself the now well-documented later-life difficulties in
source monitoring. Noted memory researcher Henry Roediger
recently summarized the documented vagaries of memory in old
age as follows: "Aging and Alzheimer's disease are a kind of double-
edged sword. You are less likely to remember things that really did hap-
pen to you but you're more likely to remember things that never happened
to you. "291 Perhaps already suffering the early devastations of
Alzheimer's, Ronald Reagan provided a dramatic example of
source dissociation on 60 Minutes during the 1980 presidential
campaign. Repeatedly telling the story of a World War II
bomber pilot who ordered his crew to bail out of his damaged
288 Brenda Milner et al., Frontal-Lobe Contribution to Recency Judgments, 29
NEUROPSYCHOLOGA 601 (1991).
289 SCHACTER, supra note 2.
290 Alan D. Baddeley & B. Wilson, Amnesia, Autobiographical Memry and Confab-
ulation, in AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY 225 (D.C. Rubin ed., 1986); John DeLuca
& Bruce J. Diamond, Aneurysm of the Anterior Communicating Artery: A Review of
Neuroanatomical and Neuropsychological Sequelae, 17 J. CLIN. & ExP. NEUROPSYCHOL.
100 (1995).
29-1 Henry Roediger, quoted in APA Monitor 38 (Oct. 2000).
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plane while he remained behind with a young belly gunner who
was too injured to jump, Reagan tearfully quoted the heroic pi-
lot who told his crew, "Never mind. We'll ride it down together."
Reagan forgot, as the press soon discovered, that his story actu-
ally came from a scene in the 1944 film A Wing and a Prayer.
While Reagan's error was doubtless much more noticeable than
most, it was typical of source-monitoring errors common among
the elderly, whether suffering from incipient Alzheimer's or not.
An understanding of the causes of age-related declines in
memory functioning has accelerated exponentially with the ad-
vent of modern brain-imaging technology.29 2 Research employ-
ing brain-imaging techniques has shown that normal aging is,
on the average, associated with neuropathology in medial-tem-
poral and frontal regions of the brain.293 Just as patients with
damage to these areas suffer from source-monitoring difficul-
ties, so do many older adults.
Older adults are less likely to remember contextual features
of events such as the speaker, the color or type style of stimuli,
the location of items, the origin of trivia facts, or whether some-
thing was seen in a video or a photograph.294 They are less able
to remember who told them something and less able to remem-
ber what information they are supposed to keep secret and what
they are not 95 They are somewhat less able to remember the
gist of an event and much less able to remember the specific
actions comprising the event.296
Older adults are particularly susceptible to false memories of
having seen something that is suggested by the features of what
they did see. They are more likely than younger adults to falsely
believe they have seen or heard words, for example, that are
semantically related to words they did see or hear or that rhyme
with those that were presented.
One study specifically addressed the susceptibility of older
adults to the "misinformation effect." Gillian Cohen and Dorothy
Faulkner 29 v showed a videotape of a kidnapping to older and
younger adults. Later, half of each group read a written sum-
292 SCHACTER, supra note 2, at 280.
293 Johnson & Raye, supra note 203, at 35.
214 See id. at 35; SCHACTER, supra note 2, at 280.
295 Id.
296 Robert J. Padgett & Hilary H. Ratner, Older and Younger Adults' Memory for
Structured and Unstructured Events, 13 Exp. AGING RES. 133 (1987).
297 Gillian Cohen & Dorothy Faulkner, Age Differences in Source Forgetting: Effects
on Reality Monitoring and on Eyewitness Testimony, 4 PSYCHOL. AGING 10 (1989).
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mary of the event that contained misinformation, and the other
half read an accurate summary. Older adults were more influ-
enced by the misinformation than younger adults, frequently
claiming that the misinformation had been part of the original
videotaped event.
Further, the reasons underlying these source confusions in-
clude both the manner of encoding and difficulties in retriev-
ing. Medial-temporal impairments appear to compromise the
richness with which event memories are bound to contextual
information during encoding, whereas frontal regions are more
important for later retrieval and source attributions. 298 Thus,
source-monitoring difficulties have been shown to be greater
among older adults with medial-temporal and/or frontal dys-
function with poorest performance among those who suffer
from both.2 9 Memory for sequence depends upon frontal re-
gions and accordingly becomes increasingly impaired with age.
Age appears to impair the richness of the images encoded at
the time something is witnessed. Thus, when asked to recount
recent episodes, older adults report less "visual reexperiencing" of
the event than younger adults. They tend to offer descriptions
that are relatively sketchy and incomplete while still feeling cer-
tain the event occurred.3 0 0 When retelling a story recently
heard for the first time, older adults recalled less of the story
than younger adults, told it less cohesively, and made more er-
rors in retelling the story.3 0 '
Common stereotypes suggest that the memories of elderly
eyewitnesses may be inaccurate and tend to obstruct police in-
vestigations.0 2 Jurors share these concerns.0 3 In fact, as com-
pared to younger adults, older adults provide less accurate and
298 Johnson et al. Source Monitoring, 114 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3 (1993); Morris Mos-
covitch, Confabulation, in MEMORY DISTORTIONS: How MINDS, BRAINS, AND SOCIE-
TIES RECONSTRUCT THE PAST 226 (Daniel L. Schacter, ed., 1995).
299 Elizabeth L. Glisky et al., Double Dissociation Between Item and Source Memory, 9
NEUROPSYCHOL. 229 (1995);Johnson & Raye, supra note 203, at 35; Mara Mather
et al., Stereotype Reliance in Source Monitoring: Age Differences and Neuropsychological
Test Correlates, 16 COGN. NEUROPSYCHOL. 437 (1999).
300 Shahin Hashroudi et al., Aging and Qualitative Characteristics of Memories for
Perceived and Imagined Complex Events, 5 PSYCHOL. & AGING 119 (1990).
301 Michael W. Pratt et al., Telling Tales: Aging, Working Memory, and the Narrative
Cohesion of Story Retellings, 25 DEV. PSYCHOL. 628 (1989).
302 A. Nicholas Groth, The Older Rape Victim and Her Assailant, 11 J. GERIATR.
PSYCHIATRY 203 (1978).
303 A. DANIEL YARMEY ET AL., ATTITUDES OFJURORS TowARD ELDERLY AND YOUNG
ADULTS (1981).
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less complete eyewitness reports, °4 make more errors, °5 and ex-
perience more difficulty in face recognition under some
circumstances. °6
Older adults are also more susceptible to the effects of distrac-
tion on memory apparently as a result of the effects of age-re-
lated declines in dopamine receptors on the functioning of
working memory. Thus, already impoverished encoding may be
further impaired by distractions or other failures of attention. 3
0 7
Schacter 31 8 suggested that this impoverished encoding may be
responsible for the age-related decline in the incidence of 'flash-
bulb" memories.3 0 9 He noted that a flashbulb memory, by defini-
tion, includes details about its source. Age-related declines in
richness of encoding provide less contextual information to
help the person retrieve the memory.
Advancing age may also alter the criteria by which we judge
the reality of a memory. For example, both older and younger
people judge the reality of a memory in part on the basis of how
clear it seems. As noted earlier, however, older adults tend to
encode less detail. Remembering fewer details of recent exper-
iences, the elderly may rely more on general feelings of familiar-
ity to judge whether something happened or not.31 0 Older
people give greater weight than younger people to the emo-
tional power of memories when judging their validity.3 1' Marcia
Johnson and Carol Raye312 suggest that older adults may require
less perceptual information to convince them a memory is real,
304 Judith A. List, Age and Schematic Differences in the Reliability of Eyewitness Testi-
mony, 22 DEV. PSYCHOL. 50 (1986); A. Daniel Yarmey, Age as a Factor in Eyewitness
Memory, in EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 142 (Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth F Loftus eds.,
1984); A. Daniel Yarmey, The Elderly Witness, in PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES IN EYEWIT-
NESS IDENTIFICATION 259 (S.L. Sporer et al. eds., 1996); A. Daniel Yarmey & Judy
Kent, Eyewitness Identification by Elderly and Young Adults, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
359 (1980).
305 LoFrus & DOYLE, supra note 11, at 75.
306 A. Daniel Yarmey, Adult Age and Gender Differences in Eyewitness Recall in Field
Settings, 23J. APPL. SoC. PSYCHOL. 1921 (1993); Yarmey, The Elderly Witness, supra
note 303, at 259.
307 SCHACTER, supra note 2, at 280.
308 See id.
309 Gillian Cohen et al., Flashbulb Memories in Older Adults, 9 PSYCHOL. AGING
454 (1994).
310 SCHACTER, supra note 2, at 280.
31, Hashtroudi et al., supra note 299, at 119; Marcia K. Johnson & Kristi S.
Multhaup, Emotion and Memory, in THE HANDBOOK OF EMOTION AND MEMORY: RE-
SEARCH AND THEORY 33 (S.A. Christianson ed., 1992).
312 Johnson & Raye, supra note 203, at 35.
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but may weight emotional detail more heavily because they find
the emotional aspects of events more interesting.
As we continue to learn more about the interrelationships of
memory and brain function, further age-related changes in the
functioning of memory will no doubt be identified. Meanwhile,
it is important to consider age when evaluating the potential for
post-event contamination of witness memory. Both the ex-
tremely young and the extremely old will tend to suffer greater
distortions from failures of source monitoring. In the elderly,
problems of source monitoring will vary greatly in magnitude as
a function of declines in brain function. Thus, while being
aware of the potential for impaired memory, one should not as-
sume all elderly will suffer such declines.
3. Minimizing Bias Through the "Cognitive Interview"
Investigative interviewing tends to be both leading and coer-
cive in nature (and sometimes hostile). For example, one analy-
sis of a large number of police interviews was found to contain,
on the average, only three open-ended questions. 13 Further, if
a witness began to give narrative responses, they were inter-
rupted within an average of 7.5 seconds. Generally, police and
investigators tend to ask too many closed-ended questions and
too few open-ended questions, to interrupt the witness in the
middle of narrative accounts, to ask questions in a predeter-
mined order without regard for continuity for the witness's re-
port, and to ask leading and suggestive questions.
Based on this and other analyses of police interviews, Ronald
Fisher and Ed Geiselman began to apply psychological knowl-
edge to develop interviewing techniques that would maximize
both the quantity and quality (accuracy) of witness reports.3"4
Among their recommendations are the following:
First, the interviewer must try to encourage the witness to
have the motivation to report what (s)he knows and give the
witness the opportunity to tell everything (s)he knows. To do
this, the investigator should develop rapport with witnesses and
allow them to talk openly and freely without interruptions.
Closed-ended questions should be kept to a minimum. Instead,
open-ended and non-suggestive questions should be used, and
313 Ronald P. Fisher et al., Critical Analysis of Police Interview Techniques, 15 J.
POLICE SCI. (Admin. 17) (1987).
314 FISHER & GEISELMAN, supra note 191.
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the witness should be allowed plenty of time to complete an-
swers without interruption.
Second, the cognitive interview is designed to incorporate
principles of memory and retrieval that will help the witness re-
member without distorting the memories in the process. To fa-
cilitate retrieval of difficult or traumatic memories, the
interviewers should conduct the interview at a slow pace and ask
few, primarily open-ended, questions.
When the witness has difficulty remembering a particular de-
tail, a trained cognitive interviewer will be able to provide non-
distorting memory aids. These include reminding the witness of
other features of the event known to be accurate or encouraging
the person to begin to recall through many different retrieval
pathways (or starting points). A trained cognitive interviewer
will also attempt to understand the witness and how that witness
thinks about the event so that (s)he will be able to ask questions
that will be most helpful to the specific witness. Finally, the in-
terviewer will make use of other means of expressing memories,
such as sketching figures or scenes.
The cognitive interview has been tested in many laboratories
against more traditional interviews, and has elicited between
35% and 75% more information without increasing incorrect
responses. 5 Two field studies with real witnesses mirrored
those of the laboratory studies with 55% and 35% increases in
the amount recalled. 316
The success of the cognitive interview is encouraging. How-
ever, it remains to induce police and other investigators, as well
as therapists and others who interview witnesses, to conform to
similar practices.
VIII. HOW CAN THE MEMORY EXPERT HELP?
Memory experts can be of assistance to attorneys either as ex-
pert witnesses to explain basic memory processes and the cir-
cumstances under which memory tends to fail to the jury, as
damage experts, or as consultants to help the attorney prepare
for trial.
315 Ronald Fisher & M.L. McCauley, Information Retrieval: Interviewing Witnesses,
in PSYCHOLOGY & POLICING 81 (N. Brewer & C. Wilson eds., 1995). G. Kohnken
et al., The Cognitive Interview: A Meta-Analysis, 5 PSYCHOL., CRIME & L. 3 (1999).
316 Roy P. Fisher et al., Field Test of the Cognitive Interview: Enhancing the Recollec-
tion of Actual Victims and Witnesses of Crime, 74 J. APPL. PSYCHOL. 722 (1989); R.
George & B.R. Clifford, Making the Most of Witnesses, 8 POLICING 185 (1992).
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A. TESTIMONY AS AN EXPERT WITNESS
1. To Provide Context For Jury Evaluation of Witness Accuracy
The most common use of memory experts has been to pro-
vide understanding to the jury of how memory works and how
and under what circumstances it might fail. Most frequently,
this has occurred when an eyewitness has identified a suspect as
the perpetrator of a crime. The memory expert is asked to ex-
plain to the jury: (a) that eyewitness testimony is less reliable (in
general) than jurors tend to assume; and (b) the nature of wit-
ness, event or post event factors that tend to be associated with
more or less accurate memory.317
2. To Provide Context For Jury Understanding of Traumatic
Failures of Memory
Memory experts have also been called to provide understand-
ing of trauma-induced failures of memory in order to provide
the context for evaluation of a victim's testimony. For example,
testimony regarding "rape trauma syndrome'818 might be offered
to explain the victim's failure to remember details of the event
or to explain inconsistencies in her memory. The testimony is
offered to explain to the jury that some failures in memory or
inconsistencies do not reflect general inaccuracy in the rest of
the reported memories. Long-term memory deficits in victims
of prolonged stress, such as in victims of child sex abuse or in
war veterans, may also be addressed and explained to support
claims of liability.
3. To Support or Question Claims for Damages
Memory experts may be of use to provide expert testimony
either in support of claims of damages or to question them.
a. To Support Claims for Damage to Memory
Modern neuroscience has progressed exponentially in under-
standing the physiological bases of memory. Each day, more is
learned about specific brain processes and structures involved in
317 For a review of the nature of expert testimony on eyewitness issues, and the
evidence supporting its effectiveness in causing the jury to more accurately differ-
entiate between accurate and inaccurate witnesses, see Michael R. Leippe, The
Case for Expert Testimony About Eyewitness Memory, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL. & L. 909
(1995).
318 P.A. Frazier & E. Borgida, Rape Trauma Syndrome: A Review of Case Law and
Psychological Research, 16 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 293 (1992).
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and necessary for memory processes. In part, this understand-
ing includes: (1) how psychological trauma can temporarily or
permanently affect the structure and functioning of the brain
and (2) how physical damage to the brain affects memory.
1. Long Term Effects of Psychological Trauma and Stress on Brain
and Memory
Severe trauma and/or prolonged stress has recently been
shown to permanently alter brain structure and function. For
example, recent imaging studies have shown deficits in hippo-
campal volume both in subjects with PTSD (which would be ex-
pected in most victims of aviation disasters) and in women
exposed to abuse in childhood. Others have shown deficits in
other areas of the brain (for example, in cortical functioning).
These areas of the brain are crucial to memory processes. Even
long-term stress in the absence of trauma can compromise
memory functioning.319
Thus, memory experts may be of assistance through testimony
regarding the damage to memory that can result from psycho-
logical trauma, explaining both the potential extent of damage
to memory and the effects of trauma on the brain that underlie
declines in memory functioning.
2. Long-Term Effects of Brain Injury on Memory
Both medical/biological and psychological investigators have
begun to provide great understanding of the relationship be-
tween the brain and memory.3 20 Thus, where the nature of
brain damage can be specifically established, memory (or gener-
ally, neuroscience) experts can provide testimony regarding the
impact of specific brain damage on memory as well as other cog-
nitive functions.
Interestingly, although such testimony tends to be offered
more frequently in support of claims of damage in cognitive
functioning, it can also be useful to dispute such claims when
the nature of the damage claims are inconsistent with the nature
of the brain damage. In other words, depending upon the pre-
cise injuries and claims involved, modern knowledge of the rela-
tionship of brain injury to cognitive dysfunction can aid in the
detection of false damage claims.
319 SUSANJ. BRADLEY, AFFECT REGULATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF PSYCHOPA-
THOLOGY 36 (2000); SCHACTER, supra note 2, at 8.
320 SCHACTER, supra note 2; Schacter, supra note 2, at 182.
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b. To Question Claims for Other Damages
"Since my past only truly exists in the present and since my present
is always in motion, my past itself changes too-actually changes-
while the illusion created is that it stays fixed. 2l
Plaintiffs and those close to them must provide accounts of
the changes in physical and mental functioning, work, family re-
lationships and lifestyle in support of their damage claims.
Memory experts may be of use either to testify regarding com-
mon distortions in reports of behavior changes and functioning
or to help the attorney identify and understand this potential.
The very nature of autobiographical reports of change re-
quires both accurate memory for the past and accurate under-
standing of the present. In fact, both are problematic.
Memory of the past is often inaccurate. As discussed previ-
ously in the sections on constructive and reconstructive memory
processes, memory for the past can be distorted, among other
things, by current motivations and beliefs. In fact, both memory
for the past and perceptions of the present are distorted by
many factors, including self-serving motivations. Anthony G.
Greenwald, 322 in an article entitled "The Totalitarian Ego:
Fabrication and Revision of Personal History, "argued that personal
history, similar to the revisionist historical practices of totalitar-
ian regimes, is continually revised in light of current motiva-
tions. Subsequent research has clearly demonstrated that
current motivations can bias autobiographical memory.323 The
motivations activated by a lawsuit and desire to prove damages
clearly provide a significant source of potential distortion.
However, other factors present for most plaintiffs may simi-
larly distort memory for changes in behavior and functioning.
For example, causal schemas, referring to implicit theories about
what causes what, have been shown to distort autobiographical
memory.324 If a plaintiff or those close to him or her, including
treating experts, believe that an injury of the sort sustained by the
plaintiff is likely to cause effects such as changed personality,
loss of memory, changes in sexual functioning, and so on, such
321 B.J. Mandel, The Past in Autobiography, 64 SOUNDINGS 75, 77 (1981).
322 Anthony G. Greenwald, The Totalitarian Ego: Fabrication and Revision of Per-
sonal History, 35 AM. PSYCHOL. 603 (1980).
323 KUNDA, supra note 53, at 342; Rasyid Sanitioso et al., Motivated Recruitment of
Autobiographical Memories, 57J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCHOL. 539 (1990).
324 Michael Ross & Anne E. Wilson, Constructing and Appraising Past Selves, in
MEMORY, BRAIN, AND BELIEF 231 (Daniel L. Schacter & Elaine Scarry eds., 2000).
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a belief will tend to cause memories of the plaintiff's condition
or behavior to be distorted to indicate better functioning than
actual before the injury and worse functioning than actual after
the injury. The witness may be an "honest liar" in this respect, as
people are generally subject to the distorting effects of expecta-
tions based on causal schemas and honestly believe in the
changes they perceive. 25
Reports of patterns of behavior, as opposed to specific inci-
dents, are also subject to error. Michael Ross, a noted expert on
autobiographical memory, illustrated this problem in the
description of his attempt to respond to a survey on health and
lifestyle. Just as plaintiffs are often asked these types of ques-
tions, he was asked how many hours per week, on average, he
had spent on various activities and how frequently he had eaten
various foods in the past year and during different preceding
periods of his life. He was also asked to report current as op-
posed to previous personal characteristics such as weight.
Noting that he found these questions very difficult to answer,
RoSS3 26 went on to address the reasons for his difficulty. He
pointed to the fact that such questions cannot be answered by
simple retrieval of stored memories. Few people have stored the
frequencies with which they engage in activities or eat particular
foods. Such answers have to be constructed from other memories
that can be brought to mind in combination with attempts to some-
how mathematically average them across time.
Also, consistent with research on the "retrospective bias," Ross
noticed that his memory and certainly his reports were colored
by the desire to report what he knew he should have been do-
ing. His answers were "constructions, reflecting his beliefs, prefer-
ences, and guesses, as well as his retrieval of stored memories. '127
As Ross' problem answering his lifestyle questionnaire illus-
trates, it is generally very difficult for people to accurately report
on patterns of behavior, whether past or present. This problem
commonly plagues research on medical issues regarding diet,
lifestyle, and health and plaintiff reports of damage alike.
325 Sissela Bok, Autobiography as Moral Battleground, in MEMORY, BRAIN, AND BE-
LIEF 307 (Daniel L. Schacter & Elaine Scarry eds., 2000); Eakin, supra note 4, at
291; DAVID MIDDLETON & DEREK EDWARDS, COLLECTIVE REMEMBERING (1990);
Ross & Wilson, supra note 323, at 231; RUBIN, supra note 157.





1. Providing Understanding of Potential for Errors of Memory!
Perception
Memory experts are sometimes hired to explain the circum-
stances under which memory will tend to be inaccurate in order
to help the attorney evaluate the testimony of witnesses for his
or her case. This assistance may help the attorney to identify
witnesses who may be partially or wholly inaccurate about what
they remember. The attorney may then decide whether to re-
tain a memory expert to testify to the jury regarding the poten-
tial pitfalls in memory.
2. Preparation for Cross Examination of Witnesses
Finally, once potentially inaccurate witnesses are identified,
the attorney may retain a memory expert to assist with the prep-
aration of cross-examination of those witnesses. A number of
points regarding the potential for inaccuracy may be made
through cross-examination without the necessity of expert testi-
mony. The memory expert might write a script for cross-exami-
nation in order to express the potential for distortion clearly.
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